Gricean Belief Change
Authors:Delgrande, James P
Nayak, Abhaya C
Pagnucco, Maurice
Source:Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 79(1), 97-113. 17 p. February 2005.
Document Type:Journal Article
Subjects:BELIEF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
LOGIC
REVISION
SEMANTICS
Persons as Subjects:GRICE, H PAUL
Abstract:One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information.
----
The idea:
Carnap seems to suggest that if we change our 'minds', we change the linguistic framework.
Grice seems more consistent with 'ordinary usage' here?
Only if we change our minds about meanings.
ReplyDeleteWe don't often suppose that we can change the meanings of "ordinary language".
RBJ