tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6991509368635056612024-03-12T21:29:44.670-07:00The City of Eternal TruthOr Beyond The Pirot Talk;
Being an allegory on Grice and Carnap.Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.comBlogger86125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-48849851226099303162020-02-14T12:50:00.001-08:002020-02-14T12:50:10.073-08:00Hacker on Carnap and Grice *contra* Quine on 'analytic' P. M. S. Hacker, Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's, remarks:<br />
<br />
"Carnap, unsurprisingly, is incredulous."<br />
<br />
"Carnap's account of analyticity, he remonstrates, is intended as an *explication* of the <i>philosophical</i> concept of analyticity, as applied to an ordinary language such as English, which is indeed imprecise.<br />
<br />
"Expressions in ordinary language do <i>not </i>have sharply defined meanings."<br />
<br />
"Quine argues that he did not know whether<br />
<br />
'Everything green is extended'<br />
<br />
is analytic or not."<br />
<br />"Quine attributes his uncertainty to the unclarity of the term ‘analytic’ ("Two dogmas of empiricism," p. 32)."<br />
<br />
"Carnap objects that the unclarity is due *not* to the term ‘analytic’, but to the fact that it is unclear, in an ordinary language such as English, whether the ‘green’ is applicable to a single spatio-temporal point, where a point is construed as lacking extension."<br />
<br />
"An ordinary language such as English does not *talk* of points thus construed."<br />
<br />
"Grice and Strawson (in their infamous, "In defence of a dogma") strengthen Carnap’s point.<br />
<br />
"Grice and Strawson note that the *same* uncertainty attaches to the question of whether<br />
<br />
'Everything green is extended'<br />
<br />
is merely *true* -- never mind 'logically true.'"<br />
<br />
"Quine could *hardly* complain, Grice and Strawson argue, that, even for Quine, ‘true’ is irremediably unclear."<br />
<br />
"In a constructed language, as Carnap has it, one lays down meaning postulates in order to ensure clarity."<br />
<br />
"Hence, IF it is a meaning postulate that<br />
<br />
‘G’ (‘green’)<br />
<br />
IS inapplicable to spatio-temporal points,<br />
<br />
‘(x) (Ux z> ~ Gx)’<br />
<br />
is analytic in L.<br />
<br />And so is<br />
<br />
‘(x) (Gx z> Ex)’<br />
<br />
(where ‘U’ signifies ‘unextended’ and ‘E’ ‘extended’).<br />
<br />
"Analytic in L," Carnap argues, denotes a sentences whose truth depends on its meaning alone, and is thus independent of the contingency of facts, or ‘true in virtue of meaning’.<br />
<br />
"Of course, it does not follow that such a statements cannot be revoked."<br />
<br />
"One same entence can be analytic in one system, and synthetic in another."<br />
<br />
"An analytic truth is unrevisable only that it remains 'analytically true' as long as the language rules, or indeed, postulates, are not changed."<br />
<br />
"Carnap might have added that it is anything but obvious what it would be to *revise* one’s belief that every bachelor is unmarried, without changing the use, or meaning, if you prefer, of the expression!"<br />
<br />
"The attribution of truth to a 'synthetic' sentence may change in the light of experience, even though the logical structure of the language does not change."<br />
<br />
"The analytic/synthetic distinction may be drawn always and only with respect to a language system, i.e., a language organised according to explicitly formulated rules or postulates, not with respect to a historically given natural language [such as English]’<br />
-- Carnap, ‘Quine on Analyticity’, in "Dear Carnap, Dear Van."Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-47135716427468805032020-02-14T12:41:00.002-08:002020-02-14T12:41:22.954-08:00Rudolf Carnap and H. P. GriceLuigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-50990322451219861262020-02-14T12:21:00.000-08:002020-02-14T12:41:35.686-08:00P. M. S. Hacker on Rudolf Carnap and H. P. Grice"Carnap, unsurprisingly, was incredulous."<br />
<br />
"Carnap's account of analyticity, he remonstrates, is intended as an *explication* of the philosophical concept of analyticity
as applied to an ordinary language such as English, which is indeed imprecise, since expressions in
ordinary language do not have sharply defined meanings."<br />
<br />
"Quine argues that
he did not know whether ‘Everything green is extended’ is analytic or not, and he
attributed his uncertainty to the unclarity of the term ‘analytic’ (TDE 32)."<br />
<br />
"Carnap
objects that the unclarity is due *not* to the term ‘analytic’, but to the fact that
it is unclear in an ordinary language such as English whether the term ‘green’ is applicable to a single
spatio-temporal point, where a point is construed as lacking extension, since ordinary language does not talk of points thus construed."<br />
<br />
"Grice and Strawson strengthen Carnap’s point in noting that the same uncertainty attaches to the question of
whether it is true that everything green is extended - and Quine could hardly
complain that the term ‘true’ is irremediably unclear."<br />
<br />
"In a constructed language,
one lays down meaning postulates in order to ensure clarity."<br />
<br />
"Hence, if it is a
meaning postulate that ‘G’ (‘green’) is inapplicable to spatio-temporal points, ‘(x) (Ux z> ~ Gx)’ is analytic in L, and so is ‘(x) (Gx z> Ex)’ (where ‘U’ signifies
‘unextended’ and ‘E’ ‘extended’).<br />
<br />
"Analytic in L," Carnap argues, signifies sentences whose truth depends on their meanings alone, and is thus independent of
the contingency of facts, or ‘true in virtue of meanings’.<br />
<br />
"Of course, it does not
follow that such statements cannot be revoked."<br />
<br />
"The same sentence can be analytic
in one system and synthetic in another."<br />
<br />
"An analytic truth is unrevisable only in the
sense that it remains analytically true as long as the language rules are not changed."<br />
<br />
"Carnap might have added that it is anything but obvious what it would be to revise one’s belief that every bachelor is unmarried, without changing the use (or meaning) of the expression."<br />
<br />
"The attribution of truth to synthetic sentences may be changed
in the light of experience, even though the logical structure of the language does
not change."<br />
<br />
"The analytic/synthetic distinction can be drawn always and only with
respect to a language system, i.e. a language organised according to explicitly
formulated rules, not with respect to a historically given natural language [such as English]’<br />
-- Carnap,
‘Quine on Analyticity’, in "Dear Carnap, Dear Van."Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-87056554462962851092020-02-14T12:15:00.002-08:002020-02-14T12:15:22.925-08:00P. M. S. Hacker on Rudolf Carnap and H. P. Grice"Carnap, unsurprisingly, was incredulous. His account of analyticity, he remonstrated, was intended as an explication of the philosophical concept of analyticty
as applied to ordinary language, which is indeed impredse, since expressions in
ordinary language do not have sharply defined meanings. Quine had argued that
he did not know whether ‘Everything green is extended’ is analytic or not, and he
attributed his uncertainty to the unclarity of the term ‘analytic’ (TDE 32). Carnap
objected that the unclarity was due not to the term ‘analytic’, but to the fact that
it is unclear in ordinary language whether the term ‘green’ is applicable to a single
spatio-temporal point, where a point is construed as lacking extension, since ordinary language does not talk of points thus construed. (Grice and Strawson strengthened Carnap’s point in noting that the same uncertainty attaches to the question of
whether it is true that everything green is extended - and Quine could hardly
complain that the term ‘true’ is irremediably unclear.) In a constructed language,
one lays down meaning postulates in order to ensure clarity. Hence, if it is a
meaning postulate that ‘G’ (‘green’) is inapplicable to spatio-temporal points, then
‘(x) (Ux z> ~ Gx)’ is analytic in L, and so is ‘(x) (Gx z> Ex)’ (where ‘U’ signifies
‘unextended’ and ‘E’ ‘extended’). ‘Analytic in L’, Carnap argued, signifies sentences whose truth depends on their meanings alone, and is thus independent of
the contingency of facts, or ‘true in virtue of meanings’. Of course, it does not
follow that such statements cannot be revoked; the same sentence can be analytic
in one system and synthetic in another. An analytic truth is unrevisable only in the
sense that it remains analytically true as long as the language rules are not changed.
(He might have added that it is anything but obvious what it would be to revise
fine’s belief that bachelors are unmarried, without changing the use (or meaning)
c of the expression.) The attribution of truth to synthetic sentences may be changed
in the light of experience, even though the logical structure of the language does
not change. ‘The analytic/synthetic distinction can be drawn always and only with
respect to a language system, i.e. a language organised according to explicitly
formulated rules, not with respect to a historically given natural language’ (Carnap,
‘Quine on Analytidty’, in Dear Camap, Dear Van, pp. 427-32)."Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-52326960073443236372018-08-08T08:25:00.002-07:002018-08-08T08:25:43.481-07:00Grice v. Carnap on what philosophy isn'tHere's a draft for "The City" which dates back a while. I stumbled across it and made a pass at bringing it to a close.<br />
<br />
In (once) recent postings to the Grice club Speranza and I have touched anew a topic on which we have not wholly agreed in the past, perhaps in the manner in which Grice and Carnap might have differed.<br />
<br />
At its most stark there is a radical difference between Carnap and Grice on the scope and nature of philosophy.<br />
<br />
For Carnap philosophy is confined to a priori reasoning yielding analytic truths expressing necessary propositions, which he would rather have in some formal language by way of escaping the inescapable ambiguity and logical incoherence of natural languages.<br />
<br />
Our knowledge of natural languages falls under Hume's "matters of fact", hence a posteriori, synthetic and contingent.<br />
For Carnap the study of such things, <i>a posteriori</i> knowledge, is, by definition empirical science, and for this he is called scientistic.<br />
Well perhaps not just for that. Its not <i>just</i> that he <i>calls</i> it science, but also that the "unity of science" demands that these phenomena be considered continuous with, and addressed by the same methods, as the rest of science.<br />
<br />
I have tended to talk in a similar manner, at least some of the way.<br />
So I talk about the study of natural languages as belonging to empirical science, even though I don't myself subscribe to the "unity" thesis.<br />
(and I might add, that Carnap's pluralism is a reason to wonder how substantial the "unity of science" was for him).<br />
Against this, Speranza, who knows more about natural language, philosophy of language, ordinary language philosophy and the science of linguistics (none of these to be confused) objects, quite rightly.<br />
<br />
There are a few points here on which I will gently criticise Carnap (where others would do so enthusiastically).<br />
A lot of it is "mere" terminology, some of it is demarcation, which is also terminology.<br />
Thus, in my case if not in Carnap's, its little more than inept terminology to talk of all <i>a posteriori</i> knowledge as belonging to science, and it's worth pleading that if that's as far as it goes, then it doesn't really amount to Grice's <i>devil</i> of scientism.<br />
On the other hand, insisting as Carnap did (though he did soften) that philosophy is confined to analytic pronouncements, is the kind of terminological eccentricity which appears as a controversial demarcation, and an intolerant ejection from the status of philosophy of much that philosophers have done.<br />
<br />
The suggestion of dogmatism may be contested, for Carnap was more conspicuously pluralistic than he was an advocate of the unity of science, and these two are in tension.<br />
The unity of science is most forcefully presented as a doctrine about language, as some kind of reductionism of the whole of language to one special language.<br />
But Carnap's pluralism rejects the thesis that any language has a special status. He wants phenomenalistic, physicalistic and "theoretical" language all to be equally acceptable, and expected each science to have its own special language.<br />
<br />
Grice has an incompatible principle which also looks as if it might be one of those terminological/demarcation things.<br />
It might <i>just</i> be methodological, that all philosophical problems should be addressed in the first instance by a careful study of the relevant ordinary language, but it is hard not to see this as a refusal to accept as philosophy those kinds of problem for which ordinary language can provide no illumination, and thus as a matter of demarcation.<br />
Could Grice really have believed that there are no philosophical problems for which a preliminary study of ordinary language is not valuable, or even relevant, and which his doctrine would therefore be excluding from philosophy?<br />
<br />
By way of a speculative gesture I'm going to suggest a concession to which I think Carnap might possibly have been amenable, and a complementary concession which, if extracted from Grice, might draw the teeth from this conflict.<br />
<br />
It's principally about adjustments to terminology and demarcation.<br />
The demarcation issue concerns the respective scopes of philosophy and science, and the point to press upon Carnap is that the real world is rather messier than his principled division of academic disciplines along lines inspired by Hume's fork (but not actually in conformance with Hume's conception of philosophy). Not all scientists are concerned with empirical matters, there is such a thing, for example, as "theoretical physics", which is an entirely mathematical discipline concerned with the mathematical consequences of scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity, rather than with the empirical, experimental confirmation or falsification of scientific theories.<br />
<br />
Likewise there always have been, and possibly always will be, kinds of philosophising which involve reasoning <i>a posteriori</i> to conclusions which are not purely logical, but which for one reason or another cannot be addressed by the methods of empirical science, or which will only become science after some kind of pre-scientific investigation (perhaps "conceptual elucidation") has rendered them fit for scientific investigation.<br />
<br />
The concession for Carnap is to give up his simplistic conception of the words "science" and "philosophy", and allow that these be decoupled from the rigid association which he preferred between these disciplines and the search for synthetic and analytic truth respectively.<br />
<br />
Carnap was capable of making this kind of terminological adjustment, bowing thus to necessity. He did in fact concede on the scope of philosophy, and he also gave signs of conceding on the usage of the term "logical truth".<br />
Certainly he did shift his usage of the technical term L-truth which for many years stood for "logical-truth" in the broad sense in which for Carnap took to be the same as analyticity. In the transition from the first edition of Meaning and Necessity and the paper on "Meaning Postulates" which was to be included as an appendix in the second edition, he shifts to using the term "L-truth" for a narrow conception of logical truth and introduces the term "A-truth" for analyticity and the broad conception.<br />
<br />
There is no sign that he is personally inclined to take the narrow view, but by this time it perhaps seems a <i>fait accompli</i>, that the community now takes the narrow view (without in general recognising that this is mere terminology).<br />
<br />
Turning back to Grice, the concession we need is that, even if a study of the relevant ordinary language were allowed as an important preliminary (to philosophical insight), maybe sometimes there isn't any. Surely there may be recondite and esoteric corners of mathematics or physics so far removed from everyday life that terminological issues can only be progressed through a detailed analysis of the scientific origins of the particular esoteric language. Must these corners of science be devoid of philosophy?<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Roger Bishop Joneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05737621401913015777noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-76164985266865802962018-08-07T08:32:00.002-07:002018-08-07T08:32:46.598-07:00Cognitive ArchitectureFollowing a slow moving theme on which I posted here some 18 months ago, I wanted to write something about a kind of "cognitive architecture" in which I am now engaged, and I thought it might be suitable material for this blog.<br />
<br />
Eternal truths, if such there be, are of course, once established, a kind of <i>knowledge</i>, and knowledge is <i>the stuff</i> of cognition. So, the place where one might hope to find eternal truths could be some ideally conceived cognitive system. A philosophical exposition of what eternal truth might be, how and where we might find it, and how it might be brought to bear in improving our mundane existence might be thought of as a kind of <i>cognitive architecture</i>, and also as a special species of philosophy, which I now like to call <i>synthetic</i> philosophy.<br />
<br />
Having thus made a pass at arguing the relevance of this topic to <i>the city of eternal truth</i>, I will try to elucidate more carefully the kind of cognitive architecture which I think might serve the purpose. I'm going to do this by throwing a bunch of adjectives at it, and explaining how these are to be taken, so that we arrive at a more definite conception.<br />
<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li><b>architecture</b> - I think of this as the highest levels in the design of some system, concerned with the system as a whole, the principal subsystems and how these fit together, and all the considerations which might precede these matters in the development of the system, particularly, in the case of cognitive systems, a whole raft of considerations which are recognisably philosophical.</li>
<li><b>cognitive</b> - this tells us what the system is intended to do, viz. to acquire, hold, reason with and apply <i>knowledge</i>.</li>
<li><b>synthetic </b>- there are two distinct ways in which the proposed architecture should be considered <i>synthetic</i>. The first is that the architecture is not intended to be descriptive of any existing cognitive system, but rather prescriptive of various possibilities, which we offer for consideration as models for a future cognitive system which we might strive to realise. The second is that the system is intended to be in part manufactured, and ultimately, overwhelmingly manufactured. A third sense is that the aspects of the architecture which may be regarded as philosophical in character (e.g. the account of what in the system counts as knowledge) will be examples of this kind of philosophy which I am calling <i>synthetic</i> philosophy (a term I will elaborate on in due course).</li>
<li><b>hybrid</b> - the cognitive systems for which an architecture is offered are intended to be <i>hybrid</i>, a mix of organic and inorganic constituents. Initially the <i>intelligence</i> will be supplied by organic components (human brains), but eventually some inorganic subsystems will deserve to be considered intelligent as well.</li>
<li><b>cosmic - </b>If we first consider our globally networked computing machinery, together with all the human brains which in one way or another connect into that network, as being a computational system slowly morphing into a cognitive system, and think forward to a period between one million and one billion years in the future, when the physical reach of humanity and our progeny extends spatially over a significant part of our galaxy, then we have the context at which the proposed cognitive architecture is aimed. It is nevertheless intended to be immediately applicable, and hence an architecture for the transition from our present global system to a future cosmic system. The hybrid/cosmological pair are also intended to help de-anthropomorphise our conception of cognition, we are not concerned merely with human cognition, but with cognition in very different systems.</li>
</ul>
That's too many adjectives to throw into a name, so I'll stick with <i>cosmic cognitive architecture</i> or just cognitive architecture, and you may understand that, unless the context dictates otherwise, I mean the whole kit and kaboodal.<br />
<br />
The first port of call in the exposition of this kind of cognitive architecture is philosophical, it is the articulation of a systematic philosophy in terms of which the cognitive system may be understood, and which will also form bedrock in the "belief system" of this cosmic cognitive system. Since this most closely relates to the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, I will talk about it at the <a href="https://carnapcorner.blogspot.com/">Carnap Corner Blog</a>.Roger Bishop Joneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05737621401913015777noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-84585032174477565042017-02-12T18:09:00.001-08:002017-02-12T18:17:23.549-08:00To mock a mockinbird: Carnap, Grice, and SmullyanSperanza<br />
<br />
Smullyan shared some passions with Carnap and Grice, if you can believe it.<br />
<br />
Smullyan, the author of a very influential, "First-Order Logic" believed, well, in the power of first-order logic.<br />
<br />
His education was peripatetic. An MA followed by a PhD from Princeton on "Theory of Formal Systems."<br />
<br />
His main contribution was puzzling: it was his puzzles.<br />
<br />
He was an admirer of Goedel, and his list of favourite authors should please both a Carnapian and a Griceian: Dodgson (aka Lewis Carroll), Boole, Cantor, and a few others!<br />
<br />
And he had a sense of humour.<br />
<br />
When Grice left Oxford, he had to give some reason. He said he moved because he was looking for the assistance of logicians and he couldn't find ONE in Oxford!<br />
<br />
This was a bit hyperbolic. He, for one, was one (Strawson credits him in "Introduction to Logical Theory" as the tutor "from whom I have never ceased to learn about logic"). In "Vacuous Names," Grice's convoluted exposition of a System to allow for names like "Marmaduke Bloggs," who refers the hero who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees ("the invention of journalists, as it happened," Grice adds), there is a passing reference to Smullyan. With Myro, and others, Smullyan provided Grice with a way to provide a neat exposition of first order predicate logic -- of which Smullyan was an expert.<br />
<br />
The fact that both played the piano helped!Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-75577644535664969732017-02-11T16:01:00.001-08:002017-02-11T16:01:12.810-08:00Reason and Reasoning -- and Grice's Bootstrap-- as it combines with Carnapian tolerance!<br />
<br />
Speranza<br />
<br />
R. B. Jones has shared with us (that's R. B. Jones and Speranza -- and all the other followers of the yellow brick road to the City of the Eternal Truth) some comments under "Deep Learning Eternal Truth".<br />
<br />
Jones notes:<br />
<br />
"I thought it might be of some interest to the followers of this blog (both of them) for me to say a few words connecting my present pre-occupations with the Carnap-flavour of the City of Eternal Truth, and this is it."<br />
<br />
Good. I love 'pre-occupations'. They contrast of course, Carnapian pre-occupations, with Griceian post-occupations. Which reminds me of the Roman occupation, as satirised by Sellars and Yeatman in "1066 and all that" -- nice figure!<br />
<br />
Jones goes on<br />
<br />
"I spent a while a few years ago failing to complete a short book-shaped work entitled "Positive Philosophy and The Automation of Reason". "<br />
<br />
Lovely title. Jones of course is aware of Comte's positivism, and the new logical positivism. He prefers the mere 'positive', as applied to 'philosophy'. "The automation of reason" is a genial turn of phrase.<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"It ran into the sand in a very incomplete state at about 130 pages, and though I still felt positive about the enterprise I couldn't find the way to make it move again."<br />
<br />
The keyword, though, remains, 'automation of reason', and we should use that phrase more frequently!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"Of course (!) "reason" is the key weapon we have in the search for eternal truth."<br />
<br />
While Grice uses 'eternal' truth -- as applied to the city thereof -- the phrase also occurs in Quine. I think it's ultimately 'metaphorical', "eternal" -- Grice's 'timeless' won't do here either.<br />
<br />
i. Either it will rain or it won't.<br />
<br />
is possibly NOT a 'so-called' "eternal" truth, in that in trivalent logics, is not even tautologous!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"For a man of logical bent, surely the truths which most deserve that plaudit are the logical truths (though what are they?)."<br />
<br />
Indeed, if 'rational' and 'logical' are interchangeable, there's also the possibility to play with 'analytic a priori' truths, as Ayer (or Freddie to his friends) calls them in his Gollancz book -- a classic of logical positivism. Ayer however notes that 'a priori' is otiose, and 'analytic truth' will just do.<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"Notwithstanding the foundering of that project, it remains my life's pre-occupation to find some way of progressing that topic, or simply of articulating the ideas on it which jostle for attention in my head. A few months ago I made a fresh start at that, shifting the context in which to progress the ideas. The whole thing has always been for me a fence-sitting between the fields of philosophy and information systems engineering."<br />
<br />
Beautiful. But cfr. Cole Porter, "Don't fence me in"!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"To automate reason is to develop software, and maybe, as is happening right now, to re-architect the hardware we use to execute the software (new hardware architectures for "Deep Learning", beyond Von Neumann). "<br />
<br />
Hence the title of his post, with "deep learning" as yet another keyword.<br />
<br />
Jones:<br /><br />"An architecture for reason and its application, depends on philosophical foundations. The articulation of appropriate such foundations is an essential and should be a prominent feature of any such architecture. "<br />
<br />
Hence the first part of his conjunctive title, "Positive philosophy AND the automation of reason". The implicature being that only positive philosophy can provide such a foundation. This reminds me of Husserl who said that he dreamed of a philosophy without foundations!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"On the other hand, even if the primary purpose is philosophical, the architectural application is a valuable way of testing the practical significance of various issues at stake. One problem with a purely philosophical approach is the enormous difficulty in swimming against the tide of contemporary philosophical opinion, which in this sphere is unduly negative about the status of formal deductive systems as a result, for example, of the Godel's incompleteness results, and of Quine's skepticism about semantics and his consequent dismissal of the notion of logical truth as it was conceived by Carnap (aka analytic truth)."<br />
<br />
Indeed, not to mention ("then why do you?") Derrida and all the irrationalists. There is some remarks by Grice on the analytic-synthetic distinction on his Valediction (to his life, almost), in "Retrospective Epilogue" to WoW. He notes that one should indeed take a pragmatist approach to the notion of analyticity.<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"A shift of thinking from a <i>philosophical</i> perspective on this problem to an <i>architectural engineering</i> perspective is liberating in a way which Carnap's <i>principle of tolerance</i> would endorse.<br />
It allows the adoption of philosophical terminology, in the service of architectural exposition, on a pragmatic basis, sidestepping side issues which in this context may be regarded as <i>metaphysical</i>."<br />
<br />
Indeed. Which brings us back to Grice's Bootstrap ("Try to pull yourself by your own bootstraps"). He is (in "Reply to Richards") considering<br />
<br />L1<br />
<br />
and<br />
<br />
L2<br />
<br />
or object-language and meta-language. And he is saying that if L1 is first-order predicate calculus, L2 should NOT contain too much metaphysical jargon; for the idea is that L2 should be reduced to L1, as far as terminology is concerned. So the less technical one is with one's L2, the fewer problems with the morrow, he hopes.<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"This is what I have done to progress the body of ideas with which I approach the "City of Eternal Truth". I have moved the locus of my creativity from my web domain, hosting philosophical web pages and abortive book projects, to my github account (see: rbjones.github.io),"<br />
<br />
which EVERYBODY should check -- where 'everybody' is a universal non-substitutional quantifier, if you must!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br /><br />"where I now seek to articulate a 21st century successor to the idea of demonstrative science found in Aristotle's "Organon," taking science here just as broadly as Aristotle did, encompassing theoretical, practical and productive sciences, and the role which deduction and logical truth plays in this broad arena."<br />
<br />
Good. I like the idea of 'demonstrative' science alla Kantotle. Grice used to lecture on the Organon, if you can believe it! And, to me, the most important thing of his seminars on Aristotle's Organon at Oxford is that J. L. Ackrill attended them! (And credits Grice as having taught him Aristotle "so well" -- In Oxford, Plato is almost non-existant, unless you are Hegelian or Bradleyian).<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"Of course, putting the material at Github creates an expectation that these architectural philosophies will ultimately be translated into <i>code</i>. It's a dream..."<br />
<br />
worth pursuing.<br />
<br />
"Code" is perhaps not a Griceian word. There is usually the distinction between a code-based model of communication and an inference-based model of communication. The idea is that codes tend to be otiose if we can provide a 'rationale' in terms of inference patterns for them.<br />
<br />
Grice said, "Do not multiply senses beyond necessity", and I don't think there is a necessity to multiply the senses of 'code', which is UNI-guous, or monosemous. But Jones uses it alla Jones, and I use it alla Grice.<br />
<br />
The code relates to the automation of reason, that Hobbes would have loved!<br />
<br />
CheersLuigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-87927517208531258132017-02-11T14:48:00.001-08:002017-02-11T14:48:34.708-08:00Aspects of reason and reasoningSperanza<br />
<br />
In his interesting "Deep Learning Eternal Truth," R. B. Jones "thought" (and rightly so) that "it might be of some interest to the followers of this blog (both of them) for me to say a few words connecting my present pre-occupations with the Carnap-flavour of the City of Eternal Truth, and this is it."<br />
<br />
Of course there may be more than two (one of which is him) who read this if not follow the yellow brick road (to the City of course!)<br />
<br />
"I spent a while a few years ago failing to complete a short book-shaped work entitled "Positive Philosophy and The Automation of Reason". It ran into the sand in a very incomplete state at about 130 pages, and though I still felt positive about the enterprise I couldn't find the way to make it move again."<br />
<br />Blame the sand -- but I love the phrase, 'automation of reason', which of course reminds me of Grice's John Locke Lectures on Aspects of reason and reasoning (previously given as the Immanuel Kant lectures, under the same title, at Stanford -- trust Grice to turn from rationalist to empiricist as he crossed the pond!)<br />
<br />
"Of course (!) "reason" is the key weapon we have in the search for eternal truth. For a man of logical bent, surely the truths which most deserve that plaudit are the logical truths (though what are they?)."<br />
<br />
Well, for Cicero, 'ratio' was a problem. The Grecian (as in "Ode on a Grecian urn") keyword is merely "logic".<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"Notwithstanding the foundering of that project, it remains my life's pre-occupation to find some way of progressing that topic, or simply of articulating the ideas on it which jostle for attention in my head. A few months ago I made a fresh start at that, shifting the context in which to progress the ideas. The whole thing has always been for me a fence-sitting between the fields of philosophy and information systems engineering. To automate reason is to develop software, and maybe, as is happening right now, to re-architect the hardware we use to execute the software (new hardware architectures for "Deep Learning", beyond Von Neumann). An architecture for reason and its application, depends on philosophical foundations. The articulation of appropriate such foundations is an essential and should be a prominent feature of any such architecture. On the other hand, even if the primary purpose is philosophical,"<br />
<br />
Grice and Carnap would be delighted to hear that!<br />
<br />
"the architectural application is a valuable way of testing the practical significance of various issues at stake."<br />
<br />
Jones:<br /><br />"One problem with a purely philosophical approach is the enormous difficulty in swimming against the tide of contemporary philosophical opinion, which in this sphere is unduly negative about the status of formal deductive systems as a result, for example, of the Godel's incompleteness results, and of Quine's skepticism about semantics and his consequent dismissal of the notion of logical truth as it was conceived by Carnap (aka analytic truth)."<br />
<br />
Not to mention ("when why do you?", I can imagine Jones retorting) Derrida and all the continental irrationalists!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br /><br />"A shift of thinking from a <i>philosophical</i> perspctive on this problem to an <i>architectural engineering</i> perspective is liberating in a way which Carnap's <i>principle of tolerance</i> would endorse.<br />
It allows the adoption of philosophical terminology, in the service of architectural exposition, on a pragmatic basis, sidestepping side issues which in this context may be regarded as <i>metaphysical</i>. This is what I have done to progress the body of ideas with which I approach the "City of Eternal Truth".<br /><br />
This reminds me of Grice's bootstrap principle ("try to pull yourself by your own bootstraps", in "Reply to Richards"): the less metaphysical the metalanguage, the less problems for the morrow!<br />
<br />
Jones:<br />
<br />
"I have moved the locus of my creativity from my web domain, hosting philosophical web pages and abortive book projects, to my github account (see: rbjones.github.io),"<br />
<br />
which everybody should check, not just two followers!<br />
<br />
"where I now seek to articulate a 21st century successor to the idea of demonstrative science found in Aristotle's Organon, taking science here just as broadly as Aristotle did, encompassing theoretical, practical and productive sciences, and the role which deduction and logical truth plays in this broad arena. Of course, putting the material at Github creates an expectation that these architectural philosophies will ultimately be translated into <i>code</i>. It's a dream" but one worth pursuing.<br />
<br />
That's the stuff that dreams are made of, as the refrain to that catchy song goes!<br />
<br />
<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-20798897461712583982017-02-11T14:01:00.001-08:002017-02-11T15:44:11.837-08:00Deep Learning Eternal TruthI thought it might be of some interest to the followers of this blog (both of them) for me to say a few words connecting my present pre-occupations with the Carnap-flavour of the City of Eternal Truth, and this is it.<br />
<br />
I spent a while a few years ago failing to complete a short book-shaped work entitled "Positive Philosophy and The Automation of Reason". It ran into the sand in a very incomplete state at about 130 pages, and though I still felt positive about the enterprise I couldn't find the way to make it move again.<br />
<br />
Of course (!) "reason" is the key weapon we have in the search for eternal truth. For a man of logical bent, surely the truths which most deserve that plaudit are the logical truths (though what are they?).<br />
<br />
Notwithstanding the foundering of that project, it remains my life's pre-occupation to find some way of progressing that topic, or simply of articulating the ideas on it which jostle for attention in my head.<br />
A few months ago I made a fresh start at that, shifting the context in which to progress the ideas.<br />
<br />
The whole thing has always been for me a fence-sitting between the fields of philosophy and information systems engineering. To automate reason is to develop software, and maybe, as is happening right now, to re-architect the hardware we use to execute the software (new hardware architectures for "Deep Learning", beyond Von Neumann). An architecture for reason and its application, depends on philosophical foundations. The articulation of appropriate such foundations is an essential and should be a prominent feature of any such architecture. On the other hand, even if the primary purpose is philosophical, the architectural application is a valuable way of testing the practical significance of various issues at stake.<br />
<br />
One problem with a purely philosophical approach is the enormous difficulty in swimming against the tide of contemporary philosophical opinion, which in this sphere is unduly negative about the status of formal deductive systems as a result, for example, of the Godel's incompleteness results, and of Quine's skepticism about semantics and his consequent dismissal of the notion of logical truth as it was conceived by Carnap (aka analytic truth).<br />
<br />
A shift of thinking from a <i>philosophical</i> perspctive on this problem to an <i>architectural engineering</i> perspective is liberating in a way which Carnap's <i>principle of tolerance</i> would endorse.<br />
It allows the adoption of philosophical terminology, in the service of architectural exposition, on a pragmatic basis, sidestepping side issues which in this context may be regarded as <i>metaphysical</i>.<br />
<br />
This is what I have done to progress the body of ideas with which I approach the "City of Eternal Truth".<br />
I have moved the locus of my creativity from my web domain, hosting philosophical web pages and abortive book projects, to my github account (see: rbjones.github.io), where I now seek to articulate a 21st century successor to the idea of demonstrative science found in Aristotle's Organon, taking science here just as broadly as Aristotle did, encompassing theoretical, practical and productive sciences, and the role which deduction and logical truth plays in this broad arena.<br />
Of course, putting the material at Github creates an expectation that these architectural philosophies will ultimately be translated into <i>code</i>. Its a dream,<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Roger Bishop Joneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05737621401913015777noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-48622599818813520172017-02-09T13:41:00.002-08:002017-02-09T13:41:28.169-08:00Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Paul Grice, and Marcus William Dick Speranza<br />
<br />
There was a post in the Grice Club which was basically a quotation from P. M. S. Hacker's essay on Witters (or Wittgenstein, if you must). Hacker has a thing, like I do, matter of fact, for alphabetical ordering. And he manages to try to list the members of what J. L. Austin called his 'kindergarten' -- i.e. the members of that play group that he led and that met on Saturday mornings. The list starts -- I shall use set-theoretical formulation to please Jones:<br />
<br />
PG = {Dick, Grice, ...}<br />
<br />
i.e. Dick is the first in the list, followed by Grice. I don't think Hacker is trying anything too deep, since, give me five minutes or so, and I shall find members for the play group starting with A, B, and C -- so Dick would NOT be the first!<br />
<br />
In any case, why does this relate to The Eternal Truth?<br />
<br />
Well, in "Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work," edited by Richard Creath, we read:<br />
<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #545454; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">"Among it various communications from </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #6a6a6a; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small; font-weight: bold;">Marcus Dick</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #545454; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">, trying to get in touch with us."</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #545454; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
So, yes, Dick made it to the Carnap annals, too! The interesting thing is that the communications could not be reciprocated because Marcus Dick left no 'future address', if you can believe that!<br />
<br />
Ah, well.<br />
<br />
In his biography, Quine notes that Dick had been a Commonwealth Fellow at Harvard, under one of Quine's own courses, and that he had displayed (or done, if you must) some outstanding 'work in logic'.<br />
<br />
The connection between Dick and Grice is more tenous, or shall I say, implicatural, in nature!<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-39498795131682000902015-08-16T08:02:00.001-07:002015-08-16T08:02:44.960-07:00Hintikka, Carnap, and GriceSperanza<br />
<br />
Jaakko Hintikka was born in Vantaa, Helsinki, Finland. <br /><br />Hintikka studied
mathematics with Rolf Nevanlinna and philosophy with <br />Georg Henrik von
Wright at the University of Helsinki where defended his <br />doctoral
dissertation on distributive normal forms. <br /><br />So we see the cross-reference
mathematics -- as per mathematics logic, that <br />today, for example, is taught
at Oxford not within the Sub-Faculty of <br />Philosophy but across the street,
so that people enrolled in disciplines other <br />than Philosophy can attend.
The chair is called "Mathematical logic" -- and <br />philosophy.<br /><br />Grice
loved Wright and he borrowed from him (but never returned) the word
<br />'alethic'. That Hintikka was inspired by these two people (and these two
<br />fields: mathematical logic and philosophy -- moral theory --) to write his
<br />essay on 'distributive normal forms' is interesting.<br /><br />Geary
commented: "A distributive normal form is not as normal as it <br />seems," and
adds with sarcasm: "especially if you catch it undistributed!".<br /><br />After
his Ph.D. studies Hintikka worked as junior fellow at Harvard and <br />became
(independently of Stig Kanger) the founder of possible world <br />semantics.
<br /><br />The keyterm is Leibniz, as in Leibniz's world: the best of all possible
<br />worlds. Woody Allen (who wrote "Irrational man") and Barrett (who wrote
<br />"Irrational man") have something to say about this, because Leibniz is
concerned <br />with the "best" (morally best) of all possible worlds and Lucas
(the <br />character in Allen's film fallaciously thinks he has discovered it!).
Hintikka's <br />treatment is more abstract: he uses subindexes w1 w2 w3 wn to
represent <br />each world. Thus<br /><br />"All man is rational"<br /><br />is true in
all possible worlds if for any world n, man is rational. <br /><br />Hintikka
published his groundbreaking work "Knowledge and Belief" on <br />epistemic logic
-- the semantics of which is 'possible-worlds'. He uses now two <br />dyadic
operators:<br /><br />B(A, p)<br /><br />and <br /><br />K(A, p)<br /><br />to represent that A
believes and knows that p respectively. He liked to <br />play with 'paradoxes'
like<br /><br />K(A, p) --> KK(A, p)<br /><br />i.e. if you know that God exists, you
know that you know that God exists.<br /><br />Hintikka was appointed professor of
Practical Philosophy at Helsinki -- <br />which was a good thing since, having
been born there, he never got lost! In <br />fact, he moved not far from the
house where he had been born. And a nice <br />house it was, too!<br /><br />Hintikka
later became professor of philosophy at Stanford -- which is a <br />bit away
from Helsinki, if just more or less at the same distance from the <br />beach
(different beaches, admittedly).<br /><br />Stanford, with Hintikka, Patrick Suppes
and Dagfinn Föllesdal, and the <br />programme initiated by Grice "Hands across
the Bay" from across the Bay in <br />UC/Berkeley -- became one of the leading
centres of philosophy of science and <br />philosophical logic, if not conceptual
analysis: Urmson and S. N. Hampshire <br />also taught there. <br /><br />Hintikka’s
new interests included inductive logic and semantic information. <br />He would
say, "What's the good of a philosopher if you don't have a new
<br />interest?"<br /><br />He shared his time between Stanford and Helsinki for a
while.<br /><br />Later Hintikka started his work with D. Reidel’s Publishing
Company (later <br />Kluwer Academic Publishers) in Holland as the
editor-in-chief of the <br />journal "Synthese" and the book series "The Synthese
Library" -- which Geary <br />calls "hardly synthetic".<br /><br />This activity made
Hintikka the most influential editor of philosophical <br />works. In fact, he
was co-editor of a festschrift, as it were, for Quine, who <br />had written
"Words and Objections". This came out in Reidel as Words and <br />ObjectIONS --
what's the good of a philosophical theory if you are not going <br />to criticise
it, as Joaquin Phoenix says in "Irrational man"? -- and they <br />invited H. P.
Grice to contribute. Grice took his time -- which delayed the <br />publication
of the thing -- and Hintikka was strict with deadlines -- but <br />eventually
the thing came out with Grice's "Vacuous Names" in it, and a <br />short reply by
Quine crediting Grice's brilliancy.<br /><br />Hintikka was appointed to a Research
Professorship in the Academy of <br />Finland which allowed him to establish a
research group of Finnish scholars <br />working mainly in logic, philosophy of
science, philosophy of language, and <br />history of philosophy. <br /><br />The
Academy of Finland owes its name to the Academy of Athens founded by <br />Plato.
Most countries have Academies: Greece first, then Rome, then Italy, <br />then
France. Then Finland. Even Britain has its academy and Grice was <br />appointed
FBA in 1966 but he delayed the deliverance of his philosophical lecture <br />for
the British Academy to 1971, when he came up with "Intention and
<br />Uncertanity": a parody on Hart and Hampshire's 'slightly ridiculous' claims
in <br />their joint essay for "Mind" on intention and certainty.<br /><br />As a
teacher and supervisor, Hintikka was highly influential though the <br />richness
of his new ideas and research initiatives. <br /><br />Many of the former students
of Hintikka have been appointed to chairs in <br />philosophy. To wit: Risto
Hilpinen, Raimo Tuomela, Juhani Pietarinen, Ilkka <br />Niiniluoto, Simo
Knuuttila, Veikko Rantala, Juha Manninen, Lauri Carlson, <br />Esa Saarinen,
Matti Sintonen, Gabriel Sandu.<br /><br />Lauri Carlson wrote a Synthese Library
essay on "Dialogue games" -- the <br />ideas will be later developed by Hintikka
himself in his contribution to P. G. <br />R. I. C. E., the Grice festschrift
edited by Grandy and Warner. <br /><br />Hintikka divorced his first wife
Soili.<br /><br />Hintikka married Merrill Bristow Provence -- Mrs. Hintikka willl
later <br />co-edit with Vermazen a festschrift for Davidson and they invited H.
P. Grice <br />to contribute. He did with a brilliant essay on 'akrasia'.
<br /><br />Hintikka and Provence were appointed at Tallahassee, Florida.
<br /><br />Hintikka married Ghita Holmström. <br /><br />Hintikka became philosophy
professor at Boston -- not far from where he <br />had been a fellow in the next
town -- when he was in Harvard, Massachussets <br />-- He would walk from Boston
to Cambridge, and back, as he seemed to prefer <br />the bookshops in Cambridge
than those in Boston.<br /><br />During his Boston pewriod, Hintikka resided in a
'cottage' (as <br />non-New-Englanders call them) at
Marlborough.<br /><br />Marlborough was not named after the person -- via rigid
designation -- but <br />after the borough. <br /><br />Hintikka retired from Boston
and moved back to Finland.<br /><br />Besides his activities in research, teaching,
and publication, Hintikka <br />served in many important positions in
international organizations, among <br />others vice president of The Association
for Symbolic Logic, vice-president and <br />later president of the Division of
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of <br />Science of the International Union of
History and Philosophy of Science <br />(DLMPS/IUHPS), president of the Charles
S. Peirce Society -- D. Ritchie was <br />mentioning this genial philosopher
recently -- and the chairman of the <br />organizing committee of the Twentieth
World Congress of Philosophy. <br /><br />As a proof of the appreciation of
Hintikka’s work, a volume dedicated to <br />him in "The Library of Living
Philosophers" was published.<br /><br />Hintikka’s publications cover an
exceptionally wide range of topics. <br /><br />During his career he published lots
of books or monographs, edited lots of <br />books, and authored lots of essays
in international journals or <br />collections. <br /><br />His main works deal
with:<br /><br />-- mathematical logic (proof theory, infinitary logics,
IF-logic)<br />-- intensional logic and propositional attitudes<br />-- philosophy
of logic and mathematics<br />-- philosophy of language (game-theoretical
semantics, quantifiers, <br />anaphora)<br />-- philosophy of science
(interrogative model of inquiry)<br />-- epistemology, and <br />-- history of
philosophy (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Peirce, Frege, <br />Wittgenstein, Grice
-- in the P. G. R. I. C. E. festschrift).<br /><br />A genius.Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-68466098470156596992015-02-19T17:32:00.001-08:002015-02-19T17:32:47.382-08:00D. P. Henry: Between Grice and CarnapSperanza<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">In his "Quæstio subtilissima", D. P. Henry places himself somewhat between R. Carnap and H. P. Grice (does he not quote). </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">Henry is concerned with the formalization of metaphysical claims, and disagrees with Carnap in treaeting them (Heidegger's infamous "The Nothing noths") as nonsense.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;"></span> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
<span style="font-family: Calibri;">R. B. Jones may find the Henry reference of some interest, as Henry is trying to see Carnap from a historical perspective and he (Henry) may miss a few points or qualifications!</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">
</div>
<br />
Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-5442325208194548862013-10-26T06:28:00.003-07:002013-10-26T06:28:50.322-07:00Carnap and Grice on the metaphysics of physicsSperanza<br />
<br />
Nothing too substantial, or substantive (if that's not a metaphysical monicker I don't know what is), but I got this via S. Clark's mailing list today, and thought of sharing. It's a CFP (I'm not sending one! I think!) on 'the metaphysics of physics', which should be an interesting combo to consider.<br />
<br />This is what the organiser wrote -- the original e-mail is to be found in Clark's archives for the University of Liverpool:<br />
<br />
"Very recently, and after a long hiatus, the metaphysics of physics has enjoyed a
remarkable renaissance, with both philosophers and physicists addressing
explicitly metaphysical questions that arise in the context of physics and the
interpretation of its theories."<br />
<br />
"As theoretical physics has achieved dramatic
progress, pushing back the boundaries of our knowledge and forcing us to rethink
our most fundamental concepts describing physical reality, questions about the
impact of this rapid development on traditionally conceived metaphysical
investigations become urgent. Does it make metaphysics irrelevant, or does it
call for an altogether new metaphysics?"<br />
<br />
"On the other hand, physics has
encountered more than a few roadblocks in its fundamental endeavours, e.g. in
attempts to bring gravity into the fold of the standard model. Could
reconceiving the metaphysical foundations of fundamental physical theories
possibly lead to a breakthrough, as some have suggested?"<br /><br />"The aim of this
volume is to bring together papers that address various aspects of the mutual
interrelations between contemporary research in theoretical physics and the
conceptual work done in analytic metaphysics. The suggested topics for the
contributions to the volume include, but are most definitely not limited to, the
following questions: “Are fundamental objects postulated by our physical
theories (elementary particles, fields, spacetime points, etc.) individuals with
intrinsic properties and well-defined identities, or perhaps relational
structures with no relata?”, “What is the ontological significance of symmetries
in physical theories?”, “How does spacetime emerge from the quantum
phenomena?”"<br />
<br />"We invite original research papers on topics related to the
general description of the planned volume."<br />
<br />
---- So there you have:<br />
<br />
I suppose the keywords then:<br />
<br />METAPHYSICS, METAPHYSIC, METAPHYSICAL as attached to PHYSICS.<br />
<br />
In this instance, it seems like the prefix, 'meta-' becomes indeed ambiguous. For how would you distinguish meta-physics of physics, or a meta-physical approach to physics from simply a meta-theoretical approach to physical theory? Or something like that.<br /><br />But it may do to revise the organiser's wording and reflect or elaborate on them!<br />
<br />
Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-61083357361905617162013-10-16T07:01:00.000-07:002013-10-16T09:05:25.750-07:00The Grice Carnap conversationRoger Bishop Jones for The City of Eternal Truth<br />
<br />
A long time ago (it now seems), Speranza agreed to collaborate with me on a project concerned with the reconciliation of the philosophies of Grice and Carnap and with finding a way forward (philosophically) which might engage both those philosophers (as they might be if they were still active) in common enterprise.<br />
<br />
In this joint endeavour, Speranza and I have taken on the philosophical personas of Grice* and Carnap*.<br />
Some progress has been made, we have a draft document entitled "A Conversation between Grice and Carnap (as it might have been)", but a meeting of minds on matters of sufficient substance remains an illusive ideal.<br />
<br />
In my own head the project is now beginning to gather momentum, and this note is to sketch some contributions which I now anticipate.<br />
<br />
This blog was started by Speranza shortly after our collaboration began, and at roughly the same time I started the "Carnap Corner" blog, so together with Speranza's Grice Club we have three blogs one devoted to each philosopher and one perhaps to the joint enterprise.<br />
<br />
"The City of Eternal Truth" is, of course, a phrase which Grice coined in his "Reply to Richards", and we can take it as being where Grice philosophically might like us to be, the ultimate aim of his philosophising. I am taking it that some such ideal might also be attributable to Carnap and that a good outcome of our project would be to come up with a conception of that idea which might provide common cause for our two philosophers (both those two, Grice and Carnap, and us two Speranza and Jones).<br />
<br />
Seeking common ground between Grice and Carnap I have been inclined to investigate the areas in which they seem at odds and to enquire whether their differences are substantive.<br />
Many of the apparent differences (for example those enumerated by Grice as his Betes Noires) seem connected with their respective attitudes towards metaphysics, in connection with which their respective attitudes towards Aristotle might be thought illuminating.<br />
It is this line of enquiry which has lately been the focus of my thinking.<br />
<br />
At face value Aristotelian Metaphysics is embraced wholeheartedly by Grice and rejected out of hand by Carnap.<br />
<br />
I have come to feel that the positions of Grice and Carnap on Aristotle might in both cases be seen as in conflict with some of their own more general philosophical principles.<br />
One might therefore hope that discussion of these apparent conflicts might make room for common ground not otherwise apparent.<br />
<br />
This case I hope to present in pieces, one on Carnap and Aristotle at Carnap Corner, one on Grice and Aristotle in the Grice Club, and then some kind of synthesis here in "The City".<br />
<br />
RBJ <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Roger Bishop Joneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05737621401913015777noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-54290084549859772962013-10-14T07:38:00.002-07:002013-10-14T07:38:29.501-07:00Carnap and Grice on logicSperanza<br />
<br />
This below did take place already, but it may be worth it checking out some abstracts, etc.<br />
<br />
Cheers.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<div class="g-no-margin-top">
<span style="color: black; font-family: georgia, "times new roman", times, serif; font-size: 1.83em; line-height: 1.18em;">International conference on "Carnap on Logic", July 3 - 6, 2013</span></div>
The conference is dedicated to a reevaluation of Carnap's work on logic and its philosophical applications. It will investigate different aspects of his contributions-from type theory and modal logic to inductive logic-and set them in context with his work in the philosophy of logic.<br />
<hr />
<h2>
Invited Speakers</h2>
<ul>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Steve Awodey (Carnegie-Mellon University)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Patricia Blanchette (University of Notre Dame)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">André Carus (Hegeler Institute)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Richard Creath (Arizona State University)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Catarina Dutilh Novaes (University of Groningen)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Michael Friedman (Stanford University)</span></li>
<li>Wolfgang Kienzler (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena)</li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Sebastian Lutz (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Erich Reck (UC Riverside)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Florian Steinberger (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Pierre Wagner (University Paris)</span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 1.5em;">Richard Zach (University of Calgary)</span></li>
</ul>
<hr />
<img alt="AvH_Logo_n7_4c" class="right" src="http://www.carnaponlogic2013.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/bilder/avh_logo_n7_4c.gif" />The conference is generously supported by the German Research Council (DFG), the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation through a Humboldt Professorship.Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-19512334160087855952013-10-14T07:35:00.001-07:002013-10-14T07:35:45.365-07:00The Grice Annual LecturesSperanza<br />
<br />
I wish Grice had them. But of course, he has them every year when a lecturer uses 'implicature' in his lectures.<br />
<br />
O. T. O. H., there's the annual Carnap lectures [<em>sic </em>in plural].<br />
<br />
Below.<br />
<br />
Cheers,<br />
<br />
----<br />
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Rudolf-Carnap-Lectures</div>
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Rrom the online site:</div>
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"[t]he Rudolf-Carnap-Lectures
are an annual event started by Prof. Dr.
Albert Newen from the Institute of
Philosophy II at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany in 2008."</div>
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"The Lectures
provide a platform for distinguished scholars to present their work in the form
of several talks on their preferred topic."</div>
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"The focus is usually on the areas of
Philosophy of Mind, Language or Science."</div>
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"In turn, graduate students interested
in these topics get the chance to engage in extensive discussion and get in
touch with state-of-the-art research."</div>
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"In addition, some of them have the chance
to present their own work on related topics during a graduate conference, based
on a peer review process."</div>
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<br /></div>
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"The lecture series is dedicated to the philosopher
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) who was born in Barmen (today: Wuppertal) which is not
far from Bochum."</div>
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"He studied Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics in Jena and
Freiburg, amongst others with Gottlob Frege, and is one of the main
representatives of Logical Empiricism."</div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="paragraph_style_1">
Prior Carnap-Lecturers include Shaun Gallagher (Memphis), Alva Noë (Berkeley), John Perry (Stanford) [who contributed to PGRICE], David
Papineau (London), Tim Crane (Cambridge) & Katalin Farkas
(Budapest) (see Archive).</div>
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Forthcoming Carnap Lectures
2014</div>
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From <span class="style_1">March 10-12, 2014</span>,
the next RCL will be presented by Prof. Daniel C.
Dennett (Tufts University). <br />
<br />
[who spells 'Gricean', rightly, as 'Griceian', I believe]</div>
<div class="paragraph_style_1">
<br />
"Dennett is going to give several lectures in the
context of a Graduate Conference with Student presentations on aspects of his
work incl. Intentionality, Consciousness, Free Will, Evolution and Religion."
</div>
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Daniel C. Dennett is Austin B. Fletcher Professor of
Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University
in Medford (Massachusetts). </div>
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More details to be
announced soon.</div>
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Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-89775689644947778842013-06-28T05:09:00.003-07:002013-06-28T05:09:46.196-07:00INFLUENCE OF THE AUFBAU ON GRICE --Speranza<br />
<br />
Well, this below is rather influence ON the Aufbau.<br />
<br />
For the record then, there is a <br />
<br />
Call for participation:<br /><br />Influences on the Aufbau.<br />
<br />
To be held at the Munich Center for
Mathematical Philosophy, LMU <br />Munich<br /><br />01-03 July
2013<br /><br />http://www.carnapsaufbau13.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/index.html<br /><br />The
workshop should cover all varieties of influences on Carnap’s seminal <br />work,
with the inclusion of the influences of <br />
<br />
Frege<br />
Russell<br />
Husserl, <br />the
neo-Kantians<br />
Dilthey, and <br />
the Dilthey-school <br />
<br />
but also the <br />influences of
less well-known philosophers such as <br />
<br />
Vaihinger, <br />Gätschenberger, <br />
Driesch,
Dingler, <br />
and others.<br /><br />Invited speakers:<br />
<br />
<br />Andre Carus (Hegeler
Institute)<br />Hans-Joachim Dahms (University of Vienna)<br />Michael Friedman
(Stanford University)<br />Thomas Mormann (University of San
Sebastian)<br />Matthias Neuber (University of Tübingen)<br />Alan Richardson (UBC
Vancouver)<br />Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (University of Puerto Rico)<br />Thomas
Ryckman (Stanford University)<br />Clinton Tolley (UC San Diego)<br />Thomas Uebel
(University of Manchester)<br />Paul Ziche (University of Utrecht)<br /><br /><br />in order to register please
contact Christian Damböck <br />(christian.damboeck@univie.ac.at)<br /><br />the
program and abstracts as well as practical information on the venue <br />etc. can
be found online:
<br />
<br />http://www.carnapsaufbau13.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/index.htmlLuigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-72351339731787338862013-05-10T05:19:00.005-07:002013-05-10T05:19:56.600-07:00Grice at Ruhr -- On the concept of structure in Grice and Carnap -- Speranza<br />
<br />
The Rudolf Carnap Lectures -- not necessarily about Carnap (although cfr. talk below by Guido).<br />
<br />
Cfr. Grice's William James lectures not really about James ("Logic and Conversation")<br />
and his "John Dewey" lecture, and his "Paul Carus" lectures, and so on.<br />
<br />
Still, Ruhr is the most charming place to hold the Carnap lectures, and I'm pleased to think Grice would be invited!<br />
<br />
<br />
Cheers,<br />
<br />
Speranza<br />
<br />
-----<br />
<br />
<br />
Rudolf Carnap Lectures and Graduate Conference<br />Institute of Philosophy II,
<br />
Ruhr-Universität Bochum<br />May 21-23, 2013<br /><br /><b>David J. Chalmers
(ANU/NYU)<br />"Structuralism, Space, and Skepticism"</b><br /><br />David J. Chalmers
is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director<br />of the Center for
Consciousness at ANU and Professor of Philosophy and<br />Co-Director of the
Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness at NYU. <br />
<br />
He will be presenting new
material in a series of lectures, developing and<br />extending themes from his
recent book "Constructing the World" (OUP 2012).<br />
<br />
<div>
<br />
<div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Tuesday 21st</span></b></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">10.30-12.30 <b>David Chalmers</b>: Lecture 1,
tba</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">12.30-14.30 Lunch Break</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">14.00-14.45 <b></b></span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><b>Guido Del Din </b>(Padua): </span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">On the concept of
structure in </span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Carnap‘s ,Der logische Aufbau der Welt‘ </span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">14.45-15.30 <b>Benjamin Andrae</b> (Munich School of Philosophy):
</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Chalmers, Russell, and </span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Whitehead on Epistemology and Acquaintance</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">15.30-16.00 Coffee Break</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">16.00-16.45 <b>Robert Smithson</b> (Carolina): Conceptual vs.
metaphysical grounding</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">18.00-20.00 <b>David Chalmers</b>: The Matrix as Metaphysics (public
lecture, HGA 30)</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">20.30 Dinner</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Wednesday 22nd</span></b></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">10.00-12.00 <b>David Chalmers</b>: Lecture 2,
tba</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">12.00-14.00 Lunch Break</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">14.00-14.45 <b>Inga Vermeulen</b> (Sheffield): Verbal disputes, but
not about words</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">14.45-15.30 <b>Dusko Prelevic</b> (Belgrade): Scrutability of Truth
and Continuum Hypothesis</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">15.30-16.00 Coffee Break</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">16.00-16.45 <b>Antonella Mallozzi</b> (The Graduate Center, CUNY):
Scrutability and negative facts</span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">19.00 Dinner </span></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"></span><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><b><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">Thursday 23rd</span></b></span></div>
<div style="font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; font: 12px/normal Helvetica; margin: 0px;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">10.00-10.45 <b>Jonathan Mai </b>(Heidelberg): Two problems with
Chalmers‘ Structuralism</span></span></div>
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<span style="letter-spacing: 0px;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Futura; font-size: small;">11.00-13.00 <b>David Chalmers</b>: Lecture 4,
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Further information about these and past Carnap Lectures, the Venue
and<br />Travel information: <a href="http://www.rub.de/philosophy/carnaplectures/Home.html" title="http://www.rub.de/philosophy/carnaplectures/Home.html">http://www.rub.de/philosophy/carnaplectures/Home.html</a><br /></div>
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Organization:<br />Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht, Prof. Dr. Albert
Newen<br />Institute of Philosophy II<br />Ruhr-Universität Bochum<br />Germany</div>
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Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht</div>
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Institut für Philosophie II</div>
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Ruhr-Universität Bochum</div>
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Universitätsstr. 150, GA3/29</div>
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44780 Bochum</div>
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Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-12048439579255060832013-04-25T04:08:00.000-07:002013-04-25T04:08:21.708-07:00The Carnap Idiom, The Grice Idiom -- Look For A Neutral One--- by JLS, of the Grice Club
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<br />
---- WON'T SAY a 'common one', because a common idiom may not ring the right sort of bell.
<br />
<br />
But when discussing what Grice calls the 'longitudinal unity of philosophy', Grice notes that one obstacle in its perception is the dating of 'idioms'. Some idioms date: they become old-fashioned. New ones are fangled, and so on ad infinitum.
<br />
<br />
---
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<br />
The idea occurred to me, after the heroic attempts by Jones in "Grice Club" to turn to some Carnapian 'common' <i>lingua franca</i> the latest Gricean novelties.
<br />
<br />
Jones proposed:
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<br />
----- for 'meaning', qua noun. As when we say, "The meaning of this". What is this? What is 'meaning' for Carnap? What was meaning for Grice?
<br />
<br />
When it comes to Carnap one has to give a lot of credit to his mother tongue. Or something. Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-82941331368506212602013-04-25T04:07:00.000-07:002013-04-25T04:07:24.781-07:00Strawson/Stroud's bio of Grice -- Carnap's bio of CarnapSperanza<br />
<br />
Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-2821046865288691912013-04-25T04:06:00.000-07:002013-04-25T04:06:11.437-07:00Enters DummettSperanza
<br />
<br />
---
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Dummett has described metaphysicsLuigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-19928552143450181692013-04-25T04:05:00.003-07:002013-04-25T04:05:38.710-07:00Perspectives on Carnap and GriceSperanza<br />
<br />
“Perspectives on Carnap” A one day workshop <br />University
of East Anglia (Norwich, UK) <br />10th June 2013 (10am-1pm / 2pm-3:30pm) - Room
Arts 3.03<br /><br />S P E A K E R S:<br />
<br />
FIRST LECTURE:<br />
<br />KAMMER QUENTIN (University of
Bordeaux 3 – SPH) <br />
<br />
"Goodman’s Reading of the Aufbau"<br />
<br />
---- Interesting. I wish we could present something on Grice's Reading of the Aufbau!<br />
Goodman is a fascinating philosopher.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
SECOND LECTURE:<br /><br />KUUSELA OSKARI
(University of East Anglia)<br />Resolving the Dispute between Ideal and Ordinary
Language Approaches <br />
<br />
----- This is fascinating. Indeed, one should trace who the first philosopher was who made the distinction. I THINK it was Cicero! (I once came across something like the Latin expression for "ordinary language" in his writings!). In fact, if there is ONE feature that distinguishes Carnap and Grice is this.<br />
<br />
<br /><br />
THIRD LECTURE:<br />
<br />WAGNER HENRI (University of Bordeaux 3 –
SPH)<br />Quine on Carnap’s Conception of Logic<br />
----- This is of course one of R. B. Jones's interests, as he seems fascinated, as Grice and myself are, with the personality of this Harvard professor of logic: Quine. I'm PRETTY sure that P. F. Strawson's motivation for HIS conception of logic is best understood as an answer to Quine in "Methods of Logic" (vide Strawson, "Intro" to "Philosophy of Logic", Oxford readings in Philosophy). And we know Grice's conception is a reply to Strawson!<br />
<br />
--<br /><br />Co-organized by the
Universities of East Anglia and Bordeaux 3 - SPH:<br />Kuusela Oskari
(UEA)<br />Uçan Timur (UEA – University of Bordeaux 3)<br /><br /><br /><br />THE
“PERSPECTIVES ON CARNAP” A ONE DAY WORKSHOP WILL BE FOLLOWED ON JUNE 11th BY A
ONE DAY WORKSHOP “WITTGENSTEIN/PHENOMENOLOGY”.Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-10628011681449764342013-04-25T04:00:00.005-07:002013-04-25T04:00:59.550-07:00Grice and Carnap, Carnap and GriceSperanza<br />
<br />
We should explore. <br />
<br />
<br />
“Perspectives on Carnap” A one day workshop <br /><br /><br /><br />University
of East Anglia (Norwich, UK) <br />10th June 2013 (10am-1pm / 2pm-3:30pm) - Room
Arts 3.03<br /><br /><br />S P E A K E R S:<br /><br />KAMMER QUENTIN (University of
Bordeaux 3 – SPH) <br />Goodman’s Reading of the Aufbau <br /><br />KUUSELA OSKARI
(University of East Anglia)<br />Resolving the Dispute between Ideal and Ordinary
Language Approaches <br /><br />WAGNER HENRI (University of Bordeaux 3 –
SPH)<br />Quine on Carnap’s Conception of Logic<br /><br /><br /><br />Co-organized by the
Universities of East Anglia and Bordeaux 3 - SPH:<br />Kuusela Oskari
(UEA)<br />Uçan Timur (UEA – University of Bordeaux 3)<br /><br /><br /><br />THE
“PERSPECTIVES ON CARNAP” A ONE DAY WORKSHOP WILL BE FOLLOWED ON JUNE 11th BY A
ONE DAY WORKSHOP “WITTGENSTEIN/PHENOMENOLOGY” (SEE ON PHILOS-L).Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-699150936863505661.post-49624612620481166512011-11-19T04:16:00.000-08:002011-11-19T04:53:38.650-08:00Re: Quine and Carnap on ontology -- with Grice thrown in for good measureSperanza<br /><br />In "Quine and Carnap on Ontology," Jones writes:<br /> <br />"This is rather rambling, and what I say about Quine is speculative and probably not entirely correct, but I'm posting anyway. After complaining about Quine's "On What There is" being diametrically opposed to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" (and I was thinking of it as the third in a triumvirate of Quinean oppositions to the core of Carnap's philosophy, the other two being the analytic/synthetic distinction and modal logic) the words "Ontological Relativity" popped up in my head, by way of reference to a contribution of Quine's in this area which I have never actually seen."<br /><br />It is a good keyword: "Ontological Relativity". Thanks for reminding us about it.<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"I searched my little philosophical library and discovered that I really did not have a copy, and decided to have a look when next I visit the British Library.<br />(and also to get Code from PGRICE, no longer readable on google books, and the journal in which Grice on Aristotle appears). However, notwithstanding my never having read the paper, just the sight of a few lines of commentary suffices to change my perception of Quine on this topic. It seems that though "On What there is" seems contrary to Carnap, "Ontological Relativity", apart from being naturalistic rather than formalistic, is on the same lines as Carnap, i.e. it is relativistic; ontology is relative to language."<br /><br />These are good points. From what I recall, this had an influence on Davidson. It is the point about the "Gavagai", etc. that Quine also develops in "Word and object". He was into defending this indeterminacy, as it were, at various levels. Ontological relativity, ontological indeterminacy? The issues are not exactly equivalent, but it may impinge on this: we say 'ontological relativity'. But how much of it is 'epistemic' indeterminacy? For a speaker S, of a language L, the things may be 'absolute' enough. It's only when someone, a metaphysician, say, tries to describe the ontology of L. He finds that various schemes are possibly. He infers, wrongly, that there is 'ontological relativity' involved.<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"That also makes it broadly similar I would guess, to Grice, for he had a relaxed liberal attitude to ontology, and one might perhaps think he allowed relativity to context not just language (which I'm sure the other two could be stretched to as well). It may be worth exploring this a little further for we are here saying something about absolute metaphysics, i.e. that ontology is not a part of it, ontological claims are supposed to be relative rather than absolute."<br /><br />----- This reminds of a gem I once read: Warnock, "Metaphysics and Logic" (repr. in Flew). VERY GRICEIAN! (It is an OLD paper, dated 1950s, I think). But Warnock, like Grice, would like to be careful. He considers ONLY, the operator (Ex) and its vernacular counterpart, "some", and he is having in mind Quine. Warnock wants to say that a claim to existence may NOT be present in all 'there is', or (Ex) formulae. "Tigers exist", for example, he finds one of the most otiose thing to say in English. And so on. I discussed that bit when I was into considering the 'seven' formal devices that Grice lists as generating implicatures of note. "Some" being one of them. Note that 'some' (or (Ex)) formulae are not truth-functional. But in the case of these formulae, it is not just the relatively speaking relatively simple point by Quine that it all boils down to what values we accept for 'x'. For our talk (and thus, ontology) of 'there is' is PRETTY COMPLICATED. "There is beauty, and it is in the eye of the beholder". In this case, the values over which 'x' ranges are complex. It is a second-order statement. "There are a few pictures at the Louvre I find PARTICULARLY nice" also involves a second-order, seeing that 'nice' does not work as "dark", or "blue". Dark and blue are ways things are, but 'nice' applies to our perceiving, say, a particularly blue thing as 'attractive' or appealing to us. Aesthetic concepts (like 'nice', then) involve a special ontological framework (Sibley discusses this -- he belonged to the Warnock-Grice school). And so on.<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />""On What there is" is perhaps ambivalent, rather than clearly opposite to the later paper (which I haven't read, still). It certainly seems antithetical to Carnap, because it is about "ontological commitment" and it is easy to think that that is exactly what Carnap denies when he distinguishes between internal and external questions and holds that a positive answer to an internal ontological question should not be confused with assent to the apparently relevant but actually meaningless external question. But if we read it in this way then Quine the logical empiricist almost comes out as a Platonist. My feeling is that the origins of this paper come from his analysis of Russell's "no class theory". Russell introduced the idea of "incomplete symbol" which appears in his theory of descriptions (in "On Denoting") but which applies also to his notation for classes in Principia Mathematica. Quine provides, in his "Set Theory and Its Logic" an analysis of exactly how much mathematics you can achieve by the use of "incomplete symbols" to talk as if classes exist without actually assuming the existence of classes. The disadvantage of this technique if you take it seriously is that, by hypothesis, these things that look like classes as far as the notation is concerned don't actually exist, and therefore are not in the range of bound variables (after all, existence, in modern logic, is just a quantifier, the things which exist are just the things in the range of the existential quantifier). In this context Quine is using the question whether or not you want the "class" to be in the range of quantification as a test for whether it can properly be called a virtual class or incomplete symbol. He is investigating what can be done with few things in the range of quantification."<br /><br />I loved your exegesis, and it's most likely right. From what I recall, Quine's PhD at Harvard was v. much into all that, and possibly his first love _was_ Russell. <br /><br />From what I recall, he does wax anti-Platonic at least at one point in "On what there is" where he refers to the 'beard of Plato' that the razor by Occam is supposed to cut, but I should revise that! --<br /><br />From what I recall, his example is "Pegasus", and indeed<br /><br />x pegasises.<br /><br />comes out as something sensible to say (on occasion). I am told that the logician R. Martin called his cat "Pegasus" just to refute Quine.<br /><br />---- But surely there are complications with the 'what-there-is' criterion (of x) when it comes, to use Jones's example:<br /><br />------ classes per se.<br /><br />and<br /><br />-- universalia at large. For Quine would admit that 'being Pegasus' is now treated as a 'universal' (a predicate) which ranges over x, y, z. We look at our universe of discouse and we don't see any flying horse, so we conclude that 'nothing pegasises.' We may still, alla Grice in "Reply to Richards", want to consider empty classes ('vacuous names and descriptions'). Recall the subtleties brought by Grice in "Vacuous Names" that Jones has admirably identified and expanded on in his pdf document. "There is Pegasus". "Something is a flying horse". "There exists a flying horse", and so on. (Grice deals with these in term of syntactic scope distinctions, but various other approaches are conceivable, and Jones have dealt with some of them).<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"Quine conducts this analysis in the context of set theory, and its relevance to Principia Mathematica remains to be established. It is now generally accepted that Russell's no-class theory does not eliminate classes in the way that they would be eliminated if only virtual classes were admitted in set theory. This is because Russell's theory of types does have a complete hierachy of types of propositional functions, which, apart from not being extensional, are logically similar to sets. Russell's incomplete symbols in this case allow classes to be eliminated in favour of propositional functions, rather than eliminated altogether. So Russell's ontology is almost as rich as Zermelo set theory, but it just happens that the things in it are mostly functions not sets. The effect is that the limitations Quine illustrates on what can be done with virtual classes in set theory do not apply to their use in Russell's theory of types. Russell's ontological parsimony (at roundabout the time of Principia) was not limited to the "no class" theory. He followed up with his philosophy of logical atomism, which is more explicitly metaphysical."<br /><br />I loved that! On top of that, he was an empiricist to the backbone, as I recall. And one which ended up influencing Oxford more than its share. Since Ayer was in love with the empiricism of Russell (what _things_ are 'sense data'? and G. A. Paul, one of Grice's group, and his reply to: "Is there a problem about sense data?").<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"As well as the distinction between real classes and virtual classes, Russell talks about logical fictions."<br /><br />I think he was quoting Bentham?<br /><br />"When he considers how to apply modern logic to science a key idea is the idea of a "logical construction"."<br /><br />A lovely keyword that reappears in Grice, via Broad. Since Grice is defending, strongly, a 'logical construction' (versus pure ego, or disguised description) approach to "I" statement ("Personal identity"). What kind of metaphysics is implied, Grice asks, when one says,<br /><br />"I was hit by a cricket ball."<br /><br />What does "I" stand for? What is the value of x<br /><br />(Ex) x was hit by a cricket ball.<br /><br />He ends up suggesting that "I" refers to mnemonic states in chains of them, alla Locke. This is pure empiricism, in that he does not consider the extension of the _body_ -- just the memories of a thinking subject. He was possibly right. He does note that "I" sometimes seems to refer to just "my body" ("I fell from the stairs"), and so on. He wrote this in 1941, and one of his moving examples (!) was: "I will be fighting soon", where "I" is like a 'combo', he feels, of mind-AND-body (or soul, if you must). And so on.<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"So the idea is that complex objects are logical constructions from atomic entities of some kind (perhaps material atoms, perhaps sense data)."<br /><br />Perhaps sense data, indeed. J. O. Urmson, one in Grice's group, was fascinated with this. He wrote a little book which was published by the OUP, "Philosophical analysis between the two wars", which is all about atomism. From what I recall, he seems to have seen Russell's empiricism of sense-data as fluent and sophisticated enough, while it was _Witters_'s (or Wittgenstein's) atomism he found pretty simplistic. He had a good example or two there. The atomism of:<br /><br />"He took off his trousers and went to bed" p & q<br />"He went to bed and took off his trousers"<br /><br />They depict the same state of affairs. The 'atoms' are just two, and the 'and then'-implicature of temporal succession is always cancellable ("But I do not mean to imply he did that in that order".) I was always fascinated by that example in that, in the original Urmson context (Grice will go on to use the same example, in "Presupposition and conversational implicature", but not in the WoW reprint) Urmson cares to consider the metaphysical implications. He then expands it to "if".<br /><br />What sort of metaphysics, or ontology, is the one that one commits when one uses "if". He, like Grice, and zillions, think 'if' is only truth-functional. So the 'atom' "p" and the atom "q" then get combined. But Strawson and zillion others would disagree and allow for a different metaphysics, where the 'atoms' are not just truth-functionally correlated. There is an element of 'inferrability' that Strawson suggests is _entailed_ (or strictly, 'conventionally implicated') by "if p, q", that is NOT implicated by truth-functional equivalences of this. And so on.<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"These logical constructions yield logical fictions, but this does not mean that we do not need to have them in the range of the quantifiers. So incomplete symbols might possibly count as logical fictions, but they don't by any means exhaust the logical fictions, many of which (like propositional functions in general) are in the range of quantifiers. If we read Quine here as criticising Russell's beliefs about what can be achieved with incomplete symbols, then the criticism fails in two ways. Firstly because what you can do with incomplete symbols is not independent of context, Russell could manage without classes in the context of his type theory, even though Quine could not in a first order set theory (because he has no alternative ontology). Secondly, we may observe that Russell no more than Carnap believes that the range of the quantifiers has the metaphysical significance which Quine seems to suggest. Russell is happy to quantify over logical fictions, and presumably does not think that logical fictions are "real". Carnap goes one step further in denying that the metaphysical question is meaningful (let alone relevant)."<br /><br />This above was excellent. The way Jones identified the main issues and provided questions to them.<br /><br />Jones goes on:<br /><br />"Carnap's step here is widely misunderstood, but I think should be regarded as possibly his most important contribution to metaphysics, for I know of no previous philosopher who considered it metaphysical even to allow that the questions (e.g. absolute, external. questions about existence) have an answer. This connects us with Carnap's "Principle of Tolerance". In "On What there Is", the alleged ontological commitment involved (let us suppose) in the use of a language, means that someone can be accused of inconsistency for using two languages whose ontological commitments are incompatible. It is this kind of accusation of inconsistency which, according to Carnap, provoked his principle of tolerance. As a graduate student he recalls discussions with friends in which he would use (say) materialistic or idealistic language depending on who he was talking to. He was then criticised by some for inconsistency. The idea is that you either are a materialist or an idealist. Whichever you are you must not use the language of the other, for that entails assent to multiple incompatible metaphysical ontologies."<br /><br />I liked that. From what I recall, it had an influence in the USA (and Dummett!) via Sellars, and other empiricists. For indeed, are we being phenomenalist or physicalist in our language of choice? Grice would think that the 'syntax of illusion' (his phrase, but others as well) is more complex than that. It seems that the language (and syntax) not of 'material-object' (physicalism) but of sense data (idealism) is pretty complex. Grice was fascinated by ways one level (or stratum, to use Waissman's wording) entails the other.<br /><br />"The pillar box seems red to me."<br /><br />"It looks to me as if the pillar box is red."<br /><br />and so on.<br /><br />What would be a PHYSICALIST claim at this point? Grice is a Lockean, so <br /><br />'x is red'<br /><br />would not count, since we are having secondary qualities involved. So, it seems that the 'implicatures' of tolerance are many and varied.<br /><br />--- (Dummett, in Truth and Other Enigmas, which includes some early pieces, elaborates on physicalism vs. phenomenalism in terms of the language of perception, and such).<br /><br />---<br /><br />Jones:<br /><br />"Carnap's principle of tolerance is just the rejection of this point of view, the relativisation of metaphysics (which of course, once relativised may no longer be called metaphysics, and of course is not counted as metaphysics by Carnap, because it is just a working out of the semantics of the language and hence of necessity de dicto rather than de re). As to "The City of Eternal Truth", where are these to be found in ontology. After all this relativisation what room do we have for ontological absolutes, are there any necessary truths in ontology?<br />Well, the obvious candidates is questions of consistency.<br />Even if any ontology were possible, not every description of an ontology is consistent.<br />The natural context in which the most difficult questions of this kind are addressed is set theory, where the relative consistency of large cardinals is considered.<br />This is just the preferred language in which such questions are considered, and questions about the consistency of arbitrary logical systems (and their underlying ontologies) are generally answered by reduction to set theory.<br />If we argue that such questions are "absolute" in some sense, does that make them metaphysics rather than just logic?"<br /><br />No, just logic!<br /><br />This reminds me of Daniel Vanderveken and John Searle. I was, elsewhere, discussing their book and we found that Vanderveken just applied set-theory to all the machinations (if that's the word) by Searle. The result is a success! So, indeed, set-theory is all that a philosopher needs, sometime! And so on. But more later, I hope. Cheers.Luigi Speranzahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.com1