Speranza
Nothing too substantial, or substantive (if that's not a metaphysical monicker I don't know what is), but I got this via S. Clark's mailing list today, and thought of sharing. It's a CFP (I'm not sending one! I think!) on 'the metaphysics of physics', which should be an interesting combo to consider.
This is what the organiser wrote -- the original e-mail is to be found in Clark's archives for the University of Liverpool:
"Very recently, and after a long hiatus, the metaphysics of physics has enjoyed a
remarkable renaissance, with both philosophers and physicists addressing
explicitly metaphysical questions that arise in the context of physics and the
interpretation of its theories."
"As theoretical physics has achieved dramatic
progress, pushing back the boundaries of our knowledge and forcing us to rethink
our most fundamental concepts describing physical reality, questions about the
impact of this rapid development on traditionally conceived metaphysical
investigations become urgent. Does it make metaphysics irrelevant, or does it
call for an altogether new metaphysics?"
"On the other hand, physics has
encountered more than a few roadblocks in its fundamental endeavours, e.g. in
attempts to bring gravity into the fold of the standard model. Could
reconceiving the metaphysical foundations of fundamental physical theories
possibly lead to a breakthrough, as some have suggested?"
"The aim of this
volume is to bring together papers that address various aspects of the mutual
interrelations between contemporary research in theoretical physics and the
conceptual work done in analytic metaphysics. The suggested topics for the
contributions to the volume include, but are most definitely not limited to, the
following questions: “Are fundamental objects postulated by our physical
theories (elementary particles, fields, spacetime points, etc.) individuals with
intrinsic properties and well-defined identities, or perhaps relational
structures with no relata?”, “What is the ontological significance of symmetries
in physical theories?”, “How does spacetime emerge from the quantum
phenomena?”"
"We invite original research papers on topics related to the
general description of the planned volume."
---- So there you have:
I suppose the keywords then:
METAPHYSICS, METAPHYSIC, METAPHYSICAL as attached to PHYSICS.
In this instance, it seems like the prefix, 'meta-' becomes indeed ambiguous. For how would you distinguish meta-physics of physics, or a meta-physical approach to physics from simply a meta-theoretical approach to physical theory? Or something like that.
But it may do to revise the organiser's wording and reflect or elaborate on them!
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Thanks for posting this Speranza.
ReplyDeletePossibly this might be a domain in which some kind of joint Grice/Speranza engagment might take place, though there might have to be some mutual tolerance on exactly how to describe the matters at hand.
Carnap began, in his doctoral dissertation, considering space, and his first thesis proposals in this area sought to meld philosophy and physics in a way which proved acceptable to neither department, forcing a bit of a rethink. I'm not myself acquainted with any of the detail but I did try in the past to engage with the formalisation of physics as a prelude to addressing some kind of metaphysics.
I have had teh impression myself that physicists consider within their domain of expertise many of the prohlems traditionally considered metaphysical.
Carnap would I think disagree with them but would be happy to endorse the resulting languiage on a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic basis.
It seems to me that though the phrase "metaphysics of physics" might be multiply construed, the later description in terms of "theoretical physics" and "analytic metaphysics" is nicer, and I think one might make of the phrase "analytic metaphysics" something which Carnap might happily embrace (though perhaps still preferring other words).
RBJ