-------------------------- LEIBNIZ'S
-------------------------- use of the "S is P"
-------------------------- formula
.
.
.
CARNAP ----------------------------- GRICE
L-equivalence
M-postulate
Method of intensions
------------------------------------pre-defense of
----------------------------------- a dogma
--------------------------- (NO USE FOR ANALYTICITY)
------------------------Quine's attack
Carnap's ------------------------ Grice, champion
emphasis on L-equivalence -------- of ordinary language.
emphasis on pragmatics ----------- "Paradigm Case Argument"
---------------------------------- people HAVE ways to deal
---------------------------------- with analytically FALSE
---------------------------------- statements. They claim
---------------------------------- incomprehension. "My
---------------------------------- neighbour's three year old is an adult"
Carnap on intensions -------------- Grice's
as reducible set-theoretically ----- later takes
to extensions ----------------------- on the 'analytic'
-------------------------------------- as a transcendental
-------------------------------------- requisite in any
-------------------------------------- language we can think of.
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Grice's movement here seems more startling than Carnap's.
ReplyDeleteDid he really say there was no use for analyticity?
And at the end, is he rejecting the Wittgensteinian conception of language as admiting "games" which don't fit into the Tractarian picture?
To say analyticity is of the essence is pretty much the same as to say "truth conditions" are of the essence, but surely this characterises not all language, but just a particularly important kind of language. The kind which I recently decided might best be called "propositional" (which assumes that a minimal conception of proposition as the meaning of sentences, does include truth conditions).
RBJ
Well, the attack by Quine came early enough in Grice's career. I would not think Grice, being a conservative reactionary type, would have cared for 'analytic' UNLESS Quine had attacked it.
ReplyDeleteRecall Grice reminiscing Grandy (WoW:Meaning Revisited) as 'rallying to the defense of the underdog').
Thus, while there IS a presupposition of 'analyticity' in "Personal Identity" (1941) -- for how can a logical contruction work unless there is an analytic truth? -- and in "Meaning" (1948) -- for he is propounding tests to 'elucidate' the import of an expression -- I would not think he used the very precise 'analytic' much.
----
As for the later takes -- he would, I think, indeed refuse the name 'language' to those silly games Witters thought people were playing. Recall 'language' is NOT a term used by Grice much -- and when he DOES use it, he is very serious about it. He can think of 'communication', etc., but LANGUAGE is serious and PRESUPPOSES the idea of 'analyticity'. Recall that in Strand 5, for example, when he is discussing the institution of truth-conditions -- to call a spade a spade --, a semantic assignation of that type seems to be built on analytic truths -- not just "a spade is a spade" but "if x is a tool for digging garden flower beds, x is a spade", and so on.
The 'transcendental' character of 'analytic' Grice develops in TWO pieces: The Reply to Richards (which came out in 1986) and the Retrospective Epilgue (after Strand 8 -- when he discusses Oxonian dialectic). He is very serious about NOT being serious with Quine. Etc.