This is a few words about what I think the most important point on which to progress the Carnap/Grice conversation on its way toward the City of Eternal Truth.
There is the proposition thing, which I raised on the Grice Club, possibly at a bad moment to get a response.
I shalln't press that one here.
The other main area of apparent discord and hence possible progress is the Griceian Bete's.
We have, in "the conversation" (PDF), an account by Speranza of what these Bete's are, but if a conciliation is sought between Grice and the beastly aspects of Carnap, the detail will be important. Important, for example, to check out my hunch that Grice's opposition is to radical or dogmatic beastlyness, rather than moderate and pragmatic minimalisations.
To this end it would be nice to know the detail (if there is any) about what Grice said about the Bete's.
This seems to me rather more difficult than progressing Grice's attitude towards the proposition. For in that latter case, I have plenty on "meaning", even "central meaning" in WOW, which can be assessed in relation to the notion of proposition (construed as a semantic entity) even if Grice didn't like that word.
But I am less aware of his having written about the Bete's and even if detailed textual references might not be forthcoming, any pointers would be of interest.
Roger Jones
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Meaning Postulates for "Refudiate"
Since I discovered the Palindrone [sic], 'refudiate', in yesterday's Newsweek, I've been having a field day at the Grice Club.
I wonder about meaning postulates, an archaism from Carnap (I mean, as Jones will tell us, he disallowed the notion in later writings).
Consider this from an online source for the defense of Palin's neologism, 'refudiate':
"a conjunction of repudiate (i.e., renounce the planned building) and refute (i.e., dispute the notion that it is necessary and appropriate at that exact location)."
Grice is never so strict as Carnap is that for any predicate we should provide, in System C-sub-R, with a 'meaning-postulate'. For Grice, the meaning-intention is constitutive. If Palin meant that the mosque plan should be 'refudiated', she obviously (we hope) meant that that was a negative-attitude that was being promoted, one attitude like repudiation and refutation and refuse. Since there was no covertness in her intention, she MEANT that, or HOPED to mean that.
I wonder about meaning postulates, an archaism from Carnap (I mean, as Jones will tell us, he disallowed the notion in later writings).
Consider this from an online source for the defense of Palin's neologism, 'refudiate':
"a conjunction of repudiate (i.e., renounce the planned building) and refute (i.e., dispute the notion that it is necessary and appropriate at that exact location)."
Grice is never so strict as Carnap is that for any predicate we should provide, in System C-sub-R, with a 'meaning-postulate'. For Grice, the meaning-intention is constitutive. If Palin meant that the mosque plan should be 'refudiated', she obviously (we hope) meant that that was a negative-attitude that was being promoted, one attitude like repudiation and refutation and refuse. Since there was no covertness in her intention, she MEANT that, or HOPED to mean that.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Belnap and Company
Glad to know that Jones, as he notes in his "Carnap Corner" blog found online some excellent pdf essay on Carnap, which cross-references with Belnap's "Carnap's lamp" essay, which he also refers to in a different post.
I had read Belnap's essay and have found it of great interest and was impressed by the technicality of the previous essay that Jones referred to, that compares Carnap with computer programming.
I am glad Jones will compare the 'flatness' of Belnap with the 'shallowness' of his own approach to stuff including Grice's 'Vacuous Names'. Etc.
I had read Belnap's essay and have found it of great interest and was impressed by the technicality of the previous essay that Jones referred to, that compares Carnap with computer programming.
I am glad Jones will compare the 'flatness' of Belnap with the 'shallowness' of his own approach to stuff including Grice's 'Vacuous Names'. Etc.
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Grice on Vacuous Names and X-Methods
By Roger Bishop Jones for The City of Eternal Truth
What is the point of my paper Grice on Vacuous Names, and how does it bear upon "The City of Eternal Truth".
Well, the key to Eternal Truth, rather than the usual philosophical speculative froth, is in analytic method.
The way we approach The City is through a dialogue between Carnap* and Grice*, in which by a constructive comparative analysis the philosophies of the two men evolve toward an effective analytic method.
This paper is one element of this process.
After an initial flurry in constructing the formal model (called System C) which one might think of as a hybrid between a formal model of and a dialectical response to system Q, I will use this as an example for the description and discussion of analytic methods. I decided to use the term "X-Methods" as a label for the position I am now developing on a pluralistic analytic method (this is the kind of thing which Carnap* might have come up with).
The exposition will be split across two chapters of a multi-volume work of formal philosophy (at present called "analyses of analysis") of which the material on Grice's system Q will form a chapter.
An earlier chapter in the work is intended to provide a discussion of the methods employed in the book, and I hope to progress that chapter and make clear in "Grice on Vacuous Names" how that chapter exemplifies the methods.
These methods are Carnap*'s approach to Eternal Truth.
Roger Jones
What is the point of my paper Grice on Vacuous Names, and how does it bear upon "The City of Eternal Truth".
Well, the key to Eternal Truth, rather than the usual philosophical speculative froth, is in analytic method.
The way we approach The City is through a dialogue between Carnap* and Grice*, in which by a constructive comparative analysis the philosophies of the two men evolve toward an effective analytic method.
This paper is one element of this process.
After an initial flurry in constructing the formal model (called System C) which one might think of as a hybrid between a formal model of and a dialectical response to system Q, I will use this as an example for the description and discussion of analytic methods. I decided to use the term "X-Methods" as a label for the position I am now developing on a pluralistic analytic method (this is the kind of thing which Carnap* might have come up with).
The exposition will be split across two chapters of a multi-volume work of formal philosophy (at present called "analyses of analysis") of which the material on Grice's system Q will form a chapter.
An earlier chapter in the work is intended to provide a discussion of the methods employed in the book, and I hope to progress that chapter and make clear in "Grice on Vacuous Names" how that chapter exemplifies the methods.
These methods are Carnap*'s approach to Eternal Truth.
Roger Jones
Fascinated that Jones created system C!
by J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club.
I am fascinated that R. B. Jones cared to create "System C" at:
rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t037.pdf
----
Little summary of how this fits with the "City of Eternal Truth". Maria R., in her entry, "non-existent objects", for the Stanford, mentions "The Golden Mountain" as a non-existent object. She does NOT mention, "The City of Eternal Truth" as a similarly non-existent thing, so there's hope for us!
In any case, as Jones notes, he created "System C" as a tribute to Carnap. And as he notes this is echoing Grice who coined his System Q in tribute to Quine and, perhaps more importantly, to Myro who 'coined' his system -- System G -- as a tribute to Grice. I have elsewhere (S/H, etc.) referred to the thing as System GHP.
So we have a few systems here! That's good!
I am fascinated that R. B. Jones cared to create "System C" at:
rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t037.pdf
----
Little summary of how this fits with the "City of Eternal Truth". Maria R., in her entry, "non-existent objects", for the Stanford, mentions "The Golden Mountain" as a non-existent object. She does NOT mention, "The City of Eternal Truth" as a similarly non-existent thing, so there's hope for us!
In any case, as Jones notes, he created "System C" as a tribute to Carnap. And as he notes this is echoing Grice who coined his System Q in tribute to Quine and, perhaps more importantly, to Myro who 'coined' his system -- System G -- as a tribute to Grice. I have elsewhere (S/H, etc.) referred to the thing as System GHP.
So we have a few systems here! That's good!
Friday, June 4, 2010
Bootstrap: System CR, System GHP
by J. L. Speranza
THIS MEANT as commentary to Jones's commentary -- but system disallowed it. It's all about 'pulling oneself up by one's bootstraps' in special connection with something like Carnap's System CR and Grice's System Q which becomes Myro's System GHP.
Very good points. Indeed, System GHP is intended as a 'model' of, say, say English. I call it "H. P." to refer to 'highly plausible' or 'hopefully powerful' -- while sticking to the initials of Grice being H. P, Herbert Paul.
And you are right that it's not meant as a 'meta-language' in principle. Indeed, in defining System Q (which is the one that Grice himself created) he uses natural English, ordinary English, as the metalanguage for his Sysem Q (and Myro does the same when defining his System G -- on which System GHP is based. Consider:
"If phi is a formula, phi /\ psi is a formula".
That simple enough 'formation rule' for System GHP -- actually subscripts for the three elemnts of "phi /\ psi" would be needed -- may cover some complexity should we want to define it in the object-language of System GHP itself. For it involves a sort of predicate-calculus, and we are dealing with the propositional-calculus segment of System GHP. For " ... is a formula" is really quite a piece of work, if you ask me! In any case I would think that Grice intends his System Q to cover BOTH the object-language (L1) and the meta-language -- but I would need to revise this. Similarly, in WoW:first two pages of 'Logic and Conversation' when he paints the picture of the Formalist (alla Hilbert) as dealing with a 'set of formulae' which may be taken as axiomata, etc., he seems to be talking of 'system', as he indeed is, as the 'proper' set of formulae -- 'proper' in the sense of 'itself', not qua technical term in set-theory! -- rather than as the set of formulae cum editorial work that the meta-language L2 may provide. But this may be tricky. In any case, there seems to be some sort of regress in that if, as Grice thinks, the formalist's point in constructing L1 is to free the language of 'metaphysical excrescences', what would the point be if any such excrescence, metaphysical or other, is brought onto the system via the meta-language?
Tarksi is a good case in point, maybe -- for I thought his "Semantic definition of truth" FULL of metaphysics at the meta-level. And it may be something like an examination of work being done by Davidson at Berkeley that had Grice formulating Bootstrap in the first place! (I am referring to Davidson on his "Truth" essay in Synthese that apparently had a big influence on Strawson's student, Strawson). But will re-read stuff and elaborate (mean: think). Thanks for input.
THIS MEANT as commentary to Jones's commentary -- but system disallowed it. It's all about 'pulling oneself up by one's bootstraps' in special connection with something like Carnap's System CR and Grice's System Q which becomes Myro's System GHP.
Very good points. Indeed, System GHP is intended as a 'model' of, say, say English. I call it "H. P." to refer to 'highly plausible' or 'hopefully powerful' -- while sticking to the initials of Grice being H. P, Herbert Paul.
And you are right that it's not meant as a 'meta-language' in principle. Indeed, in defining System Q (which is the one that Grice himself created) he uses natural English, ordinary English, as the metalanguage for his Sysem Q (and Myro does the same when defining his System G -- on which System GHP is based. Consider:
"If phi is a formula, phi /\ psi is a formula".
That simple enough 'formation rule' for System GHP -- actually subscripts for the three elemnts of "phi /\ psi" would be needed -- may cover some complexity should we want to define it in the object-language of System GHP itself. For it involves a sort of predicate-calculus, and we are dealing with the propositional-calculus segment of System GHP. For " ... is a formula" is really quite a piece of work, if you ask me! In any case I would think that Grice intends his System Q to cover BOTH the object-language (L1) and the meta-language -- but I would need to revise this. Similarly, in WoW:first two pages of 'Logic and Conversation' when he paints the picture of the Formalist (alla Hilbert) as dealing with a 'set of formulae' which may be taken as axiomata, etc., he seems to be talking of 'system', as he indeed is, as the 'proper' set of formulae -- 'proper' in the sense of 'itself', not qua technical term in set-theory! -- rather than as the set of formulae cum editorial work that the meta-language L2 may provide. But this may be tricky. In any case, there seems to be some sort of regress in that if, as Grice thinks, the formalist's point in constructing L1 is to free the language of 'metaphysical excrescences', what would the point be if any such excrescence, metaphysical or other, is brought onto the system via the meta-language?
Tarksi is a good case in point, maybe -- for I thought his "Semantic definition of truth" FULL of metaphysics at the meta-level. And it may be something like an examination of work being done by Davidson at Berkeley that had Grice formulating Bootstrap in the first place! (I am referring to Davidson on his "Truth" essay in Synthese that apparently had a big influence on Strawson's student, Strawson). But will re-read stuff and elaborate (mean: think). Thanks for input.
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Carnap and Grice pulling ourselves up by their own bootstraps
by JLS
THIS WAS MEANT as comment to the previous post, but system disallowed it.
Good. Yes, there must be something Tarskian behind this. Grice refers only briefly to Tarski in WoW:55 re: "Monkeys can talk", when he writes: "A theory of truth has (as Tarski notes) to provide not only for occurrences of true in sentennces in whch what is being spoken of as true is specified [in the object-language] but also for occurrences in which no specification is given (e.g. The policeman's statement was true)."
(Grice thought that Strawson's and indeed Ramsey's (whom he also quotes on that same page) failed to provide for that.
But I'm not sure about the NL-FL (natural-formal language) distinction at this point. Yes, there must have been something along that line in the Carnap-Grice difference of outlook. But I would think that syntax, even in NL, allows for a pretty easy way to mark the object-language/meta-language distinction: the simple quotes or scare quotes --. So, even in terms of syntactic admissability (which you say you are laxer when it comes to something like a System, and like to indulge in the semantics-ontology interface) I would think Grice is seeing a bigger problem there.
It would seem then that we do have an user of the L1 -- this may be a given. A system like System GHP, or System CR, aims at reconstructing or constructing a segment of "NL" (or the language of scientists in Carnap's construal) as it is used (provisos there). But what about L2? This is the system-analyst's job (There IS a discipline, 'systems analysis', no?, so I propose such a reference when we talk of approaching a System like System GHP or System CR --. A mere truth-functional equivalence, of the Tarski type, to allow for the specification of what the policeman said as true may be complexer than it sounds. For we will not be satisfied with 'Monkeys can talk is true' iff monkeys can talk. In 'elucidation' of various types, including philosophical, if we were asked to provide a truth-functional equivalence of "Monkeys can talk" we may rather be inspired to provide an excursus onto what we mean, in the object-language, by 'monkey', by 'talk', and by 'can'. Suppose we arrive at the conclusion that it means, 'Any specimen s of Pan troglodytes has a procedure in the repertoire which has a finite set of initial devices, together with semantic provisions for them, and a finite set of different syntactical operations or combinations, and an understanding of what the functions of those modes of combination are, so that s can generate an infinite set of utterances or complex devices, together with a correspodningly infinite set of things to be communicated by them" (apres WoW:296). Even here we would be using 'talk' in scare quotes, since apparently, Nim Chimsky may be said to 'talk' rather than talk -- i.e. the malleability of the phonetic apparatus seems to be missing.
But I don't think Grice was into specific claims in the object-language, "Monkeys can talk" that may need an elucidation in terms of the meta-language. Rather, as I believe Jones does, too with his interesting notion of semantic regress and meta-circular definitions, and the brilliant idea of the Scylla and Charidis -- bewteen meta-circularity and regressus ad infinitum -- the problem lies at the heart of the 'constructivist' enterprise.
In any case, it is a good reminder to keep a good eye on what logicians mean when they jump to metalogic (as some of them do) in a way that they think washes 'their hands' with respect to the object-language.
The 'order' index may be indicative too. System GHP, or System CR, may be thought of as a language, L1. But what about L2. As Grice describes System Q in his "Vacuous Names", he uses English, indeed, not System Q itself. But is this a mere 'abbreviatory' manoeuvre? We hope so. But are we sure? The point may be trickier. In an introduction or elimination rule for a connective, say, when a System like System GHP uses the very idea of 'valid' inference, isn't it a bit of an 'act of faith' that such openly 'meta-linguistic' operation will yield an expression in the object-language? In some logic tracts the meta-language (meta-logic) is so much richer that one doubts! Or consider the semantics, where it interfaces with the ontology (or metaphysics as Grice would prefer -- recall that Part II of WoW is entitled, "Explorations in semantics and metaphysics" --. When the meta-language (in System GHP) speaks of 'Corr (1)', correlation with truth, and 'Corr (0)' and correlation with falsity, as it provides the 'truth-tables' for each operator -- e.g. monadic or dyadic truth-functors -- what would THAT statement, i.e. the statement of each such correlation -- yield when expressed in the object-language. I AM hoping that Tarski was, as Jones said he was, 'premature' in rejecting meta-circularity. I am positive that Grice loved a circle! (WoW: Meaning Revisited -- last section, is all about Schiffer's allegations of circularity in Grice and he goes on to bring in the platonic "circle" as a case in point to prove Schiffer wrong!)
THIS WAS MEANT as comment to the previous post, but system disallowed it.
Good. Yes, there must be something Tarskian behind this. Grice refers only briefly to Tarski in WoW:55 re: "Monkeys can talk", when he writes: "A theory of truth has (as Tarski notes) to provide not only for occurrences of true in sentennces in whch what is being spoken of as true is specified [in the object-language] but also for occurrences in which no specification is given (e.g. The policeman's statement was true)."
(Grice thought that Strawson's and indeed Ramsey's (whom he also quotes on that same page) failed to provide for that.
But I'm not sure about the NL-FL (natural-formal language) distinction at this point. Yes, there must have been something along that line in the Carnap-Grice difference of outlook. But I would think that syntax, even in NL, allows for a pretty easy way to mark the object-language/meta-language distinction: the simple quotes or scare quotes --. So, even in terms of syntactic admissability (which you say you are laxer when it comes to something like a System, and like to indulge in the semantics-ontology interface) I would think Grice is seeing a bigger problem there.
It would seem then that we do have an user of the L1 -- this may be a given. A system like System GHP, or System CR, aims at reconstructing or constructing a segment of "NL" (or the language of scientists in Carnap's construal) as it is used (provisos there). But what about L2? This is the system-analyst's job (There IS a discipline, 'systems analysis', no?, so I propose such a reference when we talk of approaching a System like System GHP or System CR --. A mere truth-functional equivalence, of the Tarski type, to allow for the specification of what the policeman said as true may be complexer than it sounds. For we will not be satisfied with 'Monkeys can talk is true' iff monkeys can talk. In 'elucidation' of various types, including philosophical, if we were asked to provide a truth-functional equivalence of "Monkeys can talk" we may rather be inspired to provide an excursus onto what we mean, in the object-language, by 'monkey', by 'talk', and by 'can'. Suppose we arrive at the conclusion that it means, 'Any specimen s of Pan troglodytes has a procedure in the repertoire which has a finite set of initial devices, together with semantic provisions for them, and a finite set of different syntactical operations or combinations, and an understanding of what the functions of those modes of combination are, so that s can generate an infinite set of utterances or complex devices, together with a correspodningly infinite set of things to be communicated by them" (apres WoW:296). Even here we would be using 'talk' in scare quotes, since apparently, Nim Chimsky may be said to 'talk' rather than talk -- i.e. the malleability of the phonetic apparatus seems to be missing.
But I don't think Grice was into specific claims in the object-language, "Monkeys can talk" that may need an elucidation in terms of the meta-language. Rather, as I believe Jones does, too with his interesting notion of semantic regress and meta-circular definitions, and the brilliant idea of the Scylla and Charidis -- bewteen meta-circularity and regressus ad infinitum -- the problem lies at the heart of the 'constructivist' enterprise.
In any case, it is a good reminder to keep a good eye on what logicians mean when they jump to metalogic (as some of them do) in a way that they think washes 'their hands' with respect to the object-language.
The 'order' index may be indicative too. System GHP, or System CR, may be thought of as a language, L1. But what about L2. As Grice describes System Q in his "Vacuous Names", he uses English, indeed, not System Q itself. But is this a mere 'abbreviatory' manoeuvre? We hope so. But are we sure? The point may be trickier. In an introduction or elimination rule for a connective, say, when a System like System GHP uses the very idea of 'valid' inference, isn't it a bit of an 'act of faith' that such openly 'meta-linguistic' operation will yield an expression in the object-language? In some logic tracts the meta-language (meta-logic) is so much richer that one doubts! Or consider the semantics, where it interfaces with the ontology (or metaphysics as Grice would prefer -- recall that Part II of WoW is entitled, "Explorations in semantics and metaphysics" --. When the meta-language (in System GHP) speaks of 'Corr (1)', correlation with truth, and 'Corr (0)' and correlation with falsity, as it provides the 'truth-tables' for each operator -- e.g. monadic or dyadic truth-functors -- what would THAT statement, i.e. the statement of each such correlation -- yield when expressed in the object-language. I AM hoping that Tarski was, as Jones said he was, 'premature' in rejecting meta-circularity. I am positive that Grice loved a circle! (WoW: Meaning Revisited -- last section, is all about Schiffer's allegations of circularity in Grice and he goes on to bring in the platonic "circle" as a case in point to prove Schiffer wrong!)
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Carnap and Grice pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps
--- by JLS
--- IN "PREJUDICES AND PREDILECTIONS", which is the title I prefer for "Reply to Richards", (online books), Grice speaks of "Bootstrap". I may have quoted verbatim what the principle amounts to in the Grice Club. From memory. It concerns Russell's neologisms:
object-language (here the hyphen is important and the idea of 'object' IS important)
meta-language.
Let's use L1 and L2 for those. Since this is really a System. We can deal with the first order System GHP, or first-order System CR, alternatively.
(But there is the caveat that 'second-order' does not really necessarily MEAN 'metalanguage').
So, let's grab the piece by Grice!
--- He writes:
It is p. 93 of P. G. R. I. C. E., ed. Grandy/Warner (Clarendon Press).
He is considering points which I have discussed in the club, as to levels of priority and levels of conceptual priority, and subscripting to levels of conceptual priority (reminiscing this PhD I was referring to recently at the Grice Club regarding the point of the "... means ..."). In any case, Grice is being VERY general here, and surely he doesn't have just '... means ...' as his focus. He is considering sense-data, and moral/legal notions, too. He is considering ontology and epistemology (ontological priority, epistemic ontology), etc. He writes:
"It is perhaps reasonable to regard such fine
distinction as indispensable if we are to succeed
in the business of pulling ourselves up by our
own bootstraps. In this connection it will be
relevant for me to say that I once invented
(though I did not establish its validity) a
principle which I labelled as Boostrap. The
principle laid down that when one is introducing
the primitive concepts of a theory formulated
in an object-language, one has freedom to use
any battery of concepts expressible in the
meta-language, subject to the condition that
counterparts of such concepts are
subsequently definable or otherwise derivable
in the object-language. So the more economically
one introduces the primitive object-language concepts,
the less of a task one leaves oneself for the morrow".
I propose the above vis a vis Jones's VERY intersting reflections, here and in the other two blogs, Grice Club and Carnap Corner, about the role of metalogic in the development of twentieth-century logic -- a topic that fascinates us both. And Jones's expertise allows him to utter some very bold and inspiring and truly exegetical claims in the direction where progress should lead to.
--- IN "PREJUDICES AND PREDILECTIONS", which is the title I prefer for "Reply to Richards", (online books), Grice speaks of "Bootstrap". I may have quoted verbatim what the principle amounts to in the Grice Club. From memory. It concerns Russell's neologisms:
object-language (here the hyphen is important and the idea of 'object' IS important)
meta-language.
Let's use L1 and L2 for those. Since this is really a System. We can deal with the first order System GHP, or first-order System CR, alternatively.
(But there is the caveat that 'second-order' does not really necessarily MEAN 'metalanguage').
So, let's grab the piece by Grice!
--- He writes:
It is p. 93 of P. G. R. I. C. E., ed. Grandy/Warner (Clarendon Press).
He is considering points which I have discussed in the club, as to levels of priority and levels of conceptual priority, and subscripting to levels of conceptual priority (reminiscing this PhD I was referring to recently at the Grice Club regarding the point of the "... means ..."). In any case, Grice is being VERY general here, and surely he doesn't have just '... means ...' as his focus. He is considering sense-data, and moral/legal notions, too. He is considering ontology and epistemology (ontological priority, epistemic ontology), etc. He writes:
"It is perhaps reasonable to regard such fine
distinction as indispensable if we are to succeed
in the business of pulling ourselves up by our
own bootstraps. In this connection it will be
relevant for me to say that I once invented
(though I did not establish its validity) a
principle which I labelled as Boostrap. The
principle laid down that when one is introducing
the primitive concepts of a theory formulated
in an object-language, one has freedom to use
any battery of concepts expressible in the
meta-language, subject to the condition that
counterparts of such concepts are
subsequently definable or otherwise derivable
in the object-language. So the more economically
one introduces the primitive object-language concepts,
the less of a task one leaves oneself for the morrow".
I propose the above vis a vis Jones's VERY intersting reflections, here and in the other two blogs, Grice Club and Carnap Corner, about the role of metalogic in the development of twentieth-century logic -- a topic that fascinates us both. And Jones's expertise allows him to utter some very bold and inspiring and truly exegetical claims in the direction where progress should lead to.
System GHP, System CR and Jones's Systems
By J. L. Speranza
JONES WROTE in his commentary to "System CR and System GHP"
"[Mine] is a first order set theory".
Obviously Grice was familiar with this, since often he would refer to set-theoretical concepts -- mainly in his attack of 'Extensionalism', which just ignores all that Carnap said about intensions or the mere possibility of defining intensions in terms of extensions. This is the only treatment of a bete noire in his "Reply to Richards". He tires with the details soon enough and proposes to deal with the twelve betes noires en bloc, as offsprings of Minimalism -- in THIS connection set-theory rears its head again, in that, for example, 'set' IS a sort of 'abstract entity' -- and thus Nominalism has to be refined to deal with the acceptance of sets. At some point Grice would say, 'rejection of all abstract entitities except sets' or something like that (as he tries to reconstruct rather than deconstruct the position). But in any case, Grice would prefer to talk of 'predicate calculus'.
----
Notably in "Prejudices and predilections" he does mention the collocation, "first-order predicate calculus with identity" -- implicating that NO modal notions need be introduced -- which would have yielded a system like Kripke's System S.
When I look at the presentations of these calculus (the Praedikaet Calcul of the Germans -- based on the Propositional Calculus) I am sometimes intrigued by the ontological simplicity of it. It seems it is GOING to yield a pretty simple ontology -- i.e. the syntax (never mind semantics) is such, -- 'contrived' may be the word -- that it's no wonder that the ontology that it will be made to 'depend' on via the semantics will also be contrived.
Sometimes the way to distinguish a philosopher (such as Carnap, Grice, Jones, or Speranza) -- from a non-philosopher is to examine his reactions at the 'ontology', so I'm pleased that Jones likes to play with the ontologies and the semantics. The syntax, as Jones notes, has to reflect an ontology which will be as rich as we want it to make it -- to reflect what we see is the ontology of 'common sense' or 'ordinary language' or 'science' -- qua 'cathedral of learning'. This is QUITE a task!
In any case, Jones's use of 'first-order' merits a post, which I will entitle 'Bootstrap', soon.
JONES WROTE in his commentary to "System CR and System GHP"
"[Mine] is a first order set theory".
Obviously Grice was familiar with this, since often he would refer to set-theoretical concepts -- mainly in his attack of 'Extensionalism', which just ignores all that Carnap said about intensions or the mere possibility of defining intensions in terms of extensions. This is the only treatment of a bete noire in his "Reply to Richards". He tires with the details soon enough and proposes to deal with the twelve betes noires en bloc, as offsprings of Minimalism -- in THIS connection set-theory rears its head again, in that, for example, 'set' IS a sort of 'abstract entity' -- and thus Nominalism has to be refined to deal with the acceptance of sets. At some point Grice would say, 'rejection of all abstract entitities except sets' or something like that (as he tries to reconstruct rather than deconstruct the position). But in any case, Grice would prefer to talk of 'predicate calculus'.
----
Notably in "Prejudices and predilections" he does mention the collocation, "first-order predicate calculus with identity" -- implicating that NO modal notions need be introduced -- which would have yielded a system like Kripke's System S.
When I look at the presentations of these calculus (the Praedikaet Calcul of the Germans -- based on the Propositional Calculus) I am sometimes intrigued by the ontological simplicity of it. It seems it is GOING to yield a pretty simple ontology -- i.e. the syntax (never mind semantics) is such, -- 'contrived' may be the word -- that it's no wonder that the ontology that it will be made to 'depend' on via the semantics will also be contrived.
Sometimes the way to distinguish a philosopher (such as Carnap, Grice, Jones, or Speranza) -- from a non-philosopher is to examine his reactions at the 'ontology', so I'm pleased that Jones likes to play with the ontologies and the semantics. The syntax, as Jones notes, has to reflect an ontology which will be as rich as we want it to make it -- to reflect what we see is the ontology of 'common sense' or 'ordinary language' or 'science' -- qua 'cathedral of learning'. This is QUITE a task!
In any case, Jones's use of 'first-order' merits a post, which I will entitle 'Bootstrap', soon.
Monday, May 31, 2010
System CR and System GHP
by J. L. S.
SO, I PROPOSE they are identical. We should find out if Carnap had another name than Rudolf, since I have my System GHP to read, a 'hopefully plausible' or 'highly powerful' version of Myro's System G (based on Grice's System Q, for Quine).
So I propose they are identical.
Once Virgil and Dante speak the same lingo, they can raise to the City!
----
More on this later. My point is really a hint to think of a specific quote by Carnap -- from his book he wrote to 'replace' Principia Mathematica (seeing how inflation was killing Germany) --. Basically System C, like System G, then would contain:
vocabulary
syntax -- inference rules
introduction and elimination of operators. I have of late concentrated on "~", but the points can be made more generally about logical operators in general, notably conectives.
semantics
pragmatics
---
The sketch for Grice's "System Q" in his "Vacuous Names" I have expanded at the Grice Club. I should provide specific quotes from that essay by Grice, I suppose, and I may!
SO, I PROPOSE they are identical. We should find out if Carnap had another name than Rudolf, since I have my System GHP to read, a 'hopefully plausible' or 'highly powerful' version of Myro's System G (based on Grice's System Q, for Quine).
So I propose they are identical.
Once Virgil and Dante speak the same lingo, they can raise to the City!
----
More on this later. My point is really a hint to think of a specific quote by Carnap -- from his book he wrote to 'replace' Principia Mathematica (seeing how inflation was killing Germany) --. Basically System C, like System G, then would contain:
vocabulary
syntax -- inference rules
introduction and elimination of operators. I have of late concentrated on "~", but the points can be made more generally about logical operators in general, notably conectives.
semantics
pragmatics
---
The sketch for Grice's "System Q" in his "Vacuous Names" I have expanded at the Grice Club. I should provide specific quotes from that essay by Grice, I suppose, and I may!
Sunday, May 30, 2010
The conversation and de-construction
By Roger Bishop Jones, for The City of Eternal Truth
In the Grice Club Speranza has been talking about deconstructionism, and the discussion connects with the reasons for a recent pause in my attention to the Carnap/Grice conversation and the road to The City.
"The conversation" is an exercise in comparative analysis, in which we seek an understanding by each philosopher of the view of the other, and hope to discover substantial "sub-theories" of the ideas of each philosophy which are compatible and can provide a basis on which they could have built together.
To move forward in this enterprise I have to have straight in my head a method of comparative analysis which is capable of achieving such a reconciliation.
I had come to believe that such a method might be arrived at by some further development of my earlier conception of "X-Logic", itself a formal method, and of an informal version suitable for earlier stages in an analysis which might ultimately be formalised.
This squares with the idea which I put forward to The Grice Club that certain aspects of deconstructionism should be taken seriously in the articulation of methods for rational re-construction, so that pathologies in the target of analysis are fully explicated rather than glossed over, and can be focussed on in the analysis.
This is all rather ethereal perhaps, and will have to be articulated and illustrated more thoroughly, but perhaps give some idea why I think that progress on the Conversation depends for my part on progressing a new version of X-Logic, and on an account of how one can achieve similar effects in the first place by less formal means.
RBJ
In the Grice Club Speranza has been talking about deconstructionism, and the discussion connects with the reasons for a recent pause in my attention to the Carnap/Grice conversation and the road to The City.
"The conversation" is an exercise in comparative analysis, in which we seek an understanding by each philosopher of the view of the other, and hope to discover substantial "sub-theories" of the ideas of each philosophy which are compatible and can provide a basis on which they could have built together.
To move forward in this enterprise I have to have straight in my head a method of comparative analysis which is capable of achieving such a reconciliation.
I had come to believe that such a method might be arrived at by some further development of my earlier conception of "X-Logic", itself a formal method, and of an informal version suitable for earlier stages in an analysis which might ultimately be formalised.
This squares with the idea which I put forward to The Grice Club that certain aspects of deconstructionism should be taken seriously in the articulation of methods for rational re-construction, so that pathologies in the target of analysis are fully explicated rather than glossed over, and can be focussed on in the analysis.
This is all rather ethereal perhaps, and will have to be articulated and illustrated more thoroughly, but perhaps give some idea why I think that progress on the Conversation depends for my part on progressing a new version of X-Logic, and on an account of how one can achieve similar effects in the first place by less formal means.
RBJ
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
Carnap and Grice discussed successively (almost) by Beaney
In his entry on "Analysis" at Stanford, Fregean scholar M. Beaney tells the story with some continuity. His section 7 is Carnap. His section 8 is Grice. Some commentary. From the site at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html#7
Section 7 is thus entitled, "Carnap".
Some fragments with commentary:
"influenced not only by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein but also by neo-Kantianism (see Friedman 2000, Richardson 1998)."
I was surprised to read in the "Finding Aid to Grice" that he has joint work with this M. Friedman on universalia!
---
"to be ‘constructed’ by quasi-analysis, a method that mimics analysis in yielding ‘quasi-constituents’, but which proceeds ‘synthetically’ rather than ‘analytically’ (1928, §§ 69, 74)."
This seems to trade on "analysis" as a mathematical practice, and Grice would have favoured that. Perhaps Aristotle is given too much credit with the invention of "analysis" -- his "Analytica priora and posteriora", but perhaps, analysis, qua analysis, is after all, a mathematical conception (Descartes).
Beaney quotes from Carnap 1936:143:
“The logical analysis of a particular expression
consists in the setting-up of a linguistic system
and the placing of that expression in this system.”
He also quotes from the later, "Meaning and Necessity" (1947):
"The task of making more exact a vague
or not quite exact concept used in everyday life
or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical
development, or rather of replacing it by a newly
constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most
important tasks of logical analysis and logical construction.
We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an
explication for, the earlier concept."
(1947, 7-8)
Beaney concludes his discussion of Carnap with quotations from the still later, "Logical Foundations of Probability" and the idea that temperature is an elucidation of warmth. He notes the longitudinal unity of this conception of analysis which Beaney traces to the Greeks and Descartes on geometry.
The next section 8, is "Oxford Linguistic Philosophy"
Alas there is no explicit mention of Grice, but if Beaney is reading all the profusive quotes by Frege that Horn is bringing to the forum in his discussion of F-implicature, he SHOULD start quoting Grice more often!
Beaney dedicates a whole passage to Ryle, which Grice saw as too senior for consideration. Ryle had been born in 1900, and the post-war philosophers of Austin´s group -- to which Grice belonged -- found his figure too "fatherly". THEY were supposed to be doing philosophy, not aplying it.
Beaney discusses Austin, whom Jones-Speranza regard as ´prototype´ for the type of analysis from which Grice departs and refines.
Beaney notes:
"J. L. Austin ... emphasized the need to pay careful attention to our ordinary use of language, although he has been criticized for valuing subtle linguistic distinctions for their own sake."
Whose sake?
"He was influential in the creation of speech-act theory, with such distinctions as that between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962a)."
Grice does use the idea of a "central speech act" (sic, in WoW:vi) but without the dogmas. He was of course more onto the assertion-implication distintion, which he was attracted to, as Austin was with his own theory, for methodological rather than substantive reasons.
Beaney jumps from Austin to Strawson -- who was Grice´s student.
"P.F. Strawson, whose critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions in his own seminal paper of 1950, ‘On Referring’, and his Introduction to Logical Theory of 1952 had also helped establish ordinary language philosophy as a counterweight to the tradition of ... Carnap."
--- with caveats. Grice gets TWO mentions in that book. In the preface, and in a pretty famous (among Griceians) footnote, where Strawson discusses the "pragmatic rules" of ´implicature´. In fact in his earlier "On referring", Strawson HAD used "imply" to mark this important non-logical relation, which he later re-baptised "presupposing". The important difference is of course metaphysical: truth-value gaps are a no-no for Grice.
Beaney notes:
"The appearance of Individuals in 1959 and The Bounds of Sense in 1966 signalled a return to metaphysics, but it was a metaphysics that Strawson called ‘descriptive’ (as opposed to ‘revisionary’) metaphysics, aimed at clarifying our fundamental conceptual frameworks."
Grice suggests that he regrets Strawson never cared to mention him in THAT book. Grice always kept the notes on "Categories" -- some archival material cited by Chapman in her biography of Grice --. So, this is indeed a Griceian-Strawsonian joint thing. Grice became less and less descriptive as time went by an self-confessed revisionary.
Beaney:
"It is here that we can see how ‘connective’ analysis has replaced ‘reductive’ analysis; and this shift was explicitly discussed in the work Strawson published shortly after he retired, Analysis and Metaphysics (1992)."
Strawson perhaps published one book too many!
----
Note that he also reprinted his contribution to the Grice festschrift, "If and -->" in his own "Identity and Entity". What´s the good of a festschrift if you are going to publish the "contribution" elsewhere? At least on principle he never let himself published his joint "Defense of a dogma" with Grice in his own publications!
Beaney:
"Strawson notes that analysis has often been thought of as “a kind of breaking down or decomposing of something” (1992, 2), but points out that it also has a more comprehensive sense (1992, 19), which he draws on in offering a ‘connective model’ of analysis to contrast with the ‘reductive or atomistic model’ (1992, 21). Our most basic concepts, on this view, are ‘irreducible’, but not ‘simple’."
--- This is so complex, and one wonders. Strawson is influential for BEANEY, because Beaney is a Brit and Strawson is a Brit. Grice had become an American by then, but give me Grice anyday!
Beaney continues:
"A concept may be complex, in the sense that its philosophical elucidation requires the establishing of its connections with other concepts, and yet at the same time irreducible, in the sense that it cannot be defined away, without circularity, in terms of those other concepts to which it is necessarily related. (1992, 22-3)
Such a view is not new."
I rather prefer Grice´s clearer reflections on reductive versus reductionist analysis in his WoW: Retrospective Epilogue.
----
Plus, Grice, unlike Strawson, had a sense of humour!
----
Beaney refers, "for further discussion". to Baldwin 2001; Beaney 2007b; Hacker 1996, ch. 6; Lyons 1980; Passmore 1966, ch. 18; Rorty 1967; Stroll 2000, ch. 6; Warnock 1989."
--- of which Warnock, the best. Grice´s English teacher biographer, Siobhan Chapman, keeps quoting Warnock as G. C., which confuses me! He was Sir Geoffrey James, and Vice-Chancelor of the only university that should have one: Oxford.
Hacker succeeded Gordon Baker (festschriftist for Hart and Grice) as tutorial fellow at St. John´s, so the least thing he can do is quote from Grice. But Hacker, like, alas, D. F. Pears, has turned into a Wittersian, leaving all traces of Griceanism implicaturish wit behind! (He has Witt, rather!).
---
Passmore is a good one. A total Colonial. I loved that footnote in "Hundred Years": "There´s this ingenious fellow, Grice, who has written so little it scares". Or words.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html#7
Section 7 is thus entitled, "Carnap".
Some fragments with commentary:
"influenced not only by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein but also by neo-Kantianism (see Friedman 2000, Richardson 1998)."
I was surprised to read in the "Finding Aid to Grice" that he has joint work with this M. Friedman on universalia!
---
"to be ‘constructed’ by quasi-analysis, a method that mimics analysis in yielding ‘quasi-constituents’, but which proceeds ‘synthetically’ rather than ‘analytically’ (1928, §§ 69, 74)."
This seems to trade on "analysis" as a mathematical practice, and Grice would have favoured that. Perhaps Aristotle is given too much credit with the invention of "analysis" -- his "Analytica priora and posteriora", but perhaps, analysis, qua analysis, is after all, a mathematical conception (Descartes).
Beaney quotes from Carnap 1936:143:
“The logical analysis of a particular expression
consists in the setting-up of a linguistic system
and the placing of that expression in this system.”
He also quotes from the later, "Meaning and Necessity" (1947):
"The task of making more exact a vague
or not quite exact concept used in everyday life
or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical
development, or rather of replacing it by a newly
constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most
important tasks of logical analysis and logical construction.
We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an
explication for, the earlier concept."
(1947, 7-8)
Beaney concludes his discussion of Carnap with quotations from the still later, "Logical Foundations of Probability" and the idea that temperature is an elucidation of warmth. He notes the longitudinal unity of this conception of analysis which Beaney traces to the Greeks and Descartes on geometry.
The next section 8, is "Oxford Linguistic Philosophy"
Alas there is no explicit mention of Grice, but if Beaney is reading all the profusive quotes by Frege that Horn is bringing to the forum in his discussion of F-implicature, he SHOULD start quoting Grice more often!
Beaney dedicates a whole passage to Ryle, which Grice saw as too senior for consideration. Ryle had been born in 1900, and the post-war philosophers of Austin´s group -- to which Grice belonged -- found his figure too "fatherly". THEY were supposed to be doing philosophy, not aplying it.
Beaney discusses Austin, whom Jones-Speranza regard as ´prototype´ for the type of analysis from which Grice departs and refines.
Beaney notes:
"J. L. Austin ... emphasized the need to pay careful attention to our ordinary use of language, although he has been criticized for valuing subtle linguistic distinctions for their own sake."
Whose sake?
"He was influential in the creation of speech-act theory, with such distinctions as that between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962a)."
Grice does use the idea of a "central speech act" (sic, in WoW:vi) but without the dogmas. He was of course more onto the assertion-implication distintion, which he was attracted to, as Austin was with his own theory, for methodological rather than substantive reasons.
Beaney jumps from Austin to Strawson -- who was Grice´s student.
"P.F. Strawson, whose critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions in his own seminal paper of 1950, ‘On Referring’, and his Introduction to Logical Theory of 1952 had also helped establish ordinary language philosophy as a counterweight to the tradition of ... Carnap."
--- with caveats. Grice gets TWO mentions in that book. In the preface, and in a pretty famous (among Griceians) footnote, where Strawson discusses the "pragmatic rules" of ´implicature´. In fact in his earlier "On referring", Strawson HAD used "imply" to mark this important non-logical relation, which he later re-baptised "presupposing". The important difference is of course metaphysical: truth-value gaps are a no-no for Grice.
Beaney notes:
"The appearance of Individuals in 1959 and The Bounds of Sense in 1966 signalled a return to metaphysics, but it was a metaphysics that Strawson called ‘descriptive’ (as opposed to ‘revisionary’) metaphysics, aimed at clarifying our fundamental conceptual frameworks."
Grice suggests that he regrets Strawson never cared to mention him in THAT book. Grice always kept the notes on "Categories" -- some archival material cited by Chapman in her biography of Grice --. So, this is indeed a Griceian-Strawsonian joint thing. Grice became less and less descriptive as time went by an self-confessed revisionary.
Beaney:
"It is here that we can see how ‘connective’ analysis has replaced ‘reductive’ analysis; and this shift was explicitly discussed in the work Strawson published shortly after he retired, Analysis and Metaphysics (1992)."
Strawson perhaps published one book too many!
----
Note that he also reprinted his contribution to the Grice festschrift, "If and -->" in his own "Identity and Entity". What´s the good of a festschrift if you are going to publish the "contribution" elsewhere? At least on principle he never let himself published his joint "Defense of a dogma" with Grice in his own publications!
Beaney:
"Strawson notes that analysis has often been thought of as “a kind of breaking down or decomposing of something” (1992, 2), but points out that it also has a more comprehensive sense (1992, 19), which he draws on in offering a ‘connective model’ of analysis to contrast with the ‘reductive or atomistic model’ (1992, 21). Our most basic concepts, on this view, are ‘irreducible’, but not ‘simple’."
--- This is so complex, and one wonders. Strawson is influential for BEANEY, because Beaney is a Brit and Strawson is a Brit. Grice had become an American by then, but give me Grice anyday!
Beaney continues:
"A concept may be complex, in the sense that its philosophical elucidation requires the establishing of its connections with other concepts, and yet at the same time irreducible, in the sense that it cannot be defined away, without circularity, in terms of those other concepts to which it is necessarily related. (1992, 22-3)
Such a view is not new."
I rather prefer Grice´s clearer reflections on reductive versus reductionist analysis in his WoW: Retrospective Epilogue.
----
Plus, Grice, unlike Strawson, had a sense of humour!
----
Beaney refers, "for further discussion". to Baldwin 2001; Beaney 2007b; Hacker 1996, ch. 6; Lyons 1980; Passmore 1966, ch. 18; Rorty 1967; Stroll 2000, ch. 6; Warnock 1989."
--- of which Warnock, the best. Grice´s English teacher biographer, Siobhan Chapman, keeps quoting Warnock as G. C., which confuses me! He was Sir Geoffrey James, and Vice-Chancelor of the only university that should have one: Oxford.
Hacker succeeded Gordon Baker (festschriftist for Hart and Grice) as tutorial fellow at St. John´s, so the least thing he can do is quote from Grice. But Hacker, like, alas, D. F. Pears, has turned into a Wittersian, leaving all traces of Griceanism implicaturish wit behind! (He has Witt, rather!).
---
Passmore is a good one. A total Colonial. I loved that footnote in "Hundred Years": "There´s this ingenious fellow, Grice, who has written so little it scares". Or words.
Carno-Griceana
In private conversation, R. B. Jones has used "Carno-Gricean" which I think is very good. So I´ll start using. You know, Google.com never knows!
Rehashed Diagram
The diagram has been under discussion at The Grice Club, but on reflection I reworked it a bit, and post the latest version here again.
In theory the Speranza - Jones Carnap/Grice conversation project is spread across the three blogs (Carnap Corner, Grice Club and here), and the bit of the conversation which belongs here is the bit in which we extrapolate from the developments in the philosophies of Carnap and Grice which actually happened, via further evolution of a similar kind, to the realisation of a common conception of The City of Eternal Truth (or at least to mutually compatible conceptions).
So here is the latest diagram:
In theory the Speranza - Jones Carnap/Grice conversation project is spread across the three blogs (Carnap Corner, Grice Club and here), and the bit of the conversation which belongs here is the bit in which we extrapolate from the developments in the philosophies of Carnap and Grice which actually happened, via further evolution of a similar kind, to the realisation of a common conception of The City of Eternal Truth (or at least to mutually compatible conceptions).
So here is the latest diagram:
Sunday, May 2, 2010
I thought I would try a picture for discussion:
RBJ
Change of Meaning, Change of Belief
This below is meant as comment to Jones's point in "I propose this as interesting stuff for Carnap-Grice interface", THIS BLOG.
---
Good.
So, indeed, if we change our minds about meaning we change our linguistic frameworks. Even that bit may need some elucidation.
Let me rephrase the abstract bit by bit. Actually, I'm a bit familiar with H. Arlo Costa's theory on this. It seems quite a problem for formalists of the logic of belief. So I supposed that for Carno-Griceian studies it may do, too.
The authors of the essay cited above write in the abstract:
"One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information."
I was thinking of Carno-Griceian ways out to Quine. Recall Grice's and Strawson's TWO examples. One as a reply to a synthetically false sentence, another to an analytically false sentence:
A: My neighbour's three-year old child understands Russell's theory of types.
B: That's almost unbelievable!
----
versus:
A: My neighbour's three-year-old child is an adult.
B: I won't BELIEVE THAT.
----
For Grice and Strawson, the second scenario is BEYOND belief, as it were. But of course, one may adopt the linguistic framework of one's interlocutor and DO COME to 'understand', and then perhaps 'believe'.
The authors continue:
"This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios."
Another case that I have considered in extenso elsewhere is what I called "Speranza": a machine unable to understand novel metaphors. Like, "Meaning is a dinosaur", or "My brother had an abortion". Or things like that. I should revise the cases. But the point is that there seems to be a LEAP at some point and that it's very bold of an interpreter to deal with a metaphor, because, when taken literally, metaphors are obviously FALSE.
The authors go on:
"We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information."
-----
So, here we do need to formalise, to see what's going on if the 'change of 'our minds'' is about meaning or what.
First we should consider just synthetic change of belief.
"Is it raining?"
"No. It's not."
"Oh. I thought it was. Thanks for informing."
So here we have a change from
B(A, -p)
to
B(A, p)
Not tragic.
"Is it raining?"
"No. It's pouring!"
--- Here the case is impicatural. I take the answer as being FALSE. Pouring IS a kind of rain!
----
"Is it raining?"
"Yes. Cats and dogs".
"Whoa?"
"It's raining cats and dogs".
"I hope you are being figurative".
---- This may be one silly case, but suppose that the utterer A refuses to use "to rain cats and dogs" even figuratively. So he may need to translate that silly idiom into something he will understand, "very hard".
----
Finally we get to the cases of meaning postulates:
First the synthetic scenario:
B (A, - 'Tim understands Russell's theory of Types')
to
B (A, 'Tim understands Russell's theory of types')
In this, I'm not sure there is a change of belief involved, since U never actually DISBELIEVED that the 3-year-old child understood it.
So, we get to the 'trick' case:
B(A, -'A 3-year-old child is an adult')
to
B(A, 'A 3-year-old child is an adult')
Since one's interlocutor is actually saying that a 3-year-old child is an adult, and possibly believing it, how do we change our belief about meaning?
There must be more obvious cases. Another one would be the taste of twater for Putnan. I see that Barbara Abbott wrote about this for the Aristotelian Society.
Or consider Copernicus:
"I used to believe that the sun went around the earth, but I changed my mind."
---- No change of meaning involved. But surely there are such changes of meaning in the history of science. Indeed, that was Quine's point about Duhem, etc.
I can't think of one! Perhaps Einstein's ideas as 'changing the meaning' of 'time' and 'space' (notably space) as the idea was understood in Newtonian physics? Etc.
---
Good.
So, indeed, if we change our minds about meaning we change our linguistic frameworks. Even that bit may need some elucidation.
Let me rephrase the abstract bit by bit. Actually, I'm a bit familiar with H. Arlo Costa's theory on this. It seems quite a problem for formalists of the logic of belief. So I supposed that for Carno-Griceian studies it may do, too.
The authors of the essay cited above write in the abstract:
"One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information."
I was thinking of Carno-Griceian ways out to Quine. Recall Grice's and Strawson's TWO examples. One as a reply to a synthetically false sentence, another to an analytically false sentence:
A: My neighbour's three-year old child understands Russell's theory of types.
B: That's almost unbelievable!
----
versus:
A: My neighbour's three-year-old child is an adult.
B: I won't BELIEVE THAT.
----
For Grice and Strawson, the second scenario is BEYOND belief, as it were. But of course, one may adopt the linguistic framework of one's interlocutor and DO COME to 'understand', and then perhaps 'believe'.
The authors continue:
"This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios."
Another case that I have considered in extenso elsewhere is what I called "Speranza": a machine unable to understand novel metaphors. Like, "Meaning is a dinosaur", or "My brother had an abortion". Or things like that. I should revise the cases. But the point is that there seems to be a LEAP at some point and that it's very bold of an interpreter to deal with a metaphor, because, when taken literally, metaphors are obviously FALSE.
The authors go on:
"We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information."
-----
So, here we do need to formalise, to see what's going on if the 'change of 'our minds'' is about meaning or what.
First we should consider just synthetic change of belief.
"Is it raining?"
"No. It's not."
"Oh. I thought it was. Thanks for informing."
So here we have a change from
B(A, -p)
to
B(A, p)
Not tragic.
"Is it raining?"
"No. It's pouring!"
--- Here the case is impicatural. I take the answer as being FALSE. Pouring IS a kind of rain!
----
"Is it raining?"
"Yes. Cats and dogs".
"Whoa?"
"It's raining cats and dogs".
"I hope you are being figurative".
---- This may be one silly case, but suppose that the utterer A refuses to use "to rain cats and dogs" even figuratively. So he may need to translate that silly idiom into something he will understand, "very hard".
----
Finally we get to the cases of meaning postulates:
First the synthetic scenario:
B (A, - 'Tim understands Russell's theory of Types')
to
B (A, 'Tim understands Russell's theory of types')
In this, I'm not sure there is a change of belief involved, since U never actually DISBELIEVED that the 3-year-old child understood it.
So, we get to the 'trick' case:
B(A, -'A 3-year-old child is an adult')
to
B(A, 'A 3-year-old child is an adult')
Since one's interlocutor is actually saying that a 3-year-old child is an adult, and possibly believing it, how do we change our belief about meaning?
There must be more obvious cases. Another one would be the taste of twater for Putnan. I see that Barbara Abbott wrote about this for the Aristotelian Society.
Or consider Copernicus:
"I used to believe that the sun went around the earth, but I changed my mind."
---- No change of meaning involved. But surely there are such changes of meaning in the history of science. Indeed, that was Quine's point about Duhem, etc.
I can't think of one! Perhaps Einstein's ideas as 'changing the meaning' of 'time' and 'space' (notably space) as the idea was understood in Newtonian physics? Etc.
Saturday, May 1, 2010
Stekeler cites Grice and Carnap in abstract to his essay
"The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an antimetaphysical, therefore antirepresentationalist and antisubjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns of twists given to Frege's and Wittgenstein's original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom's normative pragmatics."
I propose this as interesting stuff for Grice/Carnap interface
Gricean Belief Change
Authors:Delgrande, James P
Nayak, Abhaya C
Pagnucco, Maurice
Source:Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 79(1), 97-113. 17 p. February 2005.
Document Type:Journal Article
Subjects:BELIEF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
LOGIC
REVISION
SEMANTICS
Persons as Subjects:GRICE, H PAUL
Abstract:One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information.
----
The idea:
Carnap seems to suggest that if we change our 'minds', we change the linguistic framework.
Grice seems more consistent with 'ordinary usage' here?
Authors:Delgrande, James P
Nayak, Abhaya C
Pagnucco, Maurice
Source:Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 79(1), 97-113. 17 p. February 2005.
Document Type:Journal Article
Subjects:BELIEF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
LOGIC
REVISION
SEMANTICS
Persons as Subjects:GRICE, H PAUL
Abstract:One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information.
----
The idea:
Carnap seems to suggest that if we change our 'minds', we change the linguistic framework.
Grice seems more consistent with 'ordinary usage' here?
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Peake and Grice on Revelations
As Warner/Teasely (1918) hymn indicates: the Scriptural sources here are two: Hebrews and Revelations.
Let's recall that among the unpublications left by Grice there was one entitled: "From Genesis to Revelations: new discourse on metaphysics"
Cfr. this with Arthur S. Peake's old book -- "Christianity: Its Nature and Its Truth"
"There can, indeed, be no doubt that from
some points of view the prospect thus held
out to us is an alluring one. To soar away
from the dreary earth into the rare atmosphere of
beautiful ideas, to reach that peaceful region
where we are no longer in the rough and tumble
of historical controversy, to have gone where
critics cease from troubling, that
would be a delightful experience. How exhilarating
to be born upward on the bold unfettered wing
of pure speculation till we have scaled
the cloudy ramparts and found ourselves at
home in the city of eternal truth!"
(p. 140).
Let's recall that among the unpublications left by Grice there was one entitled: "From Genesis to Revelations: new discourse on metaphysics"
Cfr. this with Arthur S. Peake's old book -- "Christianity: Its Nature and Its Truth"
"There can, indeed, be no doubt that from
some points of view the prospect thus held
out to us is an alluring one. To soar away
from the dreary earth into the rare atmosphere of
beautiful ideas, to reach that peaceful region
where we are no longer in the rough and tumble
of historical controversy, to have gone where
critics cease from troubling, that
would be a delightful experience. How exhilarating
to be born upward on the bold unfettered wing
of pure speculation till we have scaled
the cloudy ramparts and found ourselves at
home in the city of eternal truth!"
(p. 140).
திருப்புகழ்,
I read at:
www.kaumaram.com/thiru_uni/tpun0833.html - En caché - Similares
That Chidhambaram (திருப்புகழ்) means "The City of Eternal Truth".
Using the description at
http://www.chidambaram.rajadeekshithar.com/temple_history.htm
I propose for Chapter 5 of CarnapGrice pdf by JonesSperanza:
---
And there it lay: the City of Eternal Truth. Carnap and Grice were in awe, as they approached it with veneration. As fellow pilgrims we can now report:
The early history of the City of Eternal Truthlies hidden in the mists of time. The City reached her present form under the patronage of Kantotle. In an aerial view we can see the total surface area of the temple covers 13 hectares or 35 acres, each dedicated to a philosophical speciality -- and placing it among the largest Cities in the whole of Philosophy. The City is the result of some urban planning. It is designed with 5 concentric 'monads', or circumambulatory temple courtyards. Each of these is associated with one of the Five Elements -- which are ultimately one, of course. "The innermost 'monad' is not visible: it lies within the sanctum with the golden roof, and can only be entered by the Universal Maxim. The architecture and the rituals of this City reflect its history and doctrine. Where we now find this beautiful and ancient City was once an impenetrable Forest of Dogmatic Trees, which is a kind of mangrove. This Forest gave The City her first and most ancient name, "Woody". Within this sprawling forest was a lotus pond, and at the southern bank of this pond existed a Cunning of Reason. A Cunning of Reason is a representation of Kantotle -- which unites both the concepts of Form as well as of Formless in itself. In modern terms this formless-form might be called an abstraction. What Carnap calls an "Intension". "Intension means ‘self existent’ [only different], signifying that the Fregean Sense [like the Natural Number]
was not made by human beings, but came into existence by itself, from what Grice calls "Nature". "To this lotus pond in the "Woody" forest came two saints, named Carnap and Grice. They came from very different backgrounds and from very different directions. But they came for the same reason: to witness Kantotle’s Cosmic Dance."
It had been foretold to them that if they would 'elucidate' the "Cunning of Reason" on the bank of the lotus pond in the forest, Kantotle would come to perform His Dance for them. Eventually this great event took place. Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) came to perform His Dance on a Saturday morning, when the moon was in the asterism Ryle, during Hilary, long before the Devil of Scientism era. Kantotle's dance is called the Dance of Bliss. The two saints achieved liberation, and on their special request Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) promised to perform His Dance for all time at that place. For the full narration of the myth the reader is referred to chapter IV of the present Conversation (again -- and again). The story of the origin of the worship of Kantotle in the City of Eternal Truth is told in the Logische Aufbau der Welt.
The Sacred History of the City of Eternal Truth, which is part of the "Principia Mathematica", one of the 18 great vademecums or collections of mythology. From one of the saints, Carnap, which means "Slept in a Vehicle", The City of Eternal Truth received her second name, Pirotgrad, meaning ‘City of the Pirot’. Its third name, Griceland, refers to the philosophy and doctrine of the temple, as narrated by Grice's arch-enemy: Carnap, in his third re-incarnation. "Gri-" means consciousness or wisdom. "-ce" signifies "ether" in Pirotese but in Russell it means 'hall'. Carnap-Corner-in-Griceland unifies the two aspects of the one and only Kantotelian doctrine. Meaning thus both "Hall of Wisdom", as well as the place of the Ether of Consciousness. --- INSIDE THE CITY: The edifice which now includes within its sanctum this Cunning of Reason form of Kantotle, situated on the southern bank of the sacred pound, is called "Bosanquet"". This term means ‘place of origin’ or ‘root place’ -- an exaggeration, seeing that old Grice saw him as a 'minor figure'. "Bosanquet" can be found in the third courtyard, within the temple proper.
Facing east, it is a conventional temple with a sanctum containing the cunning of reason, and aa hall in front of the sanctum. In this hall we find the images of our two saints, Carnap and Grice. How the images got there BEFORE THEM is a great mystery. They stand with their hands folded, worshipping. A sanctum placed at an angle to the Cunning-of-Reason shrine, facing south, houses the consort of Kantotle, the goddess Aletheia. On the western wall of the shrine we find a relief sculptured of the Wishing Tree of Paradise (Eschatology). This shrine achieved its present form probably under the middle and later stages of the Vienna Circle. The main edifices of the temple are the five Halls. At the centre of the temple is situated the sanctum sanctorum or Holy Of Holiest. This means the ‘Hall of Wisdom’. It is the main shrine where Kantotle accompanied by his consort Aletheia (the Unveiled One) performs His Cosmic Dance, the Dance of Bliss. The World -- or "Nature" -- is the embodiment of the colossal human form. The City of Eternal Truth is the centre of this form, the place of the heart, where Kantotle performs the Cosmic Dance. The City is laid out as a labyrinth. For this reason the devotees may approach the
central shrine from two sides. One is called Extension. A narrower path is called Intension. As blood flows to and from the heart. The 16 stupas topping the golden roof represent the sixteen strands of The Fabric. They also asymbolize the sixteen Strands -- or goddesses. The roof of this hall is made of 21.600 tiles, representing
inhalations and exhalations of Pirots.
The links and side joints symbolize the connecting veins -- of the pirots, of course. The five main steps at the entrance to the shrine stand between the devotees and the image of Kantotle, covered in silver. They are the five seed words or syllables. By chanting these syllables,"
----------------KAN -- TO --- TLE
the devotee can cross the ocean of bondage and attain to the Lord. The granite plinth of the shrine is called Oxonianism -- because it does duty for Vienna in providing a support for Kantotle (in his Russell re-incarnation). On all special occasions worship is performed to this plinth. The name, Hall of Consciousness or Hall of Wisdom, refers to the quality of wisdom which pervades the atmosphere, bestowed upon the worshippers by the Dance of the Lord. His boon is the experience of the Cosmic Dance. A unique feature is that the structure of the actual stage is made of wood, which has so far not been botanically classified but is nevertheless real. It is rectangular in form and here Kantotle is worshipped in his three aspects: as Form or Image, as Formless-Form -- the crystal Cunning of Reason -- and as formless. From the platform opposite one can see the image of the Dancing Kantotle, situated in the middle of the stage. Kantotle is facing south, unlike most other simpler Philosophers. This signifies he is the Conqueror of Dogma, dispelling the fear of death for Humanity. The Crystal Cunning of Reason is Kantotle as Formless-Form. It was formed from the essence of the crescent moon in Kantotle's matted hair, for the purpose of peripatetic worship.
This is taken from its keeping place at the feet of the thing six times a day, and holy ablution is performed to him in the hall. Immediately to the proper right of this is the ‘mystery’ of Analyticity. Here, behind a silk curtain which is black
on the outside and red on the inside, is the Treasure of Meaning Postulates, in the form of Predicate Calculus. An abstract geometrical design, on which the deity is invoked. Behind the curtain, before it, hang a few strands of golden fig leaves. This signifies the act of creation -- or Pirotology. One moment nothing exists, the next instant the All has been brought into existence.
At regular timings the curtain is removed to allow the devotees to worship the Ether which is the vehicle of the Absolute and Consciousness. The hall houses one more unique form of Kantotle. This is the Organon, the Ruby Lord: a replica of Kantotle in ruby form. This appeared out of the fire of the sacrifice in response to the devotion of the Modernists. Every Saturday, as part of the 10.00 o’clock morning ritual, after the Recitation of the Crystal Cunning of Reason is also performed to the Ruby Kantotle. As conclusion of this ceremony the Ruby Thing is placed on the edge of the Swimming Pool and an Implicature is offered. This is the burning of camphor on a special plate which is shown both in front and behind the Ruby Thing. This brings out the special quality of translucence of this, creating a mystical spectacle for the onlookers. Nobody knows when the worship of Kantotle was established here, or when the City of Eternal Truth was build. The original wooden structure is doubtless, and ironically,the oldest structure in the temple complex,
as the shrine of Plathegel is a later construction under the Neo-Kantians. The City has no features, really, that could help to date it and it might just as well be eternal, after all.
It is unique and no other structure is known like it anywhere else in Philosophy. Analysis by the Leibnizian ifinitesimal method would be unreliable because it is known to have been regularly renovated during the centuries. But the origins of the City of Eternal Truth lie back in prehistoric times. According to the mythology the City was first constructed by a Philosopher King nicknamed "Thales". This Philosopher King was healed of leprosy by bathing in the sacred pond in the "Woody" forest and witnessed the Cosmic Dance. The first gilding of the roof of the temple and the instituting of the formal worship are all attributed to this King Philosopher.
The first historical references can be found in Jowett's translation of the Plato Dialogues, especially in the Timaeus. Here Aletheia, the six-faced Daughter of Yocasta and Socrates, is described as worshipping his parents in Athens, before going to do battle with a demon called Physicalism. This text can be dated to the fourth century BCE. The City of Eternal Truth is also prominently mentioned in "De Consolatione Philosophiae", an important religious and philosophical text in ancient Latin, dating from the beginning of the Christian era. A few centuries later the temple and its Lord are often mentioned by members of the Vienna Circle, but only derogatorily and, especially by Schlick. The first historical persons to claim having gilded the roof of the temple are Baumgarten and his 'cousin', Kant. By this time the temple had already become important. The place where Students were crowned, and where they came to worship and receive counsel. How the gilding of the roof was done is a knowledge that was sadly lost with time. But it is without doubt one of the great technical achievements of ancient times.
Immediately in front of the temple is the golden hall. Its roof is made of copper, although Kanaka means gold. This is the gold of spiritual treasure: to experience Kantotle's dance from so near. In this hall are most of the Saturday morning rituals of worship performed. The Early Morning rituals. The rituals with lamps and ritual objects. And the Ruby Thing. The pilgrims can enter certain areas of the hall for worship at specified hours. It is a controversy whether this was originally constructed together with the older hall, or some time later. This is the shrine in the form of a chariot, pulled by two stone horses.
One represents Practical Reason, the other Theoretical Reason. It is situated opposite the old hall, in the third courtyard. It is the place of the dance contest between Kantotle and Plathegel. Kantotle conquered Alethei, who would not calm down after she destroyed a powerful demon -- Reductionism -- by lifting his right leg straight up towards the sky. This dance is called "Gentzen". Then and there Aletheia suddenly remembered who she really was, the peaceful consort of Kantotle, and she was able to leave her furious mood and returned to her peaceful self. This scene is depicted in the sanctum inside. We see Kantotle performing his dance, with his leg
lifted straight above his head, and Aletheia calmed down in one corner, both accompanied by Carnap and Grice playing the Fiddles, the instruments which are used to accompany the dance.
The chariot form commemorates Kantotle as the Destroyer of the Three Demon Cities. Several divine powers joined together to create this chariot. Thus the sun and moon became the wheels, and the Two Reasons the two horses. After destroying the Three Cities he descended from his chariot, having landed opposite, and ascended into the City to commence His Dance. From this, it is also called opposite hall. This opposite (or subcontrary) hall has several distinguishing features aside from its shape and its function. Its columns are unique to the chariot hall. They are square, and circular at the same time, and although carved from the hardest granite they are covered with exquisite miniature reliefs, depicting dancers, musicians and all kinds of philosophical figures. One other feature sets this edifice apart from any other hall within the temple complex and from all other temple halls in Philosophy. This is mysteriously connected to the Sphinx -- she of Riddles fame. Just under the floor surface of the raised platform which is the Body is a belt surrounding the whole city.
Here we see lions and sphinxes alternating in pairs, girdling it. Also the pillars of the two pavilions on the western side of the hall are supported by four sphinxes which function as caryatids. It is considered by tradition the second oldest building in the complex, without any real indication of its age. It is reported in inscriptions as having been renovated by the St. Bonaventura
in the thirteenth century. The hall can be found in the third courtyard. The festival deities are kept during the year, and worship is performed for them
on Saturday mornings. This is done inside the hall, and is open to the public. The age and history of this hall is also hidden in the mists of time. There is some evidence the hall was once used not just as a dance hall, but as an "Music Hall" by visiting Philosophers and Comedians of the different governing dynasties of the Oxford and the Sorbonne during the several phases of history. No other information is available, alas.
To the right is the Thousand Pillar Hall in the second courtyard. It is
the architectural representation of the Crown. Which is the seventh spiritual energy point in the astral body. Kantotle and the goddess Aletheia, his consort, dance here in the mornings of the 9th and 10th Saturday of the Chariot Festival. About this too, we have very little historical information. It is first mentioned as the place where the Flemish philosopher, Descartes, premiered his great Song-and-Dance routine ("The Cogito") on the lives of the 63 saints -- or Malignant Demon --, before Voltaire. Its base is encircled by reliefs of dancers and musicians, as it were, participating in a procession.
The most imposing feature of the temple, which can be seen soaring above the plain from miles away, are the four temple gateways, located in the second wall of enclosure at the four cardinal points. These are:
The South,
The West,
The East
and
The North.
They are considered among the earliest examples of such structures and are in their present form dated to at least the 12th and 13th century. Both Carnapians and Griceians disagree about the dates of the individual columns, or about which one was build first. Some consider the West as oldest, some the East. In between the sculptures decorating the inside of the West Corridor we find a musician (Grice?) playing a standing double drum. This could point to an early date for this -- or a later one, if one allows for Syncopation and the Jazz Age. On the outside of the granite bases are found sculptures of many important as well as less well known deities in niches in a particular order. The inside walls of passages through all the four corridors are decorated with the 108 dance movements of Kantotle's Peripatetic Dance, from the Organon, the world’s most ancient treatise on dance, drama and theatre -- and logic. Besides here, these movements -- of which the first is called "Barbara" -- are depicted in only four other temples -- but they circulate widely on the Net. The four corridors, together with the golden dome of the central shrine are the five towers which represent the five faces of Kantotle, with the Smiley symbolizing the masterful face.
In the innermost courtyard, at a right angle with the Golden Thing, we find the shrine of Aletheia. Reclining on the Cosmic Snake, she is in the state of consciousness, enjoying the vision of Kantotle’s dance. The coexistence of the worship of both Kantotle and Aletheia within one temple is unique. The worship was established in the earliest times and was originally performed by the "Minstrels" themselves. In the later medieval period, with a shifting political situation and hyperinflation under pressure of Capitalist invasions, there was possibly a discontinuation of the worship for a long period, after which it re-instated by the Wittgenstein, of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The worship of Aletheia has since then been in the hands of Carnapians and Griceians mainly, and was no longer performed by the "Minstrels" proper.
Within the inner courtyard, to the east, we find a small shrine which houses the bracelets of both the Creator god, of the Handy Trinity, and Home, a deified saint. The presence of the Creator-God (a deity almost never worshipped) establishes the worship of all three deities of the Handy Trinity with-in the one complex. The temple of goddess Aletheia, consort of Kantotle, is situated on the west side of the Water Tank. A flight of steps leads down into its courtyard. The goddess is worshipped here as the energy and power of wisdom. On the frontal portion of the pillared hall, on the ceiling of the right and left wings, the finest eye-capturing fresco paintings of approximately a thousand years old, illustrate the Sacred Deeds of Kantotle. The galleries surrounding the temple are decorated with a procession of dancers, musicians, and philosophers, sculptured in relief. This temple was possibly built in the 11th century, if not earlier.
This holds The Sacred Twater Place or Tank. It is famous for healing the ancient king Buridan of his skin disease. His skin became golden after which he was called "The Ass". In this Tank we find a stone representation of the the Element Twater, which as Putnam has showed, is not H20, but XYZ. In the dry season it becomes visible as the water level in the tank is reduced. The Twater temple is dedicated to Abelard, the second son of Kantotle and Aletheia. This shrine is also shaped as a chariot, pulled by horses and elephants. This temple was according to tradition build by a king of the dynasty from Cambridge, which superceded the rule of the the Oxonians in the fifteenth century. His name was Testa Bianca ("White Head"), and the temple is named after him. In the middle of the 19th century this temple was renovated by the Victorians with the support of Dutch merchants, who had a trading post in nearby Porto Nuovo. According to an inscription on copper plates they donated a share of their profit for this purpose, but we do not know what they did with the rest.
---
www.kaumaram.com/thiru_uni/tpun0833.html - En caché - Similares
That Chidhambaram (திருப்புகழ்) means "The City of Eternal Truth".
Using the description at
http://www.chidambaram.rajadeekshithar.com/temple_history.htm
I propose for Chapter 5 of CarnapGrice pdf by JonesSperanza:
---
And there it lay: the City of Eternal Truth. Carnap and Grice were in awe, as they approached it with veneration. As fellow pilgrims we can now report:
The early history of the City of Eternal Truthlies hidden in the mists of time. The City reached her present form under the patronage of Kantotle. In an aerial view we can see the total surface area of the temple covers 13 hectares or 35 acres, each dedicated to a philosophical speciality -- and placing it among the largest Cities in the whole of Philosophy. The City is the result of some urban planning. It is designed with 5 concentric 'monads', or circumambulatory temple courtyards. Each of these is associated with one of the Five Elements -- which are ultimately one, of course. "The innermost 'monad' is not visible: it lies within the sanctum with the golden roof, and can only be entered by the Universal Maxim. The architecture and the rituals of this City reflect its history and doctrine. Where we now find this beautiful and ancient City was once an impenetrable Forest of Dogmatic Trees, which is a kind of mangrove. This Forest gave The City her first and most ancient name, "Woody". Within this sprawling forest was a lotus pond, and at the southern bank of this pond existed a Cunning of Reason. A Cunning of Reason is a representation of Kantotle -- which unites both the concepts of Form as well as of Formless in itself. In modern terms this formless-form might be called an abstraction. What Carnap calls an "Intension". "Intension means ‘self existent’ [only different], signifying that the Fregean Sense [like the Natural Number]
was not made by human beings, but came into existence by itself, from what Grice calls "Nature". "To this lotus pond in the "Woody" forest came two saints, named Carnap and Grice. They came from very different backgrounds and from very different directions. But they came for the same reason: to witness Kantotle’s Cosmic Dance."
It had been foretold to them that if they would 'elucidate' the "Cunning of Reason" on the bank of the lotus pond in the forest, Kantotle would come to perform His Dance for them. Eventually this great event took place. Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) came to perform His Dance on a Saturday morning, when the moon was in the asterism Ryle, during Hilary, long before the Devil of Scientism era. Kantotle's dance is called the Dance of Bliss. The two saints achieved liberation, and on their special request Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) promised to perform His Dance for all time at that place. For the full narration of the myth the reader is referred to chapter IV of the present Conversation (again -- and again). The story of the origin of the worship of Kantotle in the City of Eternal Truth is told in the Logische Aufbau der Welt.
The Sacred History of the City of Eternal Truth, which is part of the "Principia Mathematica", one of the 18 great vademecums or collections of mythology. From one of the saints, Carnap, which means "Slept in a Vehicle", The City of Eternal Truth received her second name, Pirotgrad, meaning ‘City of the Pirot’. Its third name, Griceland, refers to the philosophy and doctrine of the temple, as narrated by Grice's arch-enemy: Carnap, in his third re-incarnation. "Gri-" means consciousness or wisdom. "-ce" signifies "ether" in Pirotese but in Russell it means 'hall'. Carnap-Corner-in-Griceland unifies the two aspects of the one and only Kantotelian doctrine. Meaning thus both "Hall of Wisdom", as well as the place of the Ether of Consciousness. --- INSIDE THE CITY: The edifice which now includes within its sanctum this Cunning of Reason form of Kantotle, situated on the southern bank of the sacred pound, is called "Bosanquet"". This term means ‘place of origin’ or ‘root place’ -- an exaggeration, seeing that old Grice saw him as a 'minor figure'. "Bosanquet" can be found in the third courtyard, within the temple proper.
Facing east, it is a conventional temple with a sanctum containing the cunning of reason, and aa hall in front of the sanctum. In this hall we find the images of our two saints, Carnap and Grice. How the images got there BEFORE THEM is a great mystery. They stand with their hands folded, worshipping. A sanctum placed at an angle to the Cunning-of-Reason shrine, facing south, houses the consort of Kantotle, the goddess Aletheia. On the western wall of the shrine we find a relief sculptured of the Wishing Tree of Paradise (Eschatology). This shrine achieved its present form probably under the middle and later stages of the Vienna Circle. The main edifices of the temple are the five Halls. At the centre of the temple is situated the sanctum sanctorum or Holy Of Holiest. This means the ‘Hall of Wisdom’. It is the main shrine where Kantotle accompanied by his consort Aletheia (the Unveiled One) performs His Cosmic Dance, the Dance of Bliss. The World -- or "Nature" -- is the embodiment of the colossal human form. The City of Eternal Truth is the centre of this form, the place of the heart, where Kantotle performs the Cosmic Dance. The City is laid out as a labyrinth. For this reason the devotees may approach the
central shrine from two sides. One is called Extension. A narrower path is called Intension. As blood flows to and from the heart. The 16 stupas topping the golden roof represent the sixteen strands of The Fabric. They also asymbolize the sixteen Strands -- or goddesses. The roof of this hall is made of 21.600 tiles, representing
inhalations and exhalations of Pirots.
The links and side joints symbolize the connecting veins -- of the pirots, of course. The five main steps at the entrance to the shrine stand between the devotees and the image of Kantotle, covered in silver. They are the five seed words or syllables. By chanting these syllables,"
----------------KAN -- TO --- TLE
the devotee can cross the ocean of bondage and attain to the Lord. The granite plinth of the shrine is called Oxonianism -- because it does duty for Vienna in providing a support for Kantotle (in his Russell re-incarnation). On all special occasions worship is performed to this plinth. The name, Hall of Consciousness or Hall of Wisdom, refers to the quality of wisdom which pervades the atmosphere, bestowed upon the worshippers by the Dance of the Lord. His boon is the experience of the Cosmic Dance. A unique feature is that the structure of the actual stage is made of wood, which has so far not been botanically classified but is nevertheless real. It is rectangular in form and here Kantotle is worshipped in his three aspects: as Form or Image, as Formless-Form -- the crystal Cunning of Reason -- and as formless. From the platform opposite one can see the image of the Dancing Kantotle, situated in the middle of the stage. Kantotle is facing south, unlike most other simpler Philosophers. This signifies he is the Conqueror of Dogma, dispelling the fear of death for Humanity. The Crystal Cunning of Reason is Kantotle as Formless-Form. It was formed from the essence of the crescent moon in Kantotle's matted hair, for the purpose of peripatetic worship.
This is taken from its keeping place at the feet of the thing six times a day, and holy ablution is performed to him in the hall. Immediately to the proper right of this is the ‘mystery’ of Analyticity. Here, behind a silk curtain which is black
on the outside and red on the inside, is the Treasure of Meaning Postulates, in the form of Predicate Calculus. An abstract geometrical design, on which the deity is invoked. Behind the curtain, before it, hang a few strands of golden fig leaves. This signifies the act of creation -- or Pirotology. One moment nothing exists, the next instant the All has been brought into existence.
At regular timings the curtain is removed to allow the devotees to worship the Ether which is the vehicle of the Absolute and Consciousness. The hall houses one more unique form of Kantotle. This is the Organon, the Ruby Lord: a replica of Kantotle in ruby form. This appeared out of the fire of the sacrifice in response to the devotion of the Modernists. Every Saturday, as part of the 10.00 o’clock morning ritual, after the Recitation of the Crystal Cunning of Reason is also performed to the Ruby Kantotle. As conclusion of this ceremony the Ruby Thing is placed on the edge of the Swimming Pool and an Implicature is offered. This is the burning of camphor on a special plate which is shown both in front and behind the Ruby Thing. This brings out the special quality of translucence of this, creating a mystical spectacle for the onlookers. Nobody knows when the worship of Kantotle was established here, or when the City of Eternal Truth was build. The original wooden structure is doubtless, and ironically,the oldest structure in the temple complex,
as the shrine of Plathegel is a later construction under the Neo-Kantians. The City has no features, really, that could help to date it and it might just as well be eternal, after all.
It is unique and no other structure is known like it anywhere else in Philosophy. Analysis by the Leibnizian ifinitesimal method would be unreliable because it is known to have been regularly renovated during the centuries. But the origins of the City of Eternal Truth lie back in prehistoric times. According to the mythology the City was first constructed by a Philosopher King nicknamed "Thales". This Philosopher King was healed of leprosy by bathing in the sacred pond in the "Woody" forest and witnessed the Cosmic Dance. The first gilding of the roof of the temple and the instituting of the formal worship are all attributed to this King Philosopher.
The first historical references can be found in Jowett's translation of the Plato Dialogues, especially in the Timaeus. Here Aletheia, the six-faced Daughter of Yocasta and Socrates, is described as worshipping his parents in Athens, before going to do battle with a demon called Physicalism. This text can be dated to the fourth century BCE. The City of Eternal Truth is also prominently mentioned in "De Consolatione Philosophiae", an important religious and philosophical text in ancient Latin, dating from the beginning of the Christian era. A few centuries later the temple and its Lord are often mentioned by members of the Vienna Circle, but only derogatorily and, especially by Schlick. The first historical persons to claim having gilded the roof of the temple are Baumgarten and his 'cousin', Kant. By this time the temple had already become important. The place where Students were crowned, and where they came to worship and receive counsel. How the gilding of the roof was done is a knowledge that was sadly lost with time. But it is without doubt one of the great technical achievements of ancient times.
Immediately in front of the temple is the golden hall. Its roof is made of copper, although Kanaka means gold. This is the gold of spiritual treasure: to experience Kantotle's dance from so near. In this hall are most of the Saturday morning rituals of worship performed. The Early Morning rituals. The rituals with lamps and ritual objects. And the Ruby Thing. The pilgrims can enter certain areas of the hall for worship at specified hours. It is a controversy whether this was originally constructed together with the older hall, or some time later. This is the shrine in the form of a chariot, pulled by two stone horses.
One represents Practical Reason, the other Theoretical Reason. It is situated opposite the old hall, in the third courtyard. It is the place of the dance contest between Kantotle and Plathegel. Kantotle conquered Alethei, who would not calm down after she destroyed a powerful demon -- Reductionism -- by lifting his right leg straight up towards the sky. This dance is called "Gentzen". Then and there Aletheia suddenly remembered who she really was, the peaceful consort of Kantotle, and she was able to leave her furious mood and returned to her peaceful self. This scene is depicted in the sanctum inside. We see Kantotle performing his dance, with his leg
lifted straight above his head, and Aletheia calmed down in one corner, both accompanied by Carnap and Grice playing the Fiddles, the instruments which are used to accompany the dance.
The chariot form commemorates Kantotle as the Destroyer of the Three Demon Cities. Several divine powers joined together to create this chariot. Thus the sun and moon became the wheels, and the Two Reasons the two horses. After destroying the Three Cities he descended from his chariot, having landed opposite, and ascended into the City to commence His Dance. From this, it is also called opposite hall. This opposite (or subcontrary) hall has several distinguishing features aside from its shape and its function. Its columns are unique to the chariot hall. They are square, and circular at the same time, and although carved from the hardest granite they are covered with exquisite miniature reliefs, depicting dancers, musicians and all kinds of philosophical figures. One other feature sets this edifice apart from any other hall within the temple complex and from all other temple halls in Philosophy. This is mysteriously connected to the Sphinx -- she of Riddles fame. Just under the floor surface of the raised platform which is the Body is a belt surrounding the whole city.
Here we see lions and sphinxes alternating in pairs, girdling it. Also the pillars of the two pavilions on the western side of the hall are supported by four sphinxes which function as caryatids. It is considered by tradition the second oldest building in the complex, without any real indication of its age. It is reported in inscriptions as having been renovated by the St. Bonaventura
in the thirteenth century. The hall can be found in the third courtyard. The festival deities are kept during the year, and worship is performed for them
on Saturday mornings. This is done inside the hall, and is open to the public. The age and history of this hall is also hidden in the mists of time. There is some evidence the hall was once used not just as a dance hall, but as an "Music Hall" by visiting Philosophers and Comedians of the different governing dynasties of the Oxford and the Sorbonne during the several phases of history. No other information is available, alas.
To the right is the Thousand Pillar Hall in the second courtyard. It is
the architectural representation of the Crown. Which is the seventh spiritual energy point in the astral body. Kantotle and the goddess Aletheia, his consort, dance here in the mornings of the 9th and 10th Saturday of the Chariot Festival. About this too, we have very little historical information. It is first mentioned as the place where the Flemish philosopher, Descartes, premiered his great Song-and-Dance routine ("The Cogito") on the lives of the 63 saints -- or Malignant Demon --, before Voltaire. Its base is encircled by reliefs of dancers and musicians, as it were, participating in a procession.
The most imposing feature of the temple, which can be seen soaring above the plain from miles away, are the four temple gateways, located in the second wall of enclosure at the four cardinal points. These are:
The South,
The West,
The East
and
The North.
They are considered among the earliest examples of such structures and are in their present form dated to at least the 12th and 13th century. Both Carnapians and Griceians disagree about the dates of the individual columns, or about which one was build first. Some consider the West as oldest, some the East. In between the sculptures decorating the inside of the West Corridor we find a musician (Grice?) playing a standing double drum. This could point to an early date for this -- or a later one, if one allows for Syncopation and the Jazz Age. On the outside of the granite bases are found sculptures of many important as well as less well known deities in niches in a particular order. The inside walls of passages through all the four corridors are decorated with the 108 dance movements of Kantotle's Peripatetic Dance, from the Organon, the world’s most ancient treatise on dance, drama and theatre -- and logic. Besides here, these movements -- of which the first is called "Barbara" -- are depicted in only four other temples -- but they circulate widely on the Net. The four corridors, together with the golden dome of the central shrine are the five towers which represent the five faces of Kantotle, with the Smiley symbolizing the masterful face.
In the innermost courtyard, at a right angle with the Golden Thing, we find the shrine of Aletheia. Reclining on the Cosmic Snake, she is in the state of consciousness, enjoying the vision of Kantotle’s dance. The coexistence of the worship of both Kantotle and Aletheia within one temple is unique. The worship was established in the earliest times and was originally performed by the "Minstrels" themselves. In the later medieval period, with a shifting political situation and hyperinflation under pressure of Capitalist invasions, there was possibly a discontinuation of the worship for a long period, after which it re-instated by the Wittgenstein, of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The worship of Aletheia has since then been in the hands of Carnapians and Griceians mainly, and was no longer performed by the "Minstrels" proper.
Within the inner courtyard, to the east, we find a small shrine which houses the bracelets of both the Creator god, of the Handy Trinity, and Home, a deified saint. The presence of the Creator-God (a deity almost never worshipped) establishes the worship of all three deities of the Handy Trinity with-in the one complex. The temple of goddess Aletheia, consort of Kantotle, is situated on the west side of the Water Tank. A flight of steps leads down into its courtyard. The goddess is worshipped here as the energy and power of wisdom. On the frontal portion of the pillared hall, on the ceiling of the right and left wings, the finest eye-capturing fresco paintings of approximately a thousand years old, illustrate the Sacred Deeds of Kantotle. The galleries surrounding the temple are decorated with a procession of dancers, musicians, and philosophers, sculptured in relief. This temple was possibly built in the 11th century, if not earlier.
This holds The Sacred Twater Place or Tank. It is famous for healing the ancient king Buridan of his skin disease. His skin became golden after which he was called "The Ass". In this Tank we find a stone representation of the the Element Twater, which as Putnam has showed, is not H20, but XYZ. In the dry season it becomes visible as the water level in the tank is reduced. The Twater temple is dedicated to Abelard, the second son of Kantotle and Aletheia. This shrine is also shaped as a chariot, pulled by horses and elephants. This temple was according to tradition build by a king of the dynasty from Cambridge, which superceded the rule of the the Oxonians in the fifteenth century. His name was Testa Bianca ("White Head"), and the temple is named after him. In the middle of the 19th century this temple was renovated by the Victorians with the support of Dutch merchants, who had a trading post in nearby Porto Nuovo. According to an inscription on copper plates they donated a share of their profit for this purpose, but we do not know what they did with the rest.
---
WLOG: Strands and Monsters
R. B. Jones proposes to track the strands and monsters in Carnap and Grice with the aid of
WLOG.
We shall use the definition provided by
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/without_loss_of_generality
WLOG:
"[To] mak[e] a constraining assumption [A]
that makes it clear how to apply [an otherwise
specific proof [P], but explicitly
performed under [A]
to the general case where P is
unconstrained by [A]."
We propose to apply WLOG to the 12 monsters (M1-12 -- since they are all forms of Minimalism) vis a vis the 16 strands we identified in the philosophies of Carnap and Grice. Tomorrow.
WLOG.
We shall use the definition provided by
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/without_loss_of_generality
WLOG:
"[To] mak[e] a constraining assumption [A]
that makes it clear how to apply [an otherwise
specific proof [P], but explicitly
performed under [A]
to the general case where P is
unconstrained by [A]."
We propose to apply WLOG to the 12 monsters (M1-12 -- since they are all forms of Minimalism) vis a vis the 16 strands we identified in the philosophies of Carnap and Grice. Tomorrow.
The Carnap Biography, the Grice Biography
It is sometimes difficult to provide a link to the best biography. My favourite on Grice seems to be the rather prestigious:
Stroud, Barry C. and G. J. Warnock) "Grice, (Herbert) Paul", The Dictionary of National Biography: 1986-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 pp. 171-172.
Stroud, Barry C. and G. J. Warnock) "Grice, (Herbert) Paul", The Dictionary of National Biography: 1986-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 pp. 171-172.
Grice's theory as ultimately 'ad-hoc'
We are discussing this vis a vis the CarnapGrice project.
The reference being to:
MacKay, Alfred F. 1972. Professor Grice's Theory of Meaning. Mind, 81, 57-66.
-----
MacKay is writing as a methodologist, and concerned with the very manoeuvre of Grice on meaning. He is particularly concerned with the flurry of 'alleged' counterexamples referred to in Grice 1969.
Grice lists the following authors as having aimed at presenting a counterexample to his views:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson
----
in each case, Grice is victorious. Why? Well, McKay suggests, 'because his theory is essentially ad hoc'. For each new clause that the 'alleged' counter-example provokes, the only motivation, McKay, in this rather uncharitable reading, suggests is the 'overcoming' of the counterexample.
McKay never put forwarded his own views on meaning, and the reserach of this Mind paper draws from sharing with Grice a round table at Oberlin. He makes an important point that helps us appreciate Grice's methodology. And while it is perfectly true we submit that there is also an 'internal' logic going on.
Grice was good at this: he could SEE through the eyes of his critics. Take the first alleged counterexample, by Urmson. Urmson proposed a case where the intended effect on the addressee was NOT the result of a reason, but just a cause. His example was that of a bribe. Grice readapts it to a scenario of physical torture! -- The need to qualify the 'reason' (as well as 'cause') aspect was only CONTINGENTLY associated with Urmson's observation. The inner logic of Grice's analysis leads in that direction.
The next big counterexample was Strawson's, in 1964. The details of the Strawson manoeuvre are interesting per se since they echo some of the manoeuvres of Quine against Carnap. But all in all, Grice accepted the example by Strawson in 1964 as really pointing to a drawback in his original analysis of 1948. As it stood, it did not discriminate between forms of overt communication (which we associate with our ouse of "mean") from cases of persuasion of a more covert nature. Stampe, Schiffer, and Searle followed the Strawson line. The way by Grice to counterattack is Grice's own. He would NOT appeal to 'convention' or the openness of the 'linguistic' rule. Instead he kept adding an utterer's intention -- which McKay finds ad hoc. This particular intention, however, while superficially readable as "to block a counterexample" is imbued with Grice's important idea that everything in communication is 'above board', to which he returned in his discussion of Strand 5 in the Retrospective Epilogue ("in communication in a certain sense all must be pulbic" -- Gri89:367).
The reference being to:
MacKay, Alfred F. 1972. Professor Grice's Theory of Meaning. Mind, 81, 57-66.
-----
MacKay is writing as a methodologist, and concerned with the very manoeuvre of Grice on meaning. He is particularly concerned with the flurry of 'alleged' counterexamples referred to in Grice 1969.
Grice lists the following authors as having aimed at presenting a counterexample to his views:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson
----
in each case, Grice is victorious. Why? Well, McKay suggests, 'because his theory is essentially ad hoc'. For each new clause that the 'alleged' counter-example provokes, the only motivation, McKay, in this rather uncharitable reading, suggests is the 'overcoming' of the counterexample.
McKay never put forwarded his own views on meaning, and the reserach of this Mind paper draws from sharing with Grice a round table at Oberlin. He makes an important point that helps us appreciate Grice's methodology. And while it is perfectly true we submit that there is also an 'internal' logic going on.
Grice was good at this: he could SEE through the eyes of his critics. Take the first alleged counterexample, by Urmson. Urmson proposed a case where the intended effect on the addressee was NOT the result of a reason, but just a cause. His example was that of a bribe. Grice readapts it to a scenario of physical torture! -- The need to qualify the 'reason' (as well as 'cause') aspect was only CONTINGENTLY associated with Urmson's observation. The inner logic of Grice's analysis leads in that direction.
The next big counterexample was Strawson's, in 1964. The details of the Strawson manoeuvre are interesting per se since they echo some of the manoeuvres of Quine against Carnap. But all in all, Grice accepted the example by Strawson in 1964 as really pointing to a drawback in his original analysis of 1948. As it stood, it did not discriminate between forms of overt communication (which we associate with our ouse of "mean") from cases of persuasion of a more covert nature. Stampe, Schiffer, and Searle followed the Strawson line. The way by Grice to counterattack is Grice's own. He would NOT appeal to 'convention' or the openness of the 'linguistic' rule. Instead he kept adding an utterer's intention -- which McKay finds ad hoc. This particular intention, however, while superficially readable as "to block a counterexample" is imbued with Grice's important idea that everything in communication is 'above board', to which he returned in his discussion of Strand 5 in the Retrospective Epilogue ("in communication in a certain sense all must be pulbic" -- Gri89:367).
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Comparative Table: Carnap and Grice on analyticity
-------------------------- LEIBNIZ'S
-------------------------- use of the "S is P"
-------------------------- formula
.
.
.
CARNAP ----------------------------- GRICE
L-equivalence
M-postulate
Method of intensions
------------------------------------pre-defense of
----------------------------------- a dogma
--------------------------- (NO USE FOR ANALYTICITY)
------------------------Quine's attack
Carnap's ------------------------ Grice, champion
emphasis on L-equivalence -------- of ordinary language.
emphasis on pragmatics ----------- "Paradigm Case Argument"
---------------------------------- people HAVE ways to deal
---------------------------------- with analytically FALSE
---------------------------------- statements. They claim
---------------------------------- incomprehension. "My
---------------------------------- neighbour's three year old is an adult"
Carnap on intensions -------------- Grice's
as reducible set-theoretically ----- later takes
to extensions ----------------------- on the 'analytic'
-------------------------------------- as a transcendental
-------------------------------------- requisite in any
-------------------------------------- language we can think of.
-------------------------- use of the "S is P"
-------------------------- formula
.
.
.
CARNAP ----------------------------- GRICE
L-equivalence
M-postulate
Method of intensions
------------------------------------pre-defense of
----------------------------------- a dogma
--------------------------- (NO USE FOR ANALYTICITY)
------------------------Quine's attack
Carnap's ------------------------ Grice, champion
emphasis on L-equivalence -------- of ordinary language.
emphasis on pragmatics ----------- "Paradigm Case Argument"
---------------------------------- people HAVE ways to deal
---------------------------------- with analytically FALSE
---------------------------------- statements. They claim
---------------------------------- incomprehension. "My
---------------------------------- neighbour's three year old is an adult"
Carnap on intensions -------------- Grice's
as reducible set-theoretically ----- later takes
to extensions ----------------------- on the 'analytic'
-------------------------------------- as a transcendental
-------------------------------------- requisite in any
-------------------------------------- language we can think of.
Comparative Table: Carnap and Grice on 'logical construction'
-------------------- RUSSELL --------------
introduces 'logical construction' in his
talks on Atomism:
One very important heuristic maxim ... is a form of Occam's Razor
-----Whenever possible, substitute
---- constructions out of known entities for
-----inferences to unknown entities(1924:160)
-------------------------------------------------------
CARNAP
applies
'logical construction'
to matter in
Logische Aufbau der Welt.
---- ----------------------- In 1941
---------------------------------------- Grice borrows "the logical
---------------------------------------- construction theory" from
---------------------------------------- Broad (who knew Russell
---------------------------------------- at Cambridge) and applies
---------------------------------------- it to the problem of the
------------------------------------------------- self.
- - - "Personal Identity" (Mind)
------------------- DIVERGENCES IN APPROACH
Carnap --
reductionist interpretation ----------------- reductionist interpretation
------------------------------------------------ rejected by Grice 1989:Strand 4
-- pragmatist interepetation ------------------- reductive, not reductionist.
introduces 'logical construction' in his
talks on Atomism:
One very important heuristic maxim ... is a form of Occam's Razor
-----Whenever possible, substitute
---- constructions out of known entities for
-----inferences to unknown entities(1924:160)
-------------------------------------------------------
CARNAP
applies
'logical construction'
to matter in
Logische Aufbau der Welt.
---- ----------------------- In 1941
---------------------------------------- Grice borrows "the logical
---------------------------------------- construction theory" from
---------------------------------------- Broad (who knew Russell
---------------------------------------- at Cambridge) and applies
---------------------------------------- it to the problem of the
------------------------------------------------- self.
- - - "Personal Identity" (Mind)
------------------- DIVERGENCES IN APPROACH
Carnap --
reductionist interpretation ----------------- reductionist interpretation
------------------------------------------------ rejected by Grice 1989:Strand 4
-- pragmatist interepetation ------------------- reductive, not reductionist.
How pseudo- can philosophy be?
Carnap's favourite word is "pseudo-"
It's all 'pseudo-' for him. He was the forgery detector.
Heidegger said, causally,
"Nothing noths".
Carnap overeacted: "Nonsense!"
"Scheinprobleme!" -- This was translated as 'pseudo-problem.' In Carnap's cariacture, the philosopher is a pseudosopher (I owe the ref. to this word to Ian Cargan Dengler)
"pseudosophy pretension to wisdom"
"This group of 30 odd '-sophy' and '-sopher' words have in common an etymological derivation from the Greek sophia, meaning 'wisdom'."
"They refer to an odd group of systems of knowledge, esoteric doctrines and other principles, most of which are obsolete or extremely rare, with philosophy being the only major exception."
"Not quite sciences or studies, nor are they isms, they tend to refer to mystical or occult concepts rather than strictly religious or scientific canons of knowledge.
http://phrontistery.50megs.com/wisdom.html
It's all 'pseudo-' for him. He was the forgery detector.
Heidegger said, causally,
"Nothing noths".
Carnap overeacted: "Nonsense!"
"Scheinprobleme!" -- This was translated as 'pseudo-problem.' In Carnap's cariacture, the philosopher is a pseudosopher (I owe the ref. to this word to Ian Cargan Dengler)
"pseudosophy pretension to wisdom"
"This group of 30 odd '-sophy' and '-sopher' words have in common an etymological derivation from the Greek sophia, meaning 'wisdom'."
"They refer to an odd group of systems of knowledge, esoteric doctrines and other principles, most of which are obsolete or extremely rare, with philosophy being the only major exception."
"Not quite sciences or studies, nor are they isms, they tend to refer to mystical or occult concepts rather than strictly religious or scientific canons of knowledge.
http://phrontistery.50megs.com/wisdom.html
Dual Pages in CarnapGrice by JonesSperanza
by JLS, of the Grice Club.
---- One of the fascinating things about my joint project with Carnapian Roger Bishop Jones is that each knows what the other is talking about.
"What's the point of a joint book otherwise", Margaret Attwood notes.
---- "There's not just pages filled with Griceanisms and Carnapianisms, but comparisons. too. Take this delight: "A Conceptual Map"
--------------------
See how this is wonderfully designed in a single page of the pdf. document. And when you open the hard copy of the book, we have TWO pages to consider. The material being:
A DUAL PAGE (in the diagrammes by Jones and Speranza) refers to a page where we trace connections -- always conceptual (we cannot think but in concepts) between Carnap and Grice. We use arrows and stuff.
-------------------A
-------------CONCEPTUAL MAP
-------------------TO
The ------------------------
Carnap ------ and ------------ Griceland
Corner
------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------- .
--------------------------------------- .
--------------------------------------- .
---------------------------------- Aristotle
------------------ KANT
------------------------------Hume is where the Heart is
-------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------- (Kantotle, Ariskant)
Neo-Kantianism <--- vs. ----> Oxford Hegelianism
--------------------------- Ryle sends Ayer to Vienna
----------------
-----( Wiener Kreis )
-- Carnap on pirots.
--------------------------- Ayer returns from Vienna.
--------------------------- splits from Austin's playgroup.
****************** The War ************************
----------------- The Postward ------------------------
---------------------------- Grice influential in Austin's 'kindergartens'
------------------------ Grice travels to the USA
----------------------------- to deliver the William James lectures,
----------------------------- and puns on Heidegger alla Carnap.
----------------------------- "Heidegger is the greatest living
----------------------------- philosopher, if you can take me
----------------------------- seriously" (Gri89:18)
Carnap dies.
--------------------------------- Grice intorduces his pirotological
--------------------------------- programme in the APA presidential
--------------------------------- address (Pacific Division) for 1975.
--------------------------------------- Grice gives the Carus Lectures
--------------------------------------- (published as Grice 1991)
-------------------------------------------- Grice dies in 1988.
------------------------------ Grice's Aspects of Reason lectures
---------------------------------- (published 2001).
---- One of the fascinating things about my joint project with Carnapian Roger Bishop Jones is that each knows what the other is talking about.
"What's the point of a joint book otherwise", Margaret Attwood notes.
---- "There's not just pages filled with Griceanisms and Carnapianisms, but comparisons. too. Take this delight: "A Conceptual Map"
--------------------
See how this is wonderfully designed in a single page of the pdf. document. And when you open the hard copy of the book, we have TWO pages to consider. The material being:
A DUAL PAGE (in the diagrammes by Jones and Speranza) refers to a page where we trace connections -- always conceptual (we cannot think but in concepts) between Carnap and Grice. We use arrows and stuff.
-------------------A
-------------CONCEPTUAL MAP
-------------------TO
The ------------------------
Carnap ------ and ------------ Griceland
Corner
------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------- .
--------------------------------------- .
--------------------------------------- .
---------------------------------- Aristotle
------------------ KANT
------------------------------Hume is where the Heart is
-------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------------------- .
------------------------------- (Kantotle, Ariskant)
Neo-Kantianism <--- vs. ----> Oxford Hegelianism
--------------------------- Ryle sends Ayer to Vienna
----------------
-----( Wiener Kreis )
-- Carnap on pirots.
--------------------------- Ayer returns from Vienna.
--------------------------- splits from Austin's playgroup.
****************** The War ************************
----------------- The Postward ------------------------
---------------------------- Grice influential in Austin's 'kindergartens'
------------------------ Grice travels to the USA
----------------------------- to deliver the William James lectures,
----------------------------- and puns on Heidegger alla Carnap.
----------------------------- "Heidegger is the greatest living
----------------------------- philosopher, if you can take me
----------------------------- seriously" (Gri89:18)
Carnap dies.
--------------------------------- Grice intorduces his pirotological
--------------------------------- programme in the APA presidential
--------------------------------- address (Pacific Division) for 1975.
--------------------------------------- Grice gives the Carus Lectures
--------------------------------------- (published as Grice 1991)
-------------------------------------------- Grice dies in 1988.
------------------------------ Grice's Aspects of Reason lectures
---------------------------------- (published 2001).
Monday, April 26, 2010
Carnap and Grice as Heirs of Russell -- the 'logical construction'
By J. L. Speranza, of the Grice Club.
----
I append more running comments on Bernard Linsky's interesting entry on 'logical construction' in the Stanford Encyclopaedia (online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-construction/
and (c) B. Linsky (2009).
It relates to this item in the Grice Archive as to 'personal identity' as a 'logical construction'. It connects with Carnap's idea of 'matter' as a logical construction out of sense data.
Linksy writes that Russell refers to "several different definitions and philosophical analyses as providing "logical constructions"". These are of certain entities and expressions." The "examples he cites" are:
a. "the Frege/Russell definition of numbers as classes of equinumerous classes".
b. "the theory of definite descriptions".
c. "the construction of matter from sense data,"
-- "and several others", Linsky writes.
"Generally expressions for such entities are called "incomplete symbols" and the entities themselves "logical fictions"."
"The notion originates with Russell's logicist program of reducing mathematics to logic, was widely used by Russell, and led to the later Logical Positivist notion of construction and ultimately the widespread use of set theoretic models in philosophy."
"Russell's most specific formulation of logical construction as a method in Philosophy comes from his essay "Logical Atomism"."
Linksy quotes directly from Russell:
One very important heuristic maxim which
Dr. Whitehead and I found, by experience, to
be applicable in mathematical logic, and have
since applied to various other fields, is a
form of Occam's Razor. When some set of
supposed entities has neat
logical properties, it turns out, in a
great many instances, that the supposed entities
can be replaced by purely logical structures composed
of entities which have not such neat properties. In
that case, in interpreting a body of
propositions hitherto believed to be
about the supposed entities, we can
substitute the logical structures without altering
any of the detail of the body of propositions
in question. This is an economy, because
entities with neat logical properties are
always inferred, and if the propositions
in which they occur can be interpreted without
making this inference, the ground for the
inference fails, and our body of propositions
is secured against the need of a doubtful
step. The principle may be stated in the [following] form.
RUSSELL's formulation of 'logical construction':
Whenever possible, substitute
constructions out of known entities
for inferences to unknown entities
Ruseell 1924:160.
Linksy comments that Russell is speaking of logical constructions in this memorable passage from his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" lectures." Again Linksy quotes directly from Russell:
The method of `postulating' what we
want has many advantages; they are the
same as the advantages of theft
over honest toil. Let us leave them
to others and proceed with
our honest toil
Russell 1918:71.
Linksy comments:
"The notion of logical construction
appears frequently with the idea that
what is defined is a "logical fiction",
and an "incomplete symbol"."
As Linksy comments:
"The latter term, [incomplete symbol] derives
from the use of contextual definitions, providing an analysis of each sentence in which a defined symbol may occur without, however, giving an explicit definition, an equation or universal statement giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term in isolation."
Linksy continues:
"The terms "fiction" and "incomplete symbol" apply with differing aptness to various constructions."
Here starts Linksy's brilliant historical analysis. He writes:
"Russell's first use of construction, and
the model for later constructions, is the
Frege/Russell definition of numbers as classes.
This follows the kind of definitions used
in the arithmetization of analysis of
the preceding century, in particular, Dedekind's
earlier construction of real numbers as
bounded classes in the rational numbers. Russell's
logicist program could not rest content with
postulates for the fundamental objects of
mathematics such as the Peano Axioms
for the natural numbers. Instead numbers
were to be defined as classes of
equinumerous classes."
Is this abstraction?
Linsky notes:
"Russell refers to this method as "abstraction",
now known as the abstraction of an
equivalence class. The definition of equinumerosity,
or of the existence of a one to one mapping between two classes, also called "similarity", is solely in terms
of logical notions of quantifiers and identity. With
the numbers defined, for example, two as
the class of all two membered sets, or pairs, the properties of numbers could be derived by logical means alone."
--- Linsky then turns to the second illustration:
"The most influential of Russell's constructions
was the theory of descriptions [in] "On Denoting" in 1905."
"Russell's theory provides an analysis of
sentences of the form `The alpha is beta'
where `The alpha' is called a definite
decription."
"The analysis proposes that
`The alpha is beta' as equivalent to
`There is one and only one alpha and it is beta'".
"With this analysis, the logical properties
of descriptions can now be deduced using just the
logic of quantifiers and identity."
Linksy continues:
"Among the theorems in *14 of PM are those
showing what follows."
"First, if there is just one alpha then `The alpha is alpha' is 1, and if there is not, then `The alpha is beta' is always 0 and, crucially for the logical manipulation of descriptions."
"Second, if the alpha = the beta, and the alpha is gamma, then the beta is gamma. I.e. proper -- uniquely referring -- descriptions behave like singular terms."
"Some of these results are contentious. P. F. Strawson (Grice's tutee at St. John's< Oxford), noted that
`The present king of france is bald'
should be truth valueless since there is no present king of France, rather than "plainly false", as Russell's theory predicts."
But Grice came to the defense of Russell.
Linsky goes on:
"The theory of descriptions introduces
Russell's notion of incomplete symbol.
Definite descriptions like
`The alpha' do not show up in the formal
analysis of sentences in which they occur,
thus
`The alpha is gamma' becomes as per below."
(x) [(y)(Fy y=x) & Hx]
-- "of which no subformula, or continuous segment, can be identified as the analysis of `The alpha'".
Linsky notes:
"Much as talk about "the average family" as in
"The average family has 2.2 children" becomes
"The number of children in families divided by the number of families = 2.2",
there is no portion of that analysis that corresponds with "the average family"."
"Instead, we have a formula for eliminating
such expressions from contexts in which they occur,
hence the notion of "incomplete symbol" and
the related "contextual definition"".
Linsky notes:
"It is standard to see in this the origins of
the distinction between between surface grammatical
form and logical form, and thus the origin of linguistic analysis as a method in philosophy which operates by seeing past superficial linguistic form to underlying philosophical analysis."
----
He adds:
"The theory of descriptions has been criticized by some linguists who see descriptions and other noun phrases as full fledged constituents of sentences, and who see the sharp distinction between grammatical and logical form as a mistake."
Citation needed!
Linsky goes on:
"The theory of descriptions is often described as a model for avoiding ontological commitment to objects such as Meinongian subsistent entities, and so logical constructions in general are often seen as being chiefly aimed at ontological goals."
Cfr. Grice on 'avoiding Meinongian jungles' in "Vacuous Names".
Linsky goes on:
"In fact, that goal is at most peripheral
to most constructions. Rather, the goal is
to allow the proof of propositions that
would otherwise have to be assumed as
axioms or hypotheses."
Linsky adds:
"Nor need the ontological goal be
always elimination of problematic entities. Other
constructions should be seen more as reductions
of one class of entity to another, or replacements of one notion by a more precise, mathematical, substitute."
---
"Russell's 'no-class' theory of classes
from *20 of Whitehead's and Russell's PM
provides a contextual definition
like the theory of descriptions."
How? Well,
"One of Russell's early diagnoses of the
paradoxes was that they showed that
classes could not be objects. Indeed he
seems to have come across his paradox
of the class of all classes that are not members of
themselves by applying Cantor's argument to show that there are more classes of objects than objects."
Linksy goes on:
"Hence, Russell concludes that classes can not be objects."
"Inspired by the theory of descriptions, Russell proposes
that to say something beta of the class of alphas --
BETA{x: ALPHAx}
-- is to say that there is some property beta coextensive with (1 of the same things as) alpha such that gamma is beta."
"Extensionality of sets is thus derivable, rather than postulated: if alpha and gamma are co-extensive then anything true of"
{x: ALPHAx}
"will be true of {x: GAMMAx}."
"Features of sets then follow from the features of the logic of properties, the "ramified theory of types"."
Russell echoing Bentham:
"Because classes would seem to be individuals of some sort, but on analysis are found not to be, Russell speaks of them as "logical fictions", an expression which echoes Jeremy Bentham's notion of a "legal fiction"."
"Because statements attributing a property to particular classes are analyzed by existential sentences saying that there is some propositional function having that property, this construction should not be seen as avoiding ontological commitment entirely, but rather of reducing classes to propositional functions."
"The properties of classes are really properties of propositional functions and for every class said to have a property there really is some propositional function having that property."
Linsky then draws from other illustrations.
"For other constructions such as propositions a contextual definition is not provided."
"In any case, constructions do not appear as the referents of logically proper names, and so by that account are not part of the fundamental "furniture" of the world."
J. WISDOM on constructions.
"Early critical discussions of constructions, such as John Wisdom's, stressed the contrast between logically proper names, which do refer, and constructions, which were thus seen as ontologically innocent."
Linsky notes:
"Beginning with The Problems of Philosophy (1912), Russell turns repeatedly to the problem of matter."
"Part of the problem is to find a refution of Berkeleyan idealism, of showing how the existence and real nature of matter can be proved."
"In Problems Russell argues that matter is a well supported hypothesis that explains our experiences. Matter is known only indirectly, "by description", as the cause, whatever it may be, of our sense data, which we know "by acquaintance". This is the notion of hypothesis which Russell contrasts with construction in the passage above."
"Russell saw an analogy between the case of simply hypothesizing the existence of numbers with certain properties, those described by axioms, and hypothesizing the existence of matter. While we distinguish the certain knowledge we may have of mathematical entities from the contingent knowledge of material objects, Russell says that there are certain "neat" features of matter which are just too tidy to have turned out by accident. Examples include the most general spatiotemporal properties of objects, that no two can occupy the same place at the same time, and so on. Material objects are now to be seen as collections of sense data. Influenced by William James, Russell defended a "neutral monism" by which matter and minds were both to be constructed from sense data, but in different ways. Intuitively, the sense data occuring as they do "in" a mind, are material to construct that mind, the sense data derived from an object from different points of view to constructthat object. Russell saw some support for this in the theory of relativity, and the fundumental importance of frames of reference in the new physics."
"These prominent examples are not the only use of the notion of construction in Russell's thought."
"In Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica the multiple relation theory of propositions is introduced by saying that propositions are "incomplete symbols"."
"Russell's multiple relation theory, that he held from 1910 to 1919 or so, argued that the constitituents of propositions, say
i. Desdemona loves Cassio
which is 0, are unified in a way that does not make it the case that they constitute a fact by themselves."
"Those constituents occur only in the context of beliefs, say,
ii. Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio.
"The real fact consists of a relation of
Belief holding between the constituents
Othello, Desdemona and Cassio."
B(o, d , L, c).
"Because one might also have believed
propositions of other structures, such as --
"B (o, F, a)"
there need to be many such relations B, thus
the "multiple" relation theory."
"Like the construction of numbers, this
construction abstracts out what a
number of occurrences of a belief have in common,
a believer and various objects in a certain order."
"The analysis also makes the proposition an incomplete symbol because there is no constituent in the analysis of
`x believes that p'
that corresponds to `p'"
"Russell also suggests that propositional functions are logical constructions when he says that they are "nothing", but "nonetheless important for that" (1918:96)."
"Propositional functions are abstracted from their values, propositions. The propositional function
x is human.
is abstracted from its values
Socrates is human
Plato is human.
etc.
"Viewing propositional functions as constructions from propositions which are in turn constructions by the multiple relation theory helps to make sense of the theory of types of propositional functions in Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica".
"The notion of "incomplete symbol" does not make as much sense as "construction" when applied to propositional functions and propositions."
"This usage requires a broadening of the notion."
---- From Russell to Carnap, Grice, and beyond:
"The notion of logical construction
had a great impact on
analytic philosophy."
"One line of influence was via the notion
of a contextual definition, or paraphrase, intended
to minimize ontological commitment and to
be a model of philosophical analysis."
"The distinction between the surface appearance of definite descriptions, as singular terms, and the fully analyzed sentences from which they seem to disappear was seen as a model for making problematic notions disappear upon analysis. The theory of descriptions has been viewed as a paradigm of philosophical analysis."
CARNAP EXPLICITLY CITED BY LINSKY:
"A more technical strand in
analytic philosophy was
influenced by the construction of
matter."
Or, as I prefer, 'physicalism' out of 'phenomenalism'.
Linsky writes:
"Carnap was attempted to carry out the
construction of matter from
sense data."
--- R. B. JONES WILL HAVE LOADS TO SAY ABOUT THAT:
i. It's a pragmatist prescription. Carnap sees phenomenalism as more primitive, but there are prior and prior.
ii. Etc.
----
Linsky goes on:
"Later Nelson Goodman continued the project."
And popularised in Oxford with reviews of "Structure of Appearance" by Dummett. Grice would similarly speak of "The syntax of illusion".
Linsky goes on:
"More generally, however, the use of
set-theoretic constructions became
widespread among philosophers,
and continues in the construction of set-theoretic models,
both in the sense of logic where they model formal theories, and as objects of interest in their own right."
--- And then there's Grice.
All in all, we congratulate Bernard Linsky, recommend interested readers to check his essay from the Stanford site, and report back with any insight as it dwells on our city of eternal truth.
References cited by Linsky include:
Carnap, R. , The Logical Structure of the World & Pseudo Problems in Philosophy, trans. R.George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Goodman, N., The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951.
Russell, B., 1905, "On Denoting", in Robert Marsh, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950 , London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, 39-56.
----1918, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism , D.F.Pears, ed. Lasalle: Open Court, 1985, 35-155.
----1924, "Logical Atomism", in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism , D.F.Pears, ed., Lasalle: Open Court, 1985, 157-181.
----1912, The Problems of Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprinted 1967.
Whitehead, A.N., and Russell,B.: 1925, Principia Mathematica Vol.I., second ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925.
Wisdom, J., 1931, "Logical Constructions (I.).", Mind , XL , April, 188-216.
Related Entries
Cross-referneces by Stanford: "Russell, Bertrand | Russell's Paradox | definite descriptions | and Carnap, Rudolf"
----
I append more running comments on Bernard Linsky's interesting entry on 'logical construction' in the Stanford Encyclopaedia (online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-construction/
and (c) B. Linsky (2009).
It relates to this item in the Grice Archive as to 'personal identity' as a 'logical construction'. It connects with Carnap's idea of 'matter' as a logical construction out of sense data.
Linksy writes that Russell refers to "several different definitions and philosophical analyses as providing "logical constructions"". These are of certain entities and expressions." The "examples he cites" are:
a. "the Frege/Russell definition of numbers as classes of equinumerous classes".
b. "the theory of definite descriptions".
c. "the construction of matter from sense data,"
-- "and several others", Linsky writes.
"Generally expressions for such entities are called "incomplete symbols" and the entities themselves "logical fictions"."
"The notion originates with Russell's logicist program of reducing mathematics to logic, was widely used by Russell, and led to the later Logical Positivist notion of construction and ultimately the widespread use of set theoretic models in philosophy."
"Russell's most specific formulation of logical construction as a method in Philosophy comes from his essay "Logical Atomism"."
Linksy quotes directly from Russell:
One very important heuristic maxim which
Dr. Whitehead and I found, by experience, to
be applicable in mathematical logic, and have
since applied to various other fields, is a
form of Occam's Razor. When some set of
supposed entities has neat
logical properties, it turns out, in a
great many instances, that the supposed entities
can be replaced by purely logical structures composed
of entities which have not such neat properties. In
that case, in interpreting a body of
propositions hitherto believed to be
about the supposed entities, we can
substitute the logical structures without altering
any of the detail of the body of propositions
in question. This is an economy, because
entities with neat logical properties are
always inferred, and if the propositions
in which they occur can be interpreted without
making this inference, the ground for the
inference fails, and our body of propositions
is secured against the need of a doubtful
step. The principle may be stated in the [following] form.
RUSSELL's formulation of 'logical construction':
Whenever possible, substitute
constructions out of known entities
for inferences to unknown entities
Ruseell 1924:160.
Linksy comments that Russell is speaking of logical constructions in this memorable passage from his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" lectures." Again Linksy quotes directly from Russell:
The method of `postulating' what we
want has many advantages; they are the
same as the advantages of theft
over honest toil. Let us leave them
to others and proceed with
our honest toil
Russell 1918:71.
Linksy comments:
"The notion of logical construction
appears frequently with the idea that
what is defined is a "logical fiction",
and an "incomplete symbol"."
As Linksy comments:
"The latter term, [incomplete symbol] derives
from the use of contextual definitions, providing an analysis of each sentence in which a defined symbol may occur without, however, giving an explicit definition, an equation or universal statement giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term in isolation."
Linksy continues:
"The terms "fiction" and "incomplete symbol" apply with differing aptness to various constructions."
Here starts Linksy's brilliant historical analysis. He writes:
"Russell's first use of construction, and
the model for later constructions, is the
Frege/Russell definition of numbers as classes.
This follows the kind of definitions used
in the arithmetization of analysis of
the preceding century, in particular, Dedekind's
earlier construction of real numbers as
bounded classes in the rational numbers. Russell's
logicist program could not rest content with
postulates for the fundamental objects of
mathematics such as the Peano Axioms
for the natural numbers. Instead numbers
were to be defined as classes of
equinumerous classes."
Is this abstraction?
Linsky notes:
"Russell refers to this method as "abstraction",
now known as the abstraction of an
equivalence class. The definition of equinumerosity,
or of the existence of a one to one mapping between two classes, also called "similarity", is solely in terms
of logical notions of quantifiers and identity. With
the numbers defined, for example, two as
the class of all two membered sets, or pairs, the properties of numbers could be derived by logical means alone."
--- Linsky then turns to the second illustration:
"The most influential of Russell's constructions
was the theory of descriptions [in] "On Denoting" in 1905."
"Russell's theory provides an analysis of
sentences of the form `The alpha is beta'
where `The alpha' is called a definite
decription."
"The analysis proposes that
`The alpha is beta' as equivalent to
`There is one and only one alpha and it is beta'".
"With this analysis, the logical properties
of descriptions can now be deduced using just the
logic of quantifiers and identity."
Linksy continues:
"Among the theorems in *14 of PM are those
showing what follows."
"First, if there is just one alpha then `The alpha is alpha' is 1, and if there is not, then `The alpha is beta' is always 0 and, crucially for the logical manipulation of descriptions."
"Second, if the alpha = the beta, and the alpha is gamma, then the beta is gamma. I.e. proper -- uniquely referring -- descriptions behave like singular terms."
"Some of these results are contentious. P. F. Strawson (Grice's tutee at St. John's< Oxford), noted that
`The present king of france is bald'
should be truth valueless since there is no present king of France, rather than "plainly false", as Russell's theory predicts."
But Grice came to the defense of Russell.
Linsky goes on:
"The theory of descriptions introduces
Russell's notion of incomplete symbol.
Definite descriptions like
`The alpha' do not show up in the formal
analysis of sentences in which they occur,
thus
`The alpha is gamma' becomes as per below."
(x) [(y)(Fy y=x) & Hx]
-- "of which no subformula, or continuous segment, can be identified as the analysis of `The alpha'".
Linsky notes:
"Much as talk about "the average family" as in
"The average family has 2.2 children" becomes
"The number of children in families divided by the number of families = 2.2",
there is no portion of that analysis that corresponds with "the average family"."
"Instead, we have a formula for eliminating
such expressions from contexts in which they occur,
hence the notion of "incomplete symbol" and
the related "contextual definition"".
Linsky notes:
"It is standard to see in this the origins of
the distinction between between surface grammatical
form and logical form, and thus the origin of linguistic analysis as a method in philosophy which operates by seeing past superficial linguistic form to underlying philosophical analysis."
----
He adds:
"The theory of descriptions has been criticized by some linguists who see descriptions and other noun phrases as full fledged constituents of sentences, and who see the sharp distinction between grammatical and logical form as a mistake."
Citation needed!
Linsky goes on:
"The theory of descriptions is often described as a model for avoiding ontological commitment to objects such as Meinongian subsistent entities, and so logical constructions in general are often seen as being chiefly aimed at ontological goals."
Cfr. Grice on 'avoiding Meinongian jungles' in "Vacuous Names".
Linsky goes on:
"In fact, that goal is at most peripheral
to most constructions. Rather, the goal is
to allow the proof of propositions that
would otherwise have to be assumed as
axioms or hypotheses."
Linsky adds:
"Nor need the ontological goal be
always elimination of problematic entities. Other
constructions should be seen more as reductions
of one class of entity to another, or replacements of one notion by a more precise, mathematical, substitute."
---
"Russell's 'no-class' theory of classes
from *20 of Whitehead's and Russell's PM
provides a contextual definition
like the theory of descriptions."
How? Well,
"One of Russell's early diagnoses of the
paradoxes was that they showed that
classes could not be objects. Indeed he
seems to have come across his paradox
of the class of all classes that are not members of
themselves by applying Cantor's argument to show that there are more classes of objects than objects."
Linksy goes on:
"Hence, Russell concludes that classes can not be objects."
"Inspired by the theory of descriptions, Russell proposes
that to say something beta of the class of alphas --
BETA{x: ALPHAx}
-- is to say that there is some property beta coextensive with (1 of the same things as) alpha such that gamma is beta."
"Extensionality of sets is thus derivable, rather than postulated: if alpha and gamma are co-extensive then anything true of"
{x: ALPHAx}
"will be true of {x: GAMMAx}."
"Features of sets then follow from the features of the logic of properties, the "ramified theory of types"."
Russell echoing Bentham:
"Because classes would seem to be individuals of some sort, but on analysis are found not to be, Russell speaks of them as "logical fictions", an expression which echoes Jeremy Bentham's notion of a "legal fiction"."
"Because statements attributing a property to particular classes are analyzed by existential sentences saying that there is some propositional function having that property, this construction should not be seen as avoiding ontological commitment entirely, but rather of reducing classes to propositional functions."
"The properties of classes are really properties of propositional functions and for every class said to have a property there really is some propositional function having that property."
Linsky then draws from other illustrations.
"For other constructions such as propositions a contextual definition is not provided."
"In any case, constructions do not appear as the referents of logically proper names, and so by that account are not part of the fundamental "furniture" of the world."
J. WISDOM on constructions.
"Early critical discussions of constructions, such as John Wisdom's, stressed the contrast between logically proper names, which do refer, and constructions, which were thus seen as ontologically innocent."
Linsky notes:
"Beginning with The Problems of Philosophy (1912), Russell turns repeatedly to the problem of matter."
"Part of the problem is to find a refution of Berkeleyan idealism, of showing how the existence and real nature of matter can be proved."
"In Problems Russell argues that matter is a well supported hypothesis that explains our experiences. Matter is known only indirectly, "by description", as the cause, whatever it may be, of our sense data, which we know "by acquaintance". This is the notion of hypothesis which Russell contrasts with construction in the passage above."
"Russell saw an analogy between the case of simply hypothesizing the existence of numbers with certain properties, those described by axioms, and hypothesizing the existence of matter. While we distinguish the certain knowledge we may have of mathematical entities from the contingent knowledge of material objects, Russell says that there are certain "neat" features of matter which are just too tidy to have turned out by accident. Examples include the most general spatiotemporal properties of objects, that no two can occupy the same place at the same time, and so on. Material objects are now to be seen as collections of sense data. Influenced by William James, Russell defended a "neutral monism" by which matter and minds were both to be constructed from sense data, but in different ways. Intuitively, the sense data occuring as they do "in" a mind, are material to construct that mind, the sense data derived from an object from different points of view to constructthat object. Russell saw some support for this in the theory of relativity, and the fundumental importance of frames of reference in the new physics."
"These prominent examples are not the only use of the notion of construction in Russell's thought."
"In Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica the multiple relation theory of propositions is introduced by saying that propositions are "incomplete symbols"."
"Russell's multiple relation theory, that he held from 1910 to 1919 or so, argued that the constitituents of propositions, say
i. Desdemona loves Cassio
which is 0, are unified in a way that does not make it the case that they constitute a fact by themselves."
"Those constituents occur only in the context of beliefs, say,
ii. Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio.
"The real fact consists of a relation of
Belief holding between the constituents
Othello, Desdemona and Cassio."
B(o, d , L, c).
"Because one might also have believed
propositions of other structures, such as --
"B (o, F, a)"
there need to be many such relations B, thus
the "multiple" relation theory."
"Like the construction of numbers, this
construction abstracts out what a
number of occurrences of a belief have in common,
a believer and various objects in a certain order."
"The analysis also makes the proposition an incomplete symbol because there is no constituent in the analysis of
`x believes that p'
that corresponds to `p'"
"Russell also suggests that propositional functions are logical constructions when he says that they are "nothing", but "nonetheless important for that" (1918:96)."
"Propositional functions are abstracted from their values, propositions. The propositional function
x is human.
is abstracted from its values
Socrates is human
Plato is human.
etc.
"Viewing propositional functions as constructions from propositions which are in turn constructions by the multiple relation theory helps to make sense of the theory of types of propositional functions in Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica".
"The notion of "incomplete symbol" does not make as much sense as "construction" when applied to propositional functions and propositions."
"This usage requires a broadening of the notion."
---- From Russell to Carnap, Grice, and beyond:
"The notion of logical construction
had a great impact on
analytic philosophy."
"One line of influence was via the notion
of a contextual definition, or paraphrase, intended
to minimize ontological commitment and to
be a model of philosophical analysis."
"The distinction between the surface appearance of definite descriptions, as singular terms, and the fully analyzed sentences from which they seem to disappear was seen as a model for making problematic notions disappear upon analysis. The theory of descriptions has been viewed as a paradigm of philosophical analysis."
CARNAP EXPLICITLY CITED BY LINSKY:
"A more technical strand in
analytic philosophy was
influenced by the construction of
matter."
Or, as I prefer, 'physicalism' out of 'phenomenalism'.
Linsky writes:
"Carnap was attempted to carry out the
construction of matter from
sense data."
--- R. B. JONES WILL HAVE LOADS TO SAY ABOUT THAT:
i. It's a pragmatist prescription. Carnap sees phenomenalism as more primitive, but there are prior and prior.
ii. Etc.
----
Linsky goes on:
"Later Nelson Goodman continued the project."
And popularised in Oxford with reviews of "Structure of Appearance" by Dummett. Grice would similarly speak of "The syntax of illusion".
Linsky goes on:
"More generally, however, the use of
set-theoretic constructions became
widespread among philosophers,
and continues in the construction of set-theoretic models,
both in the sense of logic where they model formal theories, and as objects of interest in their own right."
--- And then there's Grice.
All in all, we congratulate Bernard Linsky, recommend interested readers to check his essay from the Stanford site, and report back with any insight as it dwells on our city of eternal truth.
References cited by Linsky include:
Carnap, R. , The Logical Structure of the World & Pseudo Problems in Philosophy, trans. R.George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Goodman, N., The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951.
Russell, B., 1905, "On Denoting", in Robert Marsh, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950 , London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, 39-56.
----1918, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism , D.F.Pears, ed. Lasalle: Open Court, 1985, 35-155.
----1924, "Logical Atomism", in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism , D.F.Pears, ed., Lasalle: Open Court, 1985, 157-181.
----1912, The Problems of Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprinted 1967.
Whitehead, A.N., and Russell,B.: 1925, Principia Mathematica Vol.I., second ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925.
Wisdom, J., 1931, "Logical Constructions (I.).", Mind , XL , April, 188-216.
Related Entries
Cross-referneces by Stanford: "Russell, Bertrand | Russell's Paradox | definite descriptions | and Carnap, Rudolf"
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Carnap and Grice: Formal and "Ordinary" Language
-- by JLS, of the Grice Club.
THIS IS FURTHER TO Jones's comments on "Grice: effect of Carnap", this blog.
The idea then
Russell,
Carnap
(Hilbert, even)
FORMALISM
.
.
.
\/
Oxford school of
Ordinary Language
Philosophy
(as reaction)
led by Austin (1911-1960)
and upon his demise, Grice (1913-1988).
----
But on the other hand, we should also consider:
-----
"Ordinary language philosophy" as back to 'people's talk' -- versus the technical talk of philosophers. Discomfort with technicisms like 'sense datum', even. In this case, the reaction may go via Moore and Cambridge.
Strand 3, I think, in Grice, concerns this.
The idea: that philosophers were starting to talk 'paradoxes'. Malcolm came to the defense of the ordinary man, -- and Grice was obsessed with this.
If this second 'interpretation' of "ordinary language philosophy" is furthered, one see yet another connection with Carnap.
Carnap wants to say that philosophers indeed talk 'paradoxes'. -- "The nothing noths", etc. So, there is a need to get sense back to the TOPIC of philosophy -- philosophy has been contaminated, and corrupted, in its idioms, by philosophers. We need to go back to 'ordinary' talk of "know", "believe", "is", "may", "ought", etc., rather than philosophise abstractedly on the non-naturalistic fallacy, say.
THIS IS FURTHER TO Jones's comments on "Grice: effect of Carnap", this blog.
The idea then
Russell,
Carnap
(Hilbert, even)
FORMALISM
.
.
.
\/
Oxford school of
Ordinary Language
Philosophy
(as reaction)
led by Austin (1911-1960)
and upon his demise, Grice (1913-1988).
----
But on the other hand, we should also consider:
-----
"Ordinary language philosophy" as back to 'people's talk' -- versus the technical talk of philosophers. Discomfort with technicisms like 'sense datum', even. In this case, the reaction may go via Moore and Cambridge.
Strand 3, I think, in Grice, concerns this.
The idea: that philosophers were starting to talk 'paradoxes'. Malcolm came to the defense of the ordinary man, -- and Grice was obsessed with this.
If this second 'interpretation' of "ordinary language philosophy" is furthered, one see yet another connection with Carnap.
Carnap wants to say that philosophers indeed talk 'paradoxes'. -- "The nothing noths", etc. So, there is a need to get sense back to the TOPIC of philosophy -- philosophy has been contaminated, and corrupted, in its idioms, by philosophers. We need to go back to 'ordinary' talk of "know", "believe", "is", "may", "ought", etc., rather than philosophise abstractedly on the non-naturalistic fallacy, say.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Grice as the Effect of Carnap: "Language?"
---
Jones is mainly responsible for Chapter 2. I have a say in Chapter 3.
I follow Jones in being Sellars/Yeatman. These historians of England are prone of using the form:
"... was the cause of ..."
E.g. The Zulu war: Cause of the Zulu War: the Zulus.
----
So, we should give proper consideration to this idea that Grice was the effect of Carnap.
Allow us to explain.
Everyone who reads a manual of 20th century philosophy -- as an undergraduate I was fascinated by such manuals and soon enough got wedded to Austin and his school -- knows that 'post-war Oxford philosophy', due to the bad influence of Ayer, had turned its efforts to "NATURAL" language, like English, 'ordinary language'.
HAD CARNAP NOT TAKEN The formalist approach seriously -- in his influential books of the 1930s and 1940s, Austin and Grice, in the postwar period -- they led the 'school' -- would never have gotten so 'enthusiastic' about it.
It was a slogan. "We care for ordinary language here". Implicating: not for what people like Carnap CALL 'language' but isn't ('formal language').
Oxford always had an anti-Cantabrigensis strand. They couldn't just cope with Whitehead/Russell's Principia Mathematica. Anyone familiar with the history of logic in Oxford in the 20th century (starting with J. C. Wilson, Statement and Inference) notes that formalism never set foot, or got anchored in the dreaming spires.
---
So, indeed Carnap was the cause of Grice.
--- But the more one learns of Grice, the more one detects his 'irreverent conservative' and REACTIONARY strand. He, among the Oxonians, was the one that DID want to play "Symbolo". He would NOT disregard 'formal language' as a Carnapian invention, but would rather look for the generalities. Things that could be said about BOTH formal languages AND natural languages. Things that could illuminate BOTH the ordinary-language philosopher (as they illuminated Strawson, who credits Grice in his vademecum of 'informal logic' (1952)) AND the formalist.
Alas, the Carnap-Quine interface was not running along smooth tracks, for Quine had close associations with the post-war Oxford movement. After a polemic with J. L. Austin of rather bitter overtones, Quine felt more at ease with Grice, and they would lecture together in Oxford (or rather Quine had a say as a visiting scholar).
So, with Quine in Oxford (who had learned it all from Carnap), Grice found fodder for his thoughts. For he could hold a conversation on natural language with someone who knew of "formal" "language".
By the death of Austin, ordinary-language philosophy was over. Logic had taken a firm place in all academic teaching and, more importantly, the newer generations noted that Austin had been incomparable. Nobody could have replaced him. The demise of Austin meant the demise of ordinary-language philosophy.
But Grice of course survived the 1960s, and this decade and half of the 1970s see him at his formal best.
It was circa 1978, mainly due to his close association with his former student Judith Baker, that he turned to other areas of philosophy, which, as he notes, were "less amenable" for the type of formalism he revelled in.
This is the 'rhetoric' Grice. The Grice of the florid prose. BUT ALWAYS accompanied by a reference or two to the days that formed him, and the FIGURE that helped form him more than anyone else: Austin.
Jones is mainly responsible for Chapter 2. I have a say in Chapter 3.
I follow Jones in being Sellars/Yeatman. These historians of England are prone of using the form:
"... was the cause of ..."
E.g. The Zulu war: Cause of the Zulu War: the Zulus.
----
So, we should give proper consideration to this idea that Grice was the effect of Carnap.
Allow us to explain.
Everyone who reads a manual of 20th century philosophy -- as an undergraduate I was fascinated by such manuals and soon enough got wedded to Austin and his school -- knows that 'post-war Oxford philosophy', due to the bad influence of Ayer, had turned its efforts to "NATURAL" language, like English, 'ordinary language'.
HAD CARNAP NOT TAKEN The formalist approach seriously -- in his influential books of the 1930s and 1940s, Austin and Grice, in the postwar period -- they led the 'school' -- would never have gotten so 'enthusiastic' about it.
It was a slogan. "We care for ordinary language here". Implicating: not for what people like Carnap CALL 'language' but isn't ('formal language').
Oxford always had an anti-Cantabrigensis strand. They couldn't just cope with Whitehead/Russell's Principia Mathematica. Anyone familiar with the history of logic in Oxford in the 20th century (starting with J. C. Wilson, Statement and Inference) notes that formalism never set foot, or got anchored in the dreaming spires.
---
So, indeed Carnap was the cause of Grice.
--- But the more one learns of Grice, the more one detects his 'irreverent conservative' and REACTIONARY strand. He, among the Oxonians, was the one that DID want to play "Symbolo". He would NOT disregard 'formal language' as a Carnapian invention, but would rather look for the generalities. Things that could be said about BOTH formal languages AND natural languages. Things that could illuminate BOTH the ordinary-language philosopher (as they illuminated Strawson, who credits Grice in his vademecum of 'informal logic' (1952)) AND the formalist.
Alas, the Carnap-Quine interface was not running along smooth tracks, for Quine had close associations with the post-war Oxford movement. After a polemic with J. L. Austin of rather bitter overtones, Quine felt more at ease with Grice, and they would lecture together in Oxford (or rather Quine had a say as a visiting scholar).
So, with Quine in Oxford (who had learned it all from Carnap), Grice found fodder for his thoughts. For he could hold a conversation on natural language with someone who knew of "formal" "language".
By the death of Austin, ordinary-language philosophy was over. Logic had taken a firm place in all academic teaching and, more importantly, the newer generations noted that Austin had been incomparable. Nobody could have replaced him. The demise of Austin meant the demise of ordinary-language philosophy.
But Grice of course survived the 1960s, and this decade and half of the 1970s see him at his formal best.
It was circa 1978, mainly due to his close association with his former student Judith Baker, that he turned to other areas of philosophy, which, as he notes, were "less amenable" for the type of formalism he revelled in.
This is the 'rhetoric' Grice. The Grice of the florid prose. BUT ALWAYS accompanied by a reference or two to the days that formed him, and the FIGURE that helped form him more than anyone else: Austin.
Strands and Monsters
----
We are considering a few monsters (were they ten? -- no they were TWELVE -- Grice speaks of a twelfth-fold antipathy for "Minimalism" --
things like
Nominalism
Extensionalism
Physicalism
Phenomenalism
Mechanism
Scepticism
etc.
----
On the other hand there are 16 strands in Grice. He himself dwells with 8 in WoW, but we have duplicated them to allow for the richness of his input other than in WoW.
Now:
The question.
Hypothesis.
FOR EACH STRAND, as per CarnapGrice pdf by JonesSperanza, there is a monster.
Consider
Strand 1: Philosophy of perception. The causal problem. What monster is here involved? Mechanism. Also "Physicalism" and "Phenomenalism" for Grice notes that a thesis of the strand involves the alleged reduction of a material-object statement to its sense-datum counterparts.
----
It's easier to proceed with strands other than the ones Grice recognised.
Strand 9, for example. Value. What is the monster here? Positivism. I.e. the idea that value does NOT belong in the world.
Strand 10, for example. Reason. What is the monster here? Scepticism. Because the concern with reason in Grice is an attempt to bridge Hume's fork, and that there IS such a thing as 'practical reason'.
----
So we see that for each strand, for it to have relevance, we need to identify it or mate it with a monster (or countermonster).
Grice was clear about the logic of this:
He was intolerant of intolerance.
He thought that to proscribe value, or practical reason, or abstract entities, or intention, or free will, or absolute value, or pragmatics, etc. form a philosophical explanation involved a reduction: a 'minimalism'. We were offered explanations which were more MINIMAL than they needed be.
Example.
Strand 9: value. Monster: Positivism, Scepticism. There is no value in the world. It is a world of matters of fact. So the minimalist explanation, alla Hume, goes that what is of value reduces to a 'desire'. The 'ought' becomes an 'is' -- the 'is' of desire. Just by adopting 'value' as a 'primitive' though, or a possible explanans, we avoid the reduction.
As a philosopher, like Carnap, Grice was onto the foundations. So he would not have been happy with, say, introducing abstract entities, value, pragmatic, practical reason just by fiat.
His philosophy is one of 'constructivism'. He proposes so-called 'rational reconstructions'. To even TALK about them in a world transfigured by Jacques Derrida and his ideal of de-constructionaism is enough to see how conservatively irreverent (or irreverently conservative) Grice, and we trust, Carnap, could be.
We are considering a few monsters (were they ten? -- no they were TWELVE -- Grice speaks of a twelfth-fold antipathy for "Minimalism" --
things like
Nominalism
Extensionalism
Physicalism
Phenomenalism
Mechanism
Scepticism
etc.
----
On the other hand there are 16 strands in Grice. He himself dwells with 8 in WoW, but we have duplicated them to allow for the richness of his input other than in WoW.
Now:
The question.
Hypothesis.
FOR EACH STRAND, as per CarnapGrice pdf by JonesSperanza, there is a monster.
Consider
Strand 1: Philosophy of perception. The causal problem. What monster is here involved? Mechanism. Also "Physicalism" and "Phenomenalism" for Grice notes that a thesis of the strand involves the alleged reduction of a material-object statement to its sense-datum counterparts.
----
It's easier to proceed with strands other than the ones Grice recognised.
Strand 9, for example. Value. What is the monster here? Positivism. I.e. the idea that value does NOT belong in the world.
Strand 10, for example. Reason. What is the monster here? Scepticism. Because the concern with reason in Grice is an attempt to bridge Hume's fork, and that there IS such a thing as 'practical reason'.
----
So we see that for each strand, for it to have relevance, we need to identify it or mate it with a monster (or countermonster).
Grice was clear about the logic of this:
He was intolerant of intolerance.
He thought that to proscribe value, or practical reason, or abstract entities, or intention, or free will, or absolute value, or pragmatics, etc. form a philosophical explanation involved a reduction: a 'minimalism'. We were offered explanations which were more MINIMAL than they needed be.
Example.
Strand 9: value. Monster: Positivism, Scepticism. There is no value in the world. It is a world of matters of fact. So the minimalist explanation, alla Hume, goes that what is of value reduces to a 'desire'. The 'ought' becomes an 'is' -- the 'is' of desire. Just by adopting 'value' as a 'primitive' though, or a possible explanans, we avoid the reduction.
As a philosopher, like Carnap, Grice was onto the foundations. So he would not have been happy with, say, introducing abstract entities, value, pragmatic, practical reason just by fiat.
His philosophy is one of 'constructivism'. He proposes so-called 'rational reconstructions'. To even TALK about them in a world transfigured by Jacques Derrida and his ideal of de-constructionaism is enough to see how conservatively irreverent (or irreverently conservative) Grice, and we trust, Carnap, could be.
Carnap Idiom, Grice Idiom, Common Idiom
Roger Bishop Jones is doing some excellent job. In "Strand 5" for the Grice Club he proposed some 'correspondence rules', as it were, to read Grice via Carnap, and vice versa.
That is precisely what we need.
--- It sounds exaggerating, but it may not be.
Grice considered changes of idioms as pressing and topical when it came to the "longitudinal unity of philosophy". I.e. how to make sense of Locke's rather florid prose (hey!) in terms of mid-twentieth century philosophy, as when Grice was writing?
---
Yet, he is optimistic: he sees that while the idioms change, the topics remain. And that the change of idiom is the easiest first thing to do.
----
What does Jones propose.
Well,
---
There is "meaning". Qua noun. As when we say, "the meaning of this". Here Carnap uses "Sinn". Recall that his mother tongue was German. Grice prefers the verb, '... means ...'. Is this the 'sense'? We don't think so. For Grice there is indeed more to meaning than sense. This is not just the chiffchaff, the peripheral meaning. Even within 'sense' we need some caveats.
There's Grice's "implication". Does Carnap use anything like that? To refer to any 'connotation' that an expression carrying this or that 'Sinn' may ALSO carry into the bargain? We do not know. "Implikation" is not possibly a word he used.
-----
There's Pragmatik. Carnap used this, and it had been coined, well after Carnap's main developments on this, by C. W. Morris. Does Grice use 'pragmatic'? Yes, as we point out in CarnapGrice pfd [by JonesSperanza], Strand 6, Grice says, is concerned with what he then calls the logical-pragmatic distinction, as applied to 'inference'.
---- As for the 'intension' of "pragmatic", it is best to stick with Morris's ideal which is maintained by Carnap (Intro. to Semantics): pragmatic is that branch of semeiotic that refers to the relation between a sign and its user. Is this what Grice has in mind? We think so.
Then there's truth-conditions. Both Carnap and Grice here use the correct terms. Carnap uses "Warheit", which is the abstract term for Truth. But he is well aware of the developments of logicism, so he can use the German expressios for 'truth-value', that Grice uses, 'truth-function', that Grice uses, and 'truth-condition' (that Wittgenstein used).
Psychological attitude. Does Carnap use anything like this? He refers to 'belief'. Recall that Carnap had ceased to be a German-language philosopher to become an English-language one. What would 'belief' be in German? "Glauben" is to believe. Does German allow for the richness of formations that Grice can play with this here: 'to accept', 'to judge', 'to believe', 'to will', 'to intend'. There is the bread and butter for Grice. What is the bread and butter for Carnap?
"connective". This was a topic for Grice. What does Carnap say about this? Here, strictly, a connective is a truth-functional dyadic operator. Does Carnap ever consider the amalgams and the counterparts in German for them?
I propose:
'conjunktion' --- "und"
'disjunktion' --- "oder"
'conditional' --- "ob"
----
What about 'all' and 'some'. Do they carry the same implicatures in German.
'universal quantifier' -- "alle"
'existential quantifier' --- "nicht alle"?
--
What about the iota operator:
ix ---- "der". Does Carnap ever consider that while 'the' (which obsessed Russell -- the king of France is bald) translates as 'der', 'die' and 'das' in German? Does this matter for the introduction of 'identity'?
"ethics" -- Carnap's world is a factual world. He inherited from Witters the idea that 'value' issues are not the concern of the philosopher. But Grice is ALWAYS talking 'value'.
---- Etc.
But do not despair! There IS a common ground.
That is precisely what we need.
--- It sounds exaggerating, but it may not be.
Grice considered changes of idioms as pressing and topical when it came to the "longitudinal unity of philosophy". I.e. how to make sense of Locke's rather florid prose (hey!) in terms of mid-twentieth century philosophy, as when Grice was writing?
---
Yet, he is optimistic: he sees that while the idioms change, the topics remain. And that the change of idiom is the easiest first thing to do.
----
What does Jones propose.
Well,
---
There is "meaning". Qua noun. As when we say, "the meaning of this". Here Carnap uses "Sinn". Recall that his mother tongue was German. Grice prefers the verb, '... means ...'. Is this the 'sense'? We don't think so. For Grice there is indeed more to meaning than sense. This is not just the chiffchaff, the peripheral meaning. Even within 'sense' we need some caveats.
There's Grice's "implication". Does Carnap use anything like that? To refer to any 'connotation' that an expression carrying this or that 'Sinn' may ALSO carry into the bargain? We do not know. "Implikation" is not possibly a word he used.
-----
There's Pragmatik. Carnap used this, and it had been coined, well after Carnap's main developments on this, by C. W. Morris. Does Grice use 'pragmatic'? Yes, as we point out in CarnapGrice pfd [by JonesSperanza], Strand 6, Grice says, is concerned with what he then calls the logical-pragmatic distinction, as applied to 'inference'.
---- As for the 'intension' of "pragmatic", it is best to stick with Morris's ideal which is maintained by Carnap (Intro. to Semantics): pragmatic is that branch of semeiotic that refers to the relation between a sign and its user. Is this what Grice has in mind? We think so.
Then there's truth-conditions. Both Carnap and Grice here use the correct terms. Carnap uses "Warheit", which is the abstract term for Truth. But he is well aware of the developments of logicism, so he can use the German expressios for 'truth-value', that Grice uses, 'truth-function', that Grice uses, and 'truth-condition' (that Wittgenstein used).
Psychological attitude. Does Carnap use anything like this? He refers to 'belief'. Recall that Carnap had ceased to be a German-language philosopher to become an English-language one. What would 'belief' be in German? "Glauben" is to believe. Does German allow for the richness of formations that Grice can play with this here: 'to accept', 'to judge', 'to believe', 'to will', 'to intend'. There is the bread and butter for Grice. What is the bread and butter for Carnap?
"connective". This was a topic for Grice. What does Carnap say about this? Here, strictly, a connective is a truth-functional dyadic operator. Does Carnap ever consider the amalgams and the counterparts in German for them?
I propose:
'conjunktion' --- "und"
'disjunktion' --- "oder"
'conditional' --- "ob"
----
What about 'all' and 'some'. Do they carry the same implicatures in German.
'universal quantifier' -- "alle"
'existential quantifier' --- "nicht alle"?
--
What about the iota operator:
ix ---- "der". Does Carnap ever consider that while 'the' (which obsessed Russell -- the king of France is bald) translates as 'der', 'die' and 'das' in German? Does this matter for the introduction of 'identity'?
"ethics" -- Carnap's world is a factual world. He inherited from Witters the idea that 'value' issues are not the concern of the philosopher. But Grice is ALWAYS talking 'value'.
---- Etc.
But do not despair! There IS a common ground.
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