R. B. Jones proposes to track the strands and monsters in Carnap and Grice with the aid of
WLOG.
We shall use the definition provided by
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/without_loss_of_generality
WLOG:
"[To] mak[e] a constraining assumption [A]
that makes it clear how to apply [an otherwise
specific proof [P], but explicitly
performed under [A]
to the general case where P is
unconstrained by [A]."
We propose to apply WLOG to the 12 monsters (M1-12 -- since they are all forms of Minimalism) vis a vis the 16 strands we identified in the philosophies of Carnap and Grice. Tomorrow.
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Just joking! Of course it is TODAY!
ReplyDeleteAs a proof, unconstrained, see the CarnapGrice pdf document by JonesSperanza as it stands (or sits) in Jones's page. It's chapter 4, section 5.
How does the WLOG work?
ReplyDeleteJones is right: We WANT generality. What is the good of a monster, or a strand, unless it's general.
The idea of genus/species, or species-genus, is Aristotelian, and metaphysic at best!
Why DO we want 'generality'? As Jones notes, mathematics is abstract -- 'theoretical' science, as we understand it, is 'abstract'. It's only applied science that is empirical.
Ontology (rather than metaphysics), at its basics, is the general theory of being. Where even 'being' is understood very liberal alla Frege 'predicate-calculus' were EXISTENCE is NOT a predicate!
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As Jones notes, we have to be careful here. We are not interested in APPLICATIONS of metaphysical or ontological schemes to (a) philosophers in particular -- Aristotle, Carnap, Grice, what have you -- or to (b) a portion of a language, be it formal or natural.
No, we are here to provide programmatic notes on a programme! So suppose, as we suggest, we WANT to see the world as 'mechanical'. This would be a minimalism ("Reductionism", or indeed, "Mechanism"). As Jones notes, by rejecting "Mechanism", Grice is enbracing a monster himself. His anti-minimalism is intolerant. Intolerant of intolerance. This arises from an unwillingness to engage at a deeper level "without loss of generality".
What the Mechanist is doing then, is, explaining the Kosmos as a mechanical entity. The universe of discourse will be just items in that mechanism and where anything outside it will be 'accountable' in mechanical terms. This is the 'assumption' that makes it manifest that, without it, mechanism would be plain wrong.
But consider its negative dogmatic counterpart. "Pathetism". The pathetic fallacy is the fallacy of ascribing 'ends' or 'finality' where it does not belong. A phenomenon (metereologial, say) which is perfectly explained, in nomological-deductive terms, as Jones has it, alla Mechanism is rendered otiose by explaining it in analogy with phenomena of a completely different matter.
In this case, a defense of Mechanism can be put forward that CAN NOT be done for its alternative, "Pathetism". For the Mechanist is proposing, suggesting, or 'deciding' to view all phenomena as 'mechanical' on the assumption that only physical causation will provide their underlying logic. To 'save the phenomena' by invoking a transnatural force (alla phlogiston theory) is just a repudiation of the parsimony that Occam's razor brands, and we want, as it were, to be on the cutting edge.